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ABSTRACT 
Sulimani, Foday A.S. M.A., International-Comparative Politics Program, Wright State 
University, 2007. The False Promise of International Financial Institutions in Building 
Stable Democracies in Third World Countries.  
 
 
The available literature on the democratic process in third world countries shows 
that there is a strong correlation between the strength of a country’s economic and social 
infrastructure and the successful promotion of democratic principles. It is my assumption 
that democracy can not be established without strong economic and social infrastructures. 
Furthermore, the current aid programs as operated by international financial institutions 
(IFIs) like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) give false hope to third world countries 
that fail to develop sound socioeconomic policies and yet want to establish stable 
democratic societies. Are neo-liberal policies advocated by international financial 
institutions necessarily associated with successful democratization? Is a strong economic 
and social infrastructure a necessary prerequisite in order for neo-liberal policies to be 
correlated with strong democracies?  
Two third world countries that have received aid from international financial 
institutions are Ghana and Mauritius. A case study of these countries will help to 
determine if the success of neo-liberal aid programs in promoting democracy is strongly 
correlated with the strength of that country’s pre-existing infrastructure when the aid 
program begins. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Amartya Sen (1999) rephrased the debate about democracy’s global appeal. A 
country, he asserts, does not have to be deemed “fit for democracy;” rather, the debate 
should be over whether a country would become “fit through democracy” (Sen, 1999, 4). 
Scholars see democracy as the panacea for the social, economic, and political problems in 
many third world countries. They cite democracy’s intrinsic value, its instrumental value, 
and its constructive importance as contributors to fair distribution of wealth, high levels 
of civic participation, high per capita income, and high levels of education in any 
country.1 These factors are also essential for building stable societies in which economic 
and political liberties are guaranteed and income inequality is substantially reduced. 
In third world countries, over a billion people live on less than $1 a day with 
three-quarters of a billion people malnourished and dying from diseases that are readily 
preventable in developed countries.2 In sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth Africa), where 
most of this underdevelopment persists, 77% of countries are either not-free or partly-
free.3 The social, economic and political problems in third world countries have given 
rise to civil wars, abuse of civil and political liberties, high infant mortality and illiteracy 
rates, and persistent overall lack of economic and political development. In response to 
these prevailing issues, international financial institutions have advocated aid programs 
broadly known as structural adjustment programs (SAPs) which are meant to promote 
neo-liberal economic policies, build strong social institutions, and promote good 
governance.4 Yet, why have aid programs designed by international financial institutions 
                                                 
1 Sen (1999); Lipset (1959) 
2 IMF (2006) 
3 Freedom House (2006) 
4 Economic growth is usually measured by an increase in real GDP terms (Dreher, 2006; Ndulu and 
O’Connell, 1999; Burnside and Dollar, 2000). IFIs promote economic growth through conditionalities 
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failed to produce their socioeconomic and political development objectives in third world 
countries? Is a strong economic and social infrastructure a necessary prerequisite for 
neo-liberal policies to be correlated with the development of strong democracies?5   
I agree with scholars who question whether there is a positive correlation between 
foreign aid and development. Performing research on the relationship between foreign aid 
and development is important in light of the fact that most aid comes in the form of loans 
and the combined debts of the world’s poorest countries continue to rise and the majority 
of people in these countries live in sub-standard conditions. As of 2002, the world’s 
poorest countries owed international financial institutions over $523 billion.6 The 
majority of these debts were incurred ostensibly to build economic and social structures 
that would alleviate poverty and thereby build the foundations for sustainable 
development. But too often these funds have not been used for this purpose, and many of 
these countries continue to lack sound infrastructures. It is my assumption that strong 
economic and social infrastructures would create the right conditions for democratization.  
Contrary to the utopian dream of attaining socioeconomic development through 
foreign aid, much of the literature on democratization suggests that democracy can only 
be established where there are strong growth- and development-oriented policies.7 That 
is, endogenous factors (infrastructure) are crucial to the attainment of stable democracies 
much more than exogenous factors (foreign aid).8 How can poor countries attain the 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Dreher, 2006). Economic growth should eventually lead to development. I measure economic 
development in terms of improvements in education, health, industrial development, sanitation, and other 
social welfare services (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski et al, 2000). Development involves the progress towards 
sound infrastructures. I argue that even when SAPs lead to economic growth, they fail to develop the 
socioeconomic infrastructures that promote democratization. See also IMF (2006).  
5 Socioeconomic infrastructures refer to a country’s level of income distribution, education, social welfare, 
healthcare, communications, transportation, and sanitation services.  
6 Shah (2005) 
7 Nsouli (2000); Burnside and Dollar (2000); Diamond et al. (1987) 
8 Modernization theories opened the debate about the relative importance of exogenous and endogenous 
factors in democratization. Scholars like Diamond et al, 1987; Lipset, 1959; Przeworski et al, 2000; Huber 
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socioeconomic and political development that is necessary for building stable societies? 
Without sound infrastructures already in place, are the neo-liberal policies advocated by 
international financial institutions likely to be associated with successful democratization 
 
1.1. The Research  
Why have aid programs operated by international institutions failed to produce 
their socioeconomic and political development objectives in third world countries? 
International financial institutions maintain that aid programs in the form of SAPs are 
meant to promote economic growth and political development in the recipient country. 
Lipset (1959), Przeworski et al., (2000), and Huber et al., (1993) have conducted studies 
that show a strong correlation between economic development and democratization.9 The 
aid programs by international institutions have failed to positively impact socioeconomic 
development in many third world countries, especially in Africa, and thus, failed to 
promote democratic consolidations.10 Are aid programs significantly more likely to 
contribute to socioeconomic development and therefore democratization in countries with 
strong, preexisting social and economic infrastructures? That is, is a strong economic and 
social infrastructure a necessary prerequisite in order for neo-liberal policies to be 
correlated with strong democracies? 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
et al, 1993; and Carothers, 2004 have produced important literature on this issue. My research will focus 
primarily on foreign aids that are conditioned on the implementation of SAPs. 
9 Lipset’s study (1959) shows a direct correlation between economic development and democracy. 
Przeworski et al (2000) determined that democracies survive in countries that are developed. Huber et al 
(1993) argue that the changes caused by industrialization and urbanization are crucial to democratization. 
10 Stephen Knack (2004), Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy? Burnside and Dollar (2000), Aid, 
Policies, and Growth. 
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Sub-questions 
1. Which aspects of infrastructures are most or least important to 
democratization? 
2. Can countries sustain economic growth and political development without 
sound infrastructures? 
3. Can sound infrastructures come after democratization?  
4. What modifications need to be enacted for structural adjustment programs to 
be more beneficial to citizens of borrowing countries? 
 
1.2.  Review of the Literature 
Since the 1980s scholars have paid attention to poverty related issues and have 
provided policy objectives that could help alleviate the lack of economic growth and 
political development in third world countries. The prevalent poverty in Africa poses 
problems for the world community as a whole. Many scholars see democracy as the 
panacea for curing the widespread poverty in that region. As such, many international 
financial institutions have tailored their aid programs to reflect neo-liberal policies that 
are conducive to democratization. Since many third world countries largely depend on 
foreign aid to provide basic services for their citizens, they are forced to adopt the 
policies set forth by international institutions with hopes of achieving socioeconomic 
development. However, empirical evidence has shown little correlation between aid 
programs and the development of education, health, sanitation, and other social welfare 
services.11 Can aid programs (as they currently exist) build stable democracies in third 
world countries?  
                                                 
11 See Knack (2004); Goldsmith (2001) 
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I define democracy in terms of Dahl’s (1971) “polyarchy” which suggests three 
essential conditions that are required for a country to be considered democratic. First, 
there should be meaningful competition among individuals and organized groups for 
political power. Second, there should be a “high inclusive” level of political participation 
in selecting leaders and determining policies. Third, a level of civil and political liberties 
must exist; in other words, there should be freedom of expression, freedom of the press, 
and freedom of associations. 
Scholars (Lipset, 1959; Diamond et al, 1987; Przeworski et al, 2000) have 
identified socioeconomic growth as a strong variable that is causally related to transitions 
to democracy and/or building strong democracies. I measure a country’s socioeconomic 
development in terms of its infrastructure. That is, its level of education, healthcare, 
sanitation, welfare, and income distribution. My study focuses on aid programs widely 
known as structural adjustment programs (SAPs) which impact a recipient country’s 
policies on education, healthcare, sanitation, welfare, and income distributions. There is 
much debate in the literature over how SAPs impact the above variables vis-à-vis 
socioeconomic growth, political institutions, and building state capacity. 
 
Socioeconomic Growth 
According to international financial institutions the conditionalities placed on loan 
packages are intended to jumpstart socioeconomic development by stimulating economic 
growth.12 Proponents of IMF conditionalities argue that measures like SAPs are intended 
to promote responsible economic policies in borrowing countries. Conditionalities have 
been used as tools to promote economic and political liberalization. It is argued that 
conditionalities influence good governance in countries where bad government policies 
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have led to economic stagnation and decline.13 For example, World Bank studies in the 
1980s indicate that the improved governance rule stressed by international financial 
institutions produced market reforms which sweep away “the economically unproductive 
clientele networks and government-enabled rents” that impede democratization 
(Sandbrook, 2000, 76). Conditionalities that are placed on recipient countries of foreign 
aid, in a way, ensure fiscal accountability and improve on economic performance.14
Other scholars (Anunobi, 1992; Pankhurst, 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000) see 
debt and the structural adjustment programs imposed by IFIs as key elements 
undermining efforts to achieve sustainable development in African countries. The IMF 
and World Bank’s policy conditions reduce the wages for workers in the recipient 
countries, while ensuring larger profits of multinational corporations. For example, the 
macroeconomic policies which were implemented in countries like Sudan and Zambia in 
the late 1970s led to high inflation rates that adversely impacted the middle and low 
income groups, and the rural populations.15
Diamond et al. (1987) suggest that it is sound policies and honest administrations 
that promote economic performance rather than conditionalities or even the natural 
resource endowment of a country. For example, many African countries have generous 
amounts of mineral resources, but few match the consistent growth performance of 
Botswana. Underlying Botswana’s performance is not conditionalities, but sound policies 
and effective management. Some critics of conditionalities see it as deliberate measures 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Conditionalities were incorporated into the International Monetary Fund’s Charter in September 1968.  
13 Arthur Goldsmith (2001) defines good governance as the capacity of political institutions to produce 
public goods. It involves freedom of the press, competitive elections, maintaining peace, guarantee of laws 
and order, support for economic infrastructure and ensuring a minimum level of social well-being. 
Diamond et al (1987) link bad government policies to the political situations in Argentina, Chile, Peru, and 
Uruguay where (between 1950s and 1980s) “import-substitution and sharply pendular policies” promoted 
non-competitive industries that resulted in economic stagnation, political instability and turmoil (Diamond 
et al 1987, 9).   
14 Knack (2004) 
15 Anunobi (1992) 
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employed by Western countries (who hold a disproportionate number of shares and votes 
in these institutions) to keep third world countries in a perpetual state of indebtedness.16
Another argument advanced in favor of foreign aid is that it can indirectly 
promote movements toward democracy by improving on education and increasing per 
capita incomes. Sandbrook (2000) contends that even though the programs of 
macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization imposed by the IMF and the World Bank 
in the 1980s produced riots and demonstrations (by the urban workers and middle class), 
these actions promoted movements that were against authoritarian regimes in many 
African countries. Economic depression discredits authoritarian governments and fosters 
domestic movements.17
Burnside and Dollar (2000) hold a different view; for them, foreign aid “on an 
average has had little impact on growth” (Burnside and Dollar, 2000, 864). Although 
international financial organizations make “good policy and governance” a condition for 
granting aid, their study shows that aid was granted to many countries that did not meet 
the necessary requirements. As such, corrupt governments in Nigeria still secured aid 
from bilateral and multilateral aid donors. They argue that granting loans to corrupt 
governments indirectly enables “bad governance” because, those governments default on 
loan repayments and invite the wrath of sanctions on their countries. Such sanctions lead 
to “mass poverty, unemployment, unsustainable population growth rates, high rate of 
inflation, and the rapidly decreasing ability of the country to feed itself…” (Anunobi, 
1992, 118).   
                                                 
16 Anunobi (1992) 
17 IMF conditionalities in some instances have produced movements against authoritarian regimes as in the 
case of Kenya in the 1980s and 1990s, where civil liberties groups rose up against President Arap Moi’s 
authoritarian regime (Sandbrook 2000, 4). Elsewhere, I observe that in other instances these same 
conditionalities gave rise to authoritarian regimes. For example, the impact of conditionalities in Ghana 
brought about widespread support for Rawlings when he seized power from Limann’s administration in the 
early 1980s (Panford, 1997). 
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Further, the implementation of SAPs in many African countries led to substantial 
decreases in expenditures on programs such as education, sanitation and healthcare. IFIs 
were thus seen as “foreign aggressors or agents of imperialism, whose objectives are to 
undermine the welfare and prosperity of African people” (Pankhurst, 1998, 4). Africa’s 
current debt burden is “more than 200 percent of its exports” and “servicing that debt has 
diverted resources away from essential development programs” (IMF Survey, 1999, 349). 
The impact of IFIs on socioeconomic growth has been the biggest bone of 
contention between scholars who see foreign aid (based on structural adjustment) as the 
necessary route to creating accountability in third world countries, and those who call 
attention to the stifling and unfair nature of such loans. I argue that, loans with or without 
conditions, are not the primary needs in promoting economic growth and political 
development. Any country that lacks the educational capacity, healthy citizenry, and a 
relatively fair distribution of wealth will always be plagued by poverty and strife. Aid 
conditioned on building the infrastructures that affect these variables is the panacea to the 
lack of sustainable development in third world countries.  
 
Political Institutions 
Political institutions play an important role in “shaping the conflict-regulating 
capacity of democratic systems” (Diamond et al, 1987, 12). The incapacity of 
authoritarian regimes to create sustainable development in the 1970s and 1980s was one 
of the reasons advanced by IFIs for adopting reforms that were intended to build and 
strengthen political institutions in recipient countries. Surveys conducted by the World 
Bank during this period identified political factors as major causes for Africa’s economic 
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decline.18 State-interventionist policies, nepotism, and waste prevented economic growth 
and engineered capital flight. Furthermore, the legal systems in these countries which 
failed to safeguard property rights or enforce contracts, discouraged potential 
investment.19 As such, one of IMF’s conditions after the 1980s was that states must 
create an “enabling environment" for investment in the private sector.20
The provision of such an environment involved good governance, in which 
accountability, “transparency and openness in decision-making, the rule of law…” and 
efficient public management were incorporated into government (Sandbrook, 2000, 13). 
For example, the USAID explicitly made democratic governance a condition for 
receiving assistance from them. Sizeable amounts of resources from IFIs have been 
committed to countries that demonstrate good governance in accountability and promote 
the rule of law.21 It is the assumption of these international institutions that 
democratization is the vehicle that could “re-establish the rule of law, open up policy 
debates, reduce governmental waste…enhance accountability, and empower coalitions 
supporting market-based reforms” (Sandbrook, 2000, 13). 
Contrary to the adoption of reforms that promoted good governance, foreign aid 
was still given to untrustworthy leaders who repressed their populations.22 As such, the 
“good governance” condition upon which aid is granted has achieved little political and 
administrative headway. Nicolas van de Walle (former Governor of the World Bank) 
concedes that “aid on balance has been undermining institutional capacity in Africa” 
(Van de Walle cited by Goldsmith, 2001, 123). Further, reduction in state spending on 
necessary commodities like food and medicine, in an effort to “balance the books” with 
                                                 
18 World Bank (1989) 
19 Sandbrook (2000) 
20 World Bank Report (1983) 
21 Knack (2004) 
22 Goldsmith (2001) 
9 
  
IFIs undermined democratically elected governments and in some cases enabled 
repression of citizens. In Zimbabwe for instance, President Mugabe has cited IMF 
conditionalities as the cause of the decline in the state’s capacity to meet the citizens’ 
basic needs.23
Another defining characteristic of democracy is the existence of a medium of 
competition through which political authority is given, civil and political liberties are 
guaranteed, with a free press and the rule of law.24 This function of democracy has 
caused many international financial institutions to include these conditions in aid 
packages. For example, USAID spends more than $700 million a year on democracy 
related programs, including the provision of technical assistance to parliaments, 
judiciaries and political parties, fostering the growth and participation of civil society 
organizations, and monitoring elections.25 In addition, most international financial 
institutions now include, among the conditions attached to grants or loans they give, 
better performance in the areas of civil liberties, the conduct of elections, and respect for 
the rule of law. 
Carothers (2004) questions the effectiveness of foreign aid programs aimed at 
training parliaments and judicial system “in countries with long histories of 
nondemocratic rule and the absence of the rule of law” (Carothers, 2004, 17). Most of 
these programs do not set attainable goals for the time frame and resources available to 
them. Furthermore, the development of effective institutions and a participant civil 
society will thrive better if they are generated from within than from without. Local 
                                                 
23 A central argument of Carothers (2004) in Critical Mission is that, democracy promoters have failed in 
their mission because of disjointed policies that did not create a balance between the needs of the donor and 
recipient countries. This lack of foresight has been the central problem of IFIs. A comprehensive approach 
to promoting sustainable development in third world countries should be preceded by the development of 
sound institutions and infrastructures. See also Pankhurst (1998). 
24 Schumpeter (1976) 
25 Carothers (1999) 
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organizations and institutions that receive technical assistance from foreign donors 
usually lose their domestic credibility. As Carothers puts it, external assistance to 
political processes raises a sensitive question about “what is development versus what is 
deformation of a local political process” (Carothers, 2004, 18). 
There is no quick solution to building an environment that will ensure sustainable 
development. It takes investment in specific sectors in society to produce the right 
institutions that will foster growth and development, and guarantee the rights and liberties 
of citizens. As Lipset (1959) observed, the higher the education in any country, the better 
the chances for producing the institutions that promote economic and political 
liberalization. I agree with him. 
 
State and Society 
Stable democracies usually have governments that govern effectively. That is, in 
such countries state structures are capable of producing economic growth, meet 
distributive demands, and maintain order without restricting liberty.26 For the state to 
perform this role, the state itself must be strengthened. According to the World Bank 
(1997), the reforms advocated by SAPs are actually intended to help states balance their 
responsibilities with their capacity. In other words, states become more effective and 
strong when they can negotiate, implement, and monitor complex agreements with IMF 
and other aid agencies; effectively manage the private sector; resolve infrastructural 
problems that discourage private investment; and mediate the many conflicts within 
society including ethnic, employment, and factional problems which might threaten 
social peace and stability.27
                                                 
26 Diamond et al. (1987) 
27 Sandbrook (2000) 
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The majority of African countries have not experienced this strength because of 
“the general weakness and decline in the effectiveness of state structures in the post-
independence period” (Diamond et al., 1987, 15). In this region, post-independence 
governments (Ghana for example) plundered and personalized state structures to the 
point in which the countries became ungovernable. The good governance approach that is 
been imposed by international financial institutions is intended to produce a 
democratization process that will generate the reforms necessary to turn back the 
damages caused by the above administrative weaknesses.28
Kaufman (1992) sees things differently. According to him, the reforms which 
usually accompany SAPs cut back social expenditures, lower subsidies, and ultimately 
undermine the strength of governments. Furthermore, Engberg-Pederson et al. (1996) 
posit that there is no evidence to suggest any “positive causal link” between the changes 
advocated by international financial institutions and “political pluralism and 
improvements in the observance of human rights” (Engberg-Pedersen et al., 1996, 23).29 
Also, Carothers (2004) argues that some of the policies pursued by international 
institutions undermine human rights issues and inadvertently empower authoritarian rule 
in some regions. Furthermore, in his controversial “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” 
Carothers (2004) discusses some of the faulty assumptions and failures of agencies like 
the USAID in promoting democratic values in recipient countries. The lack of 
understanding of the political climate and history of some of these countries leads to 
waste of funds on unproductive projects. Most third world countries lack the structures 
that are necessary for economic growth and for meeting the demands of pluralism.30 
                                                 
28 Dia (1993); Van de Walle (1995) 
29 Knack’s study, cited in the International Studies Quarterly (2004, 262) finds a weak relationship 
between aid and democratization. Goldsmith (2001, 144) “finds small positive relationships between aid 
and indicators of democracy and economic liberalization.” 
30 Diamond et al. (1987) 
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Political instability and authoritarian regimes in Africa have emerged as a result of 
political and economic crisis; the economic reforms imposed by IFIs can be very 
instrumental in producing such crises.31   
The above literature suggests that an effective management of aid is vital to the 
development of stable democracies; thus, the recipient country must demonstrate fiscal 
responsibility.32 Most aid programs aimed at promoting economic growth and political 
development fail because endogenous factors are not supportive of such programs.33 
Furthermore, any solutions to the problems in third world countries should reflect these 
countries’ needs and perspectives on the one hand, and should be able to meet acceptable 
standards in the international community on the other.34 There should be a sharing of the 
debt burden between lenders and borrowers, and this must reflect the reality that aid 
programs can only effectively contribute to economic and political development, if they 
are combined with high quality economic management based upon sound infrastructure. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
It is worth restating the assumptions that underlie the hypothesis of this research. 
Firstly, I assume that the conditions that are incorporated within structural adjustment 
programs have a direct impact upon democratization in the borrowing country. Secondly, 
I define democracy in terms of Dahl’s polyarchy. That is, a country should meet the 
criteria set forth in Dahl’s polyarchy for it to be considered a stable democracy. Thirdly, I 
contend in line with scholars like Lipset (1959) and Przeworski et al (2000), whose 
                                                 
31 See Footnote 8 for reference. 
32 Fiscal responsibility refers to a country’s capacity to develop sound policies that are geared towards 
developing education, healthcare, sanitation, and other social welfare services.  
33 Cyril Enweze, Vice President of the African Development Bank observed that countries that receive 
foreign aid must develop accountability, transparency, anticorruption actions, participatory governance, and 
an enabling legal and judicial framework if aid programs should promote economic growth and political 
development (IMF Survey, 1999). Most third world countries can not boast of such an environment.  
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studies have determined that the level of socioeconomic development can either lead to 
democratization or promote democratic consolidation respectively. Finally, the primary 
variables that comprise a country’s level of socioeconomic development or infrastructure 
include education, healthcare, sanitation, and level of income inequality.  
A case study of two countries (Ghana and Mauritius) will help determine whether 
there is a positive correlation between SAPs and democratization. The “most similar 
systems” design offers the right model for this study. Despite some obvious differences, 
the above countries share four critical similarities that directly impact the variables in this 
research. These similarities include their colonial legacies, a diverse ethnic citizenry, 
extensive debts from IFIs in the 1980s, and the level of socioeconomic growth prior to 
implementing SAPs. The reforms that were implemented during structural adjustment 
determined whether these countries developed stable democracies or remained 
Delegative democracies. In other words, the aids that these countries received, which 
made the adoption of structural adjustment a prerequisite for qualifying for those loans, 
has been the determining factor for state of democracy in these countries. 
Ghana adopted SAPs from IFIs in the 1980s that had an impact on their 
socioeconomic policies in the areas of education, welfare, sanitation, and income 
distribution. Ghana’s structural adjustment program was introduced in 1983 and was 
called the Economic Recovery Program (ERP). Ghana’s ERP has gone through three 
phases: the ERP (1983-1987), the ERP II (1987-1993) and the Accelerated Growth 
Strategy (AGS) post 1993.35 The reforms adopted under Ghana’s various ERPs continue 
to shape that country’s economic and political growth. Mauritius refused accepting the 
IMF and World Bank conditions dealing with education, healthcare and welfare services. 
                                                                                                                                                 
34 President Mogae of Botswana discussed ways in which foreign aid could be beneficial to both recipient 
and donor countries (IMF Survey, 1999). 
35 Hutchful (1997) 
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The SAP adopted by Mauritius in the late 1970s and early 1980s directly tried to develop 
the export processing zone (EPZ) strategy that the country had implemented in the early 
1970s. In 1985, Mauritius became the first African country to successfully conclude its 
structural adjustment program with the World Bank and IMF.36
I assume that the structural adjustment programs adopted by Ghana have a direct 
impact on the development of infrastructures and progress towards democratization. 
Currently, Ghana is one of the “heavily indebted poor countries” (HIPC) and seeking 
debt relief from international donor agencies. Mauritius, on the other hand, which did not 
adopt SAPs that directly affected its socioeconomic policies, has one of the strongest 
economies and stable democracies in Africa. Comparing these countries will help predict 
the impact of conditionalities on democratization. 
The above cases were selected for the following reasons. Ghana was considered 
the success story of IMF’s structural adjustment programs in the 1980s. Two decades 
later, Ghana is one of the heavily indebted poor countries in Africa. Mauritius has gone 
through similar transitions as Ghana, but sound economic and social policies have made 
it one of the fastest growing economies in the world with a strong democracy. Ghana and 
Mauritius share similarities in terms of political history, ethnic diversity, and heavy 
borrowing from IFIs from the late 1970s to the early 1980s that forced the 
implementation of SAPs. However, even though both countries accomplished economic 
growth in the 1990s, the condition of living of Mauritians is better than that of Ghanaians 
and Mauritius’ democracy is consolidated. Can economic liberalization produce political 
liberalization? What factor is responsible for Mauritius’ success and Ghana’s failure? Is 
progress towards democratization related to the level of development of a country’s 
infrastructures at the commencement of structural adjustment? 
                                                 
36 English (2002) 
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Contemporary social science scholars widely accept the following indices as 
effective measurements of the variables that will be analyzed in this study. The “Physical 
Quality of Life Index” (PQLI), which was developed by the Overseas Development 
Council, effectively measures a country’s literacy, life expectancy, and infant mortality 
rates. The “Human Development Index” (HDI) ranks countries and provides a composite 
picture of a country’s provision of sanitation, education, and other welfare services. The 
“Gini Index” provides data on income distribution. The above will be used to test the 
independent variables relative to infrastructure. For the dependent variable, to track 
progress toward consolidated democracies, I will use data from Freedom House, World 
Bank, and IMF reports. 
Another variable that will be analyzed in addition to the above variables vis-à-vis 
democratization is that of corruption. Pervasive corruption in many third world countries 
determines how effectively aid is used. The “Corruption Perceptions Index” (CPI) 
developed by Transparency International measures the extent of corruption in a country’s 
public and political sectors. IMF, World Bank, USAID, and Freedom House statistics 
will also be used to measure the level of corruption in the countries under review. 
Finally, the time frame for this study will range from 1980 to date. The debt crisis 
of the early 1980s forced Ghana and Mauritius to turn to international financial 
institutions for loans. During that same period, IFIs advocated SAPs as comprehensive, 
long-term solutions for debtor nations.37 As such, this time frame will provide 
observations of how SAPs have faired in promoting economic growth and political 
development.  
 
                                                 
37 Welch (2000) 
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2.  GHANA 
 
Ghana’s interactions with the world’s most prominent and influential financial 
institutions – the IMF and World Bank – started in the 1960s. By the 1980s and 1990s, 
Ghana was one of the few sub-Saharan countries that consistently implemented IMF and 
World Bank’s structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that were aimed at reversing the 
country’s economic decline and set it on the path of economic growth and 
development.38 This chapter reviews Ghana’s successes and failures with SAPs. This 
review will primarily focus on the Rawlings years (1981 – 2000), a period that witnessed 
the prescription and consistent implementation of IMF and World Bank policies.  
The first part of this chapter gives a historical background of Ghana’s emergence 
from colonialism and its prospects for economic and political development. Following 
this, I will review the economic and political conditions in Ghana prior to the 
implementation of SAPs; the debt crisis of the 1970s and 1980s that necessitated the 
implementation of SAPs. The final sections analyzes the Economic Recovery Programs 
(ERPs) that were adopted from 1983-2000 and their impact on Ghana’s economic growth 
and socioeconomic infrastructures. The concluding section of this chapter reviews 
Ghana’s democratization against the background of the ERPs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Many scholars including Louis (2005), Osei-Dadzie (2004), Konadu-Agyemang (1998, 2001), Boafo-
Arthur (1999), Panford (1997), Hutchful (1997), have produced extensive literature on Ghana’s programs 
with the IMF and World Bank. 
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2.1. Historical Background   
In 1957 Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African country to gain political 
independence from colonial rule. Ghana’s independence was characterized by 
tremendous hope in its ability to lead Africa toward economic development. In 
comparison to other African countries, Ghana in the 1960s was considered the “Black 
Star” of Africa.39 During this period (the late 1950s to 1960s), Ghana was the wealthiest 
country in all of sub-Saharan Africa; it had $532 million in foreign reserves, the best 
infrastructure, relatively, a well-trained and educated work force, a wealth of natural 
resources including gold, bauxite, and manganese, and was the world’s leader in cocoa 
exports.40  
Although Ghana had such wealth of reserves at independence, hindsight shows 
that its development prospects were forestalled by certain economic and political factors. 
Firstly, the British colonial regime’s economic policies failed to lay the foundations for 
sustainable development.41 Similar to other colonial territories, the colonial regime 
pursued economic policies that focused primarily on export trade of raw materials. In 
Ghana these products included cocoa, gold, timber, diamond, and bauxite. In an 
advantageous way, sound policies were not developed to sustain Ghana’s economic 
growth and incorporate its economy into the expanding worldwide capitalist system.42 
Secondly, in the political realm, the British colony’s indirect rule policy produced a class 
of bureaucrats, soldiers, and middle-class professionals who consumed a considerable 
portion of the surpluses produced by the rural and unskilled workers without any 
accountability to the general citizenry. In Ghana, this was the class that dominated the 
                                                 
39 Konadu-Agyemang (1998) observes that at independence Ghana was the wealthiest African nation in 
terms of its reserves, and its natural and human resources. Panford (1997) compares the economic and 
social infrastructure of Ghana from 1951-1973 and the period after the late 1970s.  
40 Louis (2005); Konadu-Agyemang (1998) 
41 Louis (2005) 
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nationalist movement and gained control of the state apparatus at independence. It is 
against this background that power was handed over to Kwame Nkumah and his 
Convention People’s Party (CPP) in 1957.  
It is not surprising then that the high hopes of Ghana becoming the most 
developed country in sub-Saharan Africa started dwindling as Kwame Nkrumah and 
successive leaders (who were either democratically elected or who seized power) 
embarked on programs that depleted Ghana’s reserves and continued it on the path of 
perpetual dependence on foreign assistance.43 As Panford (1997) observed, Ghana did 
not experience civil wars (as did many African countries after independence) but 
corruption, lack of accountability, political instability, and later the austerity measures 
imposed by SAPs gave rise to the deteriorating living and working conditions of 
Ghanaians.44
A timeline (Table 2.1) of the different governments that have ruled Ghana from 
independence to date shows that political instability is one of the main factors that has 
hampered Ghana’s prospects for development. From 1957 to 2006, a total of thirteen 
governments have ruled Ghana: six military regimes, two regimes under a military leader 
turned civilian president (Jerry Rawlings), and five democratically elected governments. 
This data becomes even more significant when we see that within a nine-year period 
(January 1972 to December 1981) a total of five governments ruled Ghana: four military 
regimes and one democratically elected government.45 It was during this period (1972-
1981) that Ghana’s economic and political situation reached crisis proportions. The rapid 
shifts in political and ideological regimes during this time frame resulted in policy 
instability and the advent of Ghana’s dependence on foreign assistance for its 
                                                                                                                                                 
42 Grier (1981) 
43 Louis (2005); Boafo-Arthur (1999); Grier (1981) 
44 Louis (2005); Konadu-Agyemang (1998); Panford (1997) 
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sustenance.46 The various governments in Ghana have constantly shifted the country’s 
policy direction: Nkrumah promoted Pan-Africanism, Ankrah and Busia adopted neo-
liberal policies, Acheampong promoted nationalism, Limann focused on socioeconomic 
development, and Rawlings followed the path of structural adjustment.   
From a policy perspective, Louis (2005) observes that from independence to date, 
Ghana has adopted policies aimed at producing an economic development similar to 
Western European countries and the US. This neo-liberal approach advocates free market 
initiatives aimed at increasing the gross domestic product (GDP) “with the hope that the 
benefits thereby accrued would trickle down to the whole society at large in the form of 
jobs and other economic opportunities” (Louis, 2005, 1). That is, an increase in GDP 
would create the necessary conditions for the wider distribution of the economic and 
social benefits of growth. In addition to this view, scholars including Osei-Dadzie (2004), 
Konadu-Agyemang (1998), and Gyimah-Boadi (1991) argue that the economic and 
political development policies that have been implemented by the majority of past and 
present political leadership in Ghana have been selfish and motivated about the personal 
gains for the leaders and their cronies. These neo-liberal policies, however, have failed to 
transform Ghana into a modern industrialized society. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 Boafo-Arthur (1999); Hutchful (1997) 
46 Hutchful (1997) 
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Table 2.1: Ghana’s governments since independence 
 
Government Leader Dates of Tenure 
Convention People’s Party (CPP) 
 
National Liberation Council (NLC) 
 
 
Progress Party (PP) 
National Redemption Council 
 
Supreme Military Council (SMC I) 
 
Supreme Military Council (SMC II) 
 
Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) 
 
People’s National Party (PNP) 
 
Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) 
National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) 
National Democratic Congress 
(NDC 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
Kwame Nkrumah 
 
J. A. Ankrah 
A. Afrifa  
 
K. A. Busia 
I. K. Acheampong 
 
I. K. Acheampong 
 
 Akuffo 
 
Jerry Rawlings 
 
 
Hilla Limann 
 
Jerry Rawlings 
 
Jerry Rawlings 
 
Jerry Rawlings 
 
John A. Kufuor 
John A. Kufuor 
3/1957 – 2/1966 
 
2/1966 – 4/1969 
4/1969 – 10/1969 
 
10/1969 – 1/1972 
1/1972 – 1975 
 
1975 – 7/1978 
 
7/1978 – 6/1979 
 
6/1979 – 9/1979 
 
 
9/1979 – 12/1981 
 
12/1981 – 12/1992 
 
1/1993 – 12/1996 
 
12/1996 – 12/2000  
 
12/2000 – 12/2004  
12/2004 – Present  
Source: Hutchful (1997); U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (June 2006).  
 
In tandem with the above factors are other anti-development conditions that 
permeate the Ghanaian society. Scholars (Panford, 1997; Konadu-Agyemang, 1998; 
Boafo-Arthur, 1999; Aryeetey and Fosu, 2004; Louis, 2005) cite economic 
mismanagement, uncontrolled inflation, a mismanaged public sector, productivity 
disincentives, over-subsidized social services, corruption, and inept leadership as causes 
of Ghana’s economic and political downturn.47  
                                                 
47 Konadu-Agyemang cites the extensive literature that have been produced by scholars like Kraus 1991; 
Younger 1989; Gyimah-Boadi 1991; and Werlin 1994 addressing the conditions that led to Ghana’s decline 
between 1970 and 1983. 
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Corruption has been a feature of politics – in developed and developing countries, 
democratic and authoritarian societies, old as well as new democracies – since recorded 
history.48 In Ghana, corruption has become an everyday phenomena and is one of the 
major factors that have hindered socioeconomic and political growth in the country.49 At 
the government or state level, nepotism, cronyism and tribalism are the basis of the 
culture that overrides political life. Appointments and selections to all branches of 
government are not determined by merit, but on the basis of tribe, friendship or relatives 
in positions of authority. To compound the situation are the favors expected by the 
patrons from their beneficiaries, which includes but not limited to, financial payments, 
awarding undeserved government contracts to patrons, and diversion of funds to fund 
political activities.50  
Also, corporate governance, which should be an effective tool in creating 
safeguards against corruption and mismanagement is virtually nonexistent. As a result, 
accountability, transparency, rule of law, fairness, responsibility, and property rights are 
very weak and serve as breeding grounds for corruption.51 Public officials and ordinary 
citizens have gradually embraced corruption as a norm of society. As will be observed, 
Ghana’s leaders as well as the overwhelming majority of citizens freely engage in 
misappropriating public funds, accepting and giving out bribes, and profiteering in 
business. The leaders violate the constitutional rights of citizens, are unaccountable, 
involve in election corruption, and lack transparency. For example, in 1964 Nkrumah 
changed the country’s constitution to make himself a “Life President.” Busia (1969-1972) 
was unable to curtail the rampant corruption among civil servants. General Acheampong 
                                                 
48 Gyimah-Boadi (2004) 
49 Adomako (2005) describes the different levels of corruption in Ghana including white level, civil level, 
and everyday level. Mensah et al. (2003) conducted a study that offer empirical findings about the 
intertwining nature of corporate governance and corruption in Ghana 
50 Adomako (2005) 
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in 1972 confiscated all shares of foreign businesses. Limann’s government (1979-1981), 
similar to the Busia regime, was unable to stop misappropriation of government funds. 
Five of the ministers in Rawlings’ government (1993-2000) are currently on trial for 
embezzling $22 million of funds allocated for different projects during their rule. And 
currently, President Kufuor’s Minister of Youth and Sports is on trial for stealing $46,000 
in just the first month of his appointment.52  
As Adomako (2005) points out, corruption is one of the most deadly social and 
ethical problems that has faced Ghana in the last 50 years. In a survey conducted by 
Ghana’s Center for Democratic Development (2000), 75% of households in Ghana see 
corruption as a serious problem, 66% admit to be paying 10% of their annual incomes in 
bribes to public officials, and 44% of companies (domestic and international) admit to 
making unofficial payments to public officials on an ongoing basis. The culture of 
corruption is imbibed in Ghanaian society and can not be ignored in discussing Ghana’s 
democratization vis-à-vis economic reforms.  
In addition to all of the above, structural factors like terms of trade and the 
fluctuating prices of export commodities versus the costs of imported goods have created 
structural imbalances in Ghana’s economy. Within two decades of gaining independence, 
the Ghanaian economy had crumbled and international financial institutions became key 
players in the country’s future.  
When Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings staged his second coup on December 31, 
1981 the majority of Ghanaians believed he would develop the policies needed to address 
the country’s political and economic problems.53 Hopes in Jerry Rawlings and his 
                                                                                                                                                 
51 Mensah et al. (2003) 
52 Sarpong (2006) 
53 According to Hutchful (1997) the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) – led by Rawlings – 
was a radical civil-military coalition that seized power from the democratically-elected Limann government 
in 1981. This was the second instance of Rawlings staging a coup. His reason for this coup was to halt the 
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Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government to turn Ghana’s fortunes 
around did not translate into reality. Similar to circumstances that were prevalent during 
previous regimes including corruption, lack of sound development policies, unproductive 
state enterprises, overarching foreign influence over Ghana’s development policies, 
Rawlings was faced with a situation beyond his comprehension. Between December 1981 
and 1983, the economy continued to spiral downward as inflation rates reached record 
levels, droughts, famines, and the forceful return of over two million Ghanaian economic 
refugees from Nigeria by the Shehu Shagari regime (1979-1983) added fuel to an already 
blazing debt crisis.54 In desperation, the PNDC government (in the middle of 1983) 
entered into negotiations with the IMF and World Bank. The outcome of those 
negotiations was the adoption of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) prescribed by 
the Bretton Woods institutions as the panacea for Ghana’s economic decline. 
As stated in Chapter 1, the conditions placed on loans through SAPs directly 
impact the recipient country’s socioeconomic infrastructure. I argue that strong 
socioeconomic infrastructures are necessary prerequisites for neo-liberal policies of IFIs 
to promote strong democracies. I seek to test this assumption by assessing the impact of 
the Economic Recovery Programs and Structural Adjustment Programs on Ghana’s 
democratization.  
 
2.2. Post Colonialism: Economic Growth and Political Development 
For a better perspective on how Ghana’s economic fortunes turned for the worse, 
a review of the different governments’ policy records between the late 1950s and the late 
1970s is necessary.  
                                                                                                                                                 
socioeconomic decline of Ghana and end its neo-colonial economy. Panford (1997) argues that the PNDC 
promised Ghanaians better conditions of life after the economic deterioration the country was witnessing.  
54 Panford (1997) 
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Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party  
By the time Ghana’s independence was declared on March 6, 1957, Kwame 
Nkrumah was already serving as that country’s first African Prime Minister; after having 
won Ghana’s first free and fair general elections under universal franchise in 1951.55 In 
1960 he won the next general election and became the first president of independent 
Ghana. Nkrumah gained popularity in Ghana and Africa as a whole by taking an anti-
colonial, anti-neo-colonial, and anti-imperialist stance towards political issues. He 
became very committed to Pan-Africanism; having being influenced by black 
intellectuals like Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. DuBois, and George Padmore.56
Kwame Nkrumah promoted development policies that were aimed at moving 
Ghana’s economy toward a more industrialized model.57 This was a popular idea at the 
time because it was reasoned that moving African countries out of the colonial trade 
system through reducing its dependence on foreign capital, technology, and material 
goods would allow them to be truly independent. To accomplish this goal, the Nkrumah 
government developed policies that promoted import-substitution industrialization (ISI) 
through the use of public capital (mainly Cocoa Marketing Board surpluses), amassing 
budgetary deficits, and through heavy external borrowing.58 Even though this approach 
attained high rates of capital formation, it failed to achieve the economic growth and 
industrialization that was intended. Many of the projects that the CPP government 
embarked on were unsuccessful and too expensive for the amount of revenue it was 
receiving from the export trade.  
                                                 
55 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (2006); Osei-Dadzie (2004) 
56 Osei-Dadzie (2004) 
57 Ghana’s development policy in the 1960s focused on transforming the country into an industrialized 
nation through “concentrating high rates of capital formation into a relatively few years” (Hutchful, 1997). 
58 Hutchful (1997) 
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Scholars like Panford (1994) and Konadu-Agyemang (1998) argue that Nkumah’s 
approach was able to achieve a certain level of modernization of the economic structure. 
That is, the creation of the nation’s first welfare system, the construction of major 
highways, railroads, the tap water system, schools, and the Volta hydroelectric power 
plant that generates power for Ghana and surrounding countries were programs that 
moved Ghana towards building a modern nation.59 However, there is not much debate 
about the fact that it was at these early stages of Ghana’s development that the authorities 
started growing the budget deficits, investing in inefficient state enterprises, and showing 
its inability to develop policies that would control inflation and produce effective social 
services.60 Furthermore, it was during the Nkrumah years that the Ghanaian leadership 
started stifling the interests, rights, and civil liberties of Ghanaians. For example, in 1958 
the Trade Union Act made strikes illegal; the Preventive Detention Act of 1961 allowed 
the arrests and detention of citizens without the involvement of the nation’s court system; 
and in 1964 Nkrumah declared Ghana a one-party state and made himself “Life 
President.”61
By 1965, Nkrumah’s expansionist programs had had a negative impact Ghana’s 
economy. A combination of factors including inefficient state enterprises, agricultural 
stagnation, falling export earnings resulting from a decline of the world cocoa market, 
and growing budgetary deficits “produced serious inflation and other distortions in the 
economy” (Hutchful, 1997, 3). In May 1965, Nkrumah’s government approached the 
                                                 
59 Osei-Dadzie (2004) 
60 This has been extensively discussed by Hutchful (1997); Kraus (1991); Younger (1989); Konadu-
Agyemang (1994, 1998) 
61 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (2006) discusses Nkrumah’s corrupt, oppressive, 
and dictatorial practices. Similar characteristics will be demonstrated by future military regimes in Ghana, 
especially the Rawlings regime that was well noted for banning political activities, beatings of citizens, and 
murdering government officials including judges and opposition leaders that disagreed with their policies in 
the 1980s. 
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IMF for financial assistance.62 The World Bank’s assistance was also sought that same 
year. Both the IMF and World Bank prescribed non-inflationary borrowing and a drastic 
reduction of government spending to levels that could be covered by government 
revenues.63 The Nkrumah government rejected the institutions’ prescription because it 
would have halted the government’s development programs. Unfortunately, Nkrumah’s 
rejection of the institutions’ conditions “shook foreign confidence in the Ghanaian 
economy” which had already started going downhill (Rimmer, 1992 as cited by Boafo-
Arthur, 1999, 2). In February 1966, Nkrumah’s government was overthrown by the 
Ghanaian military and the National Liberation Council (NLC) took over the reigns of 
government.64 The coup leaders argued that Nkrumah had become a dictator, was exiling 
political dissidents, and that his expansionist policies were ravaging the Ghanaian 
economy.  
 
The National Liberation Council 
The NLC that formed after the overthrow of Ghana had cordial relations with the 
IMF and was the first to adopt stabilization measures in May 1966 (barely three months 
after seizing power from the Nkrumah government).65 The NLC’s “Standby 
Arrangement” with the IMF addressed deflationary fiscal and monetary policies.66 It 
focused on the reduction in overall government expenditure, non-inflationary sources of 
borrowing, reduction in bank credits to both the public and private sectors, wage and 
salary controls, and large-scale retrenchments in the public and private sectors. Also, 
                                                 
62 Boafo-Arthur (1999) 
63 Boafo-Arthur (1999) 
64 Scholars (Osei-Dadzie, 2004; Boafo-Arthur, 1999; Seymour, 1980) speculate that Nkrumah was 
overthrown with the help of the American CIA because of his anti-neocolonial rhetoric and seeming 
support for communism over capitalism (even though he claimed neutrality). Yergin and Stanislaw (2006) 
argue that American corporations (for similar reasons undermined) Nkrumah’s development programs like 
the Akosombo Dam project. 
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these measures advocated the phased liberalization of import and exchange controls, 
removal of price controls and subsidies, devaluation of the national currency (by 30% 
against the U.S. dollar), and short-term rescheduling of the external debt and restrictions 
on new short – and – medium term borrowing.67  
The NLC’s stabilization policy showed some strength in terms of reducing both 
budgetary expenditure and the deficit. However, during that same period, there was an 
increase in unemployment that caused a decrease in the real income of the poor. Also, the 
private sector was unable to raise investment that would have compensated for the 
reduction in public spending. That is, the foreign investment that liberalization was 
expected to attract did not materialize. Furthermore, inefficiency continued in both the 
parastatals and in the agricultural sector; balance of trade and the deficit worsened; and 
fiscal stabilization was only temporary.68 As a result, the military willingly turned over 
the government to civilians.   
 
Busia and the Progress Party 
Ghana’s government returned to civilian authority under the Second Republic in 
October 1969 when the Progress Party, led by Dr. Kofi Busia won 105 of the 140 seats in 
the nation’s parliamentary elections.69 Busia’s government attempted a two-pronged 
approach to Ghana’s economic problems. On the one hand, it deepened trade 
liberalization by allowing importation of more foreign goods and services. On the other 
hand, it focused on “rural development, agriculture…private sector development…and 
                                                                                                                                                 
65 Boafo-Arthur (1999) observes that three months after seizing power the IMF granted a standby credit to 
the NLC government because it had satisfied the Funds conditions sufficiently.  
66 These Standby Arrangements promoted trade liberalization financial restrictions in the form of 
retrenchment of labor in the private sector and some government parastatals (Hutchful 1997). 
67 Boafo-Arthur (1999); Frimpong-Ansah (1991); Hutchful (1985) 
68 Hutchful (1987 and 1997) 
69 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (2006) 
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increased spending in order to stimulate the economy out of recession” (Hutchful 1997, 
3).70
These efforts to rescind Ghana’s economic decline failed because international 
financiers refused to support President Busia’s development policies: the country’s deficit 
doubled by 1971, the prices of the country’s exports declined, and the cocoa market 
collapsed in mid-1971 (events that were beyond the Busia government’s control). These 
events led to the prescription of additional austerity measures by the IMF and World 
Bank, which resulted in further devaluation of the cedi. The Busia government’s adoption 
of additional conditionalities set forth by the IFIs was political suicide in that, it created a 
political backlash by Ghanaians to whom it was accountable, and it became the only 
national government whose implementation of IMF policies was used by the military as a 
pretext to overthrow it. According to the military, the worsening conditions that resulted 
after the adoption of SAP – a drastic devaluation of the cedi, sudden increase in the prices 
of basic items like sugar, rice and milk – had created discontent among citizens and 
warranted a change of government.71 The coup leaders, led by Col. I.K. Acheampong, 
ousted the Busia government in January 1972 and formed the National Redemption 
Council (NRC).72  
 
2.3. Debt Crisis: 1970s and 1980s 
In the early 1970s, Ghana started experiencing persistent economic problems 
consistent with deteriorating underdeveloped economies.73 Internally, these problems 
included corruption and mismanagement of the economy, falling living standards, high 
rates of inflation, rising budget deficits, drop in foreign exchange revenue, rising 
                                                 
70 See also Boafo-Arthur (1999) 
71 Jeong (1995); Hutchful (1997); Boafo-Arthur (1999) 
72 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (2006) 
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unemployment, and increasing indebtedness.74 Externally, problems including lower 
demand and prices for raw materials (produced by these countries) versus the higher 
prices for imported goods (fuel, food, medical supplies, etc) created serious structural 
imbalances in these economies. By the early 1980s it was evident that Ghana’s economic 
growth and political development had nose-dived.  
The economy was in ruins and the military had become the major player in 
Ghanaian politics. At the same time, a good portion of the country’s minimal revenue 
was used for servicing its debts. Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of Ghana’s revenue that 
went toward serving its public debts between 1970 and 1981. It was under these 
conditions that the country reversed to military dictatorial rule in 1972, just three years 
after the establishment of the Second Republic. 
 
The National Redemption Council and the Supreme Military Council I & II 
The 1972 coup leaders, led by Col. I.K. Acheampong (later General 
Acheampong) formed the National Redemption Council (NRC). The NRC promised to 
improve the lives of Ghanaians and based its programs on nationalism, economic 
development, and self-reliance.75 The government was re-organized in 1975, and the 
Supreme Military Council (SMC I), headed by now General Acheampong replaced the 
NRC. 
General I.K. Acheampong and his NRC and SMC I governments redefined 
Ghana’s policy direction. Between 1966 and 1971 – based on IMF and World Bank 
conditions – the cedi had been devalued by 78.6% against the dollar.76 To reverse the 
resulting increases in the prices of essential commodities, the Acheampong government 
                                                                                                                                                 
73 Panford (1997); Konadu-Agyemang (1998); Adedeji et al. (1990); Hutchful (1997) 
74 Konadu-Agyemang (1998); Panford (1997); Pellow and Chazan (1986); Ray (1986) 
75 U.S. State Department, Bureau of African Affairs (2006) 
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revalued the cedi upward by 21.4%, unilaterally repudiated Ghana’s external debts, and 
imposed strict controls over the private and public sectors. It was hoped that the removal 
of excessive external influence over the country’s economy would mobilize Ghanaians 
into utilizing their domestic resources for national development.77 Unfortunately, during 
this period, the internal and external shocks that resulted from rising oil prices, droughts, 
rising budget deficits, massive government corruption, and smuggling weakened Ghana 
more.78  
 
Figure 2.1: Ghana’s debt service as a percentage of GDP (1970-1981) 
 
Source: World Bank Group (WDI, 2007). 
 
To halt the fast economic decline, General Acheampong’s chief of staff, Lt. Gen. 
F. Akuffo arrested him in July 1978 and formed the SMC II government. General Akuffo 
succumbed to IMF pressure and reintroduced SAPs in 1978. The stabilization measures 
                                                                                                                                                 
76 Boafo-Arthur (1999); Frimpong-Ansah (1991) 
77 Boafo-Arthur (1999, 7) argues that General Acheampong ideologically mobilized Ghanaians to believe 
in themselves. The regime’s twin programs of Operation Feed Yourself (OFY) and Operation Feed Your 
Industries (OFI) under the slogan of “grow what you eat and eat what you grow” compelled citizens to rely 
on internal resources over external loans. Further, Acheampong antagonized external donors by seizing the 
shares of foreign mining, timber, banking and insurance companies.  
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introduced under General Akuffo included another devaluation of the cedi by 58%, 
reduction of the planned budgetary deficit from C1.5 billion to C500 million, and 
increasing the price of cocoa from C40 to C80.79 These measures failed because the 
production of cocoa and other products declined, and Ghana lost its position as the 
world’s leading cocoa producer. Also, the government was unable to curtail the rampant 
corruption in which senior military officers played a major role.80 These declining 
conditions and the leaders’ apparent inability to resolve Ghana’s problems were excuses 
used by other military leaders to intervene in politics.  
In June 1979, Rawlings and a group of junior and noncommissioned officers 
staged a bloody coup; executing eight senior military officers including Generals 
Acheampong and Akuffo. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 
government that was formed by Rawlings was noted for its “Special Tribunals” that 
summarily sentenced hundreds of individuals to long prison terms, confiscated the 
properties of individuals, and killed dozens of judges and other professionals.81  
Jerry Rawlings’ brief entry into government in 1979 was economically 
unspectacular but foreshadowed his ruthless tactics in dealing with dissidents and 
enforcing policies.82 Jerry Rawlings made no new economic policies before handing 
power over to a democratically elected government in September 1979. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
78 Between 1971 and 1977 Ghana’s overall deficit rose by 450 per cent (Hutchful, 1997).  
79 Boafo-Arthur (1999) 
80 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (2006); Panford (1997) 
81 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (2006); Boafo-Arthur (1999) 
82 Jerry Rawlings and the junior officers that seized power from the Akuffo regime (SMC II) in June 1979 
had a brief stay in office, but their rule was noted for the brutality used to enforce price controls (Yankah, 
1986; Hutchful, 1997). Also, the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs’ (2006) profile of 
countries discusses the anti-democratic Special Tribunals that AFRC used to sentence, imprison, and 
execute citizens that were accused of corruption in public and private enterprises. 
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Hilla Limann and People’s National Party 
The AFRC conducted presidential and parliamentary elections in June and July 
1979, which the People’s National Party (PNP), led by Hilla Limann won. On September 
24, 1979 the AFRC handed over power to the newly elected President and Parliament of 
the Third Republic. 
From the outset, President Limann was against austerity measures because of the 
hardship they caused Ghanaians and the political backlash such measures would have 
brought on his government. As such, he refused to accept the Fund’s program.83 Instead, 
the Limann government tried to cater to the demands of the unions, workers and export 
farmers; the groups that had been most adversely affected by Ghana’s economic 
decline.84 Being unable to reach any agreement with the Fund, the government was 
unable to halt the economic decline. Unfortunately, during this same period there was 
further decline in the cocoa market and Ghana’s budget deficit (1980/81) rose from C1.62 
billion to C4.5 billion (cedis).85 It became apparent that Limann’s government was 
incapable of resolving Ghana’s daunting economic problems. 
Hutchful (1997) and Konadu-Agyemang (1998) give us an apt picture of the scale 
of Ghana’s economic crisis by the early 1980s. According to Hutchful (1997) the increase 
of public expenditure between 1975 and 1981 did not correspond with an increase in 
government revenue. By 1981, domestic and export production had declined and the 
                                                 
83 The Fund refers to the program through the IMF provides loans to countries experiencing balance of 
payments problems. Such loans are provided under an “arrangement” that stipulates the specific policies 
and measures that borrowing countries would adopt to resolve their balance of payments problems. The 
economic program(s) that underlie these arrangements are formulated by the country in consultation with 
the IMF and require the approval of the Fund’s Executive Board before the loans are released – in phased 
installments (IMF Factsheet, 2006).  
84 Hutchful (1997) argues that Limann was skeptical of the relevance of IMF solutions. To meet the 
demands of the unions, workers and farmers, his government tripled the minimum daily wage from C4.00 
to C12.00. Note also, Boafo-Arthur’s (1999) discussion of Limann’s approach to the IMF.  
85 Boafo-Arthur (1999); Hutchful (1997); U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (2006) 
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country was utilizing only 24% of its industrial capacity. As such, the manufacturing 
index dropped from 100 in 1979 to 63.3 in 1981. During this same period (between 1974 
and 1982), the “production of maize, rice, cassava, yams and other major crops fell 50-80 
per cent. Cocoa exports also fell by over 30 per cent in the same period, lowering 
Ghana’s share of total world production from 24.4 per cent in 1974/75 to 15.4 per cent in 
1980/81” (Hutchful 1997, 4-5).                                                                        
According to Konadu-Agyemang (1998), between 1970 and 1983 real export 
earnings fell by 52%, domestic savings and investments as a percentage of GDP dropped 
to almost zero, and an unprecedented number of skilled and unskilled Ghanaian 
employees left the country. As the nation was experiencing its worst droughts and 
famines (early 1980s), “the sudden expulsion and repatriation of over 1 million 
Ghanaians who had earlier sought greener pastures in Nigeria, added fuel to the already 
existing high unemployment and inflation rates” (Konadu-Agyemang 1998, 131). 
The inability of Ghanaian governments to produce successful policies to solve the 
country’s economic problems had negatives consequences for both the citizens and the 
state as a whole. On the part of the citizens, survival became a major challenge. Important 
cleavages (class, ethnic, regional, generational and gender) became apparent in the 
Ghanaian society as a result of the shifts in income and social power.86 For the state, its 
institutions were weakened as a result of the multiple military interventions in the affairs 
of government. Political and ideological divisions permeated society and there was lack 
of any coherent economic and political policy direction. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
86 Hutchful (1997) argues that severe shifts in income and social power created cleavages in Ghanaian 
society: important civil society groups withdrew from the political process, the society became polarized 
over, “respectively, monetarist and structuralist, and socialist and capitalist solutions to the crisis” 
(Hutchful, 1997, 5). 
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In as much as the endogenous factors played a major role in Ghana’s decline, the 
influence of international financial institutions (IFIs) and the world market on Ghana’s 
policy direction can not be ignored. It is evident that from 1957 to 1981 and there after, 
the Bretton Woods institutions gave support only to Ghanaian governments that adopted 
SAPs – be they democratic or anti-democratic and economically successful or not. For 
example, the Nkrumah and Limann governments were unable to negotiate any deals with 
the IMF and World Bank because they were opposed to the conditionalities placed on 
SAPs, but the NLC and SMC II received support from those institutions. This becomes 
more glaring when we assess successive Ghanaian governments’ relationship with the 
Fund and the World Bank (after 1981). 
 
Jerry Rawlings and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) 
Jerry Rawlings’ rule of Ghana – after he seized power for a second time in 1981 – 
should be divided into two phases: first as leader of the PNDC and second as the civilian 
president and leader of the NDC. It is worth noting that both phases were characterized 
by pursuit of similar economic policies with not much of a change in personnel. 
Upon his second coming in 1981, Rawlings promised to purge the nation of 
corruption and “end its neo-colonial economy” (Panford 1997, 82). Rawlings argued that 
IFIs’ influence over Ghana’s economic development was forcing the country to still 
pursue colonial economic policies – dependence on export of raw materials and foreign 
imports – that would not improve on the conditions of living of Ghanaians. This rhetoric 
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won the support of students, urban masses, workers, unions and left-wing organizations 
that were frustrated by Ghana’s economic and political problems.87  
However, similar to previous regimes, the PNDC’s ambitious intention of 
stemming the crisis was short-lived as events beyond their control overshadowed the 
minor gains they were making in managing the deficit, price controls and black-
marketing. Between 1981 and 1983 fierce droughts caused famine in Ghana. The 
extremely dry weather caused bush fires and as a result, there were shortages in the 
country’s staple foods (rice, yam, maize, and cassava) and meat.88 Worsening the 
situation was the expulsion of over a million illegal Ghanaians from Nigeria by the 
Shagari regime (October 1979 to December 1983) and the payments the government was 
making to external debtors siphoned much needed funds from its revenue.89  
Faced with this national crisis, the PNDC was left with not much of an alternative 
than to seek financial assistance from international financial institutions. After a series of 
negotiations with the IMF and World Bank, the PNDC in June 1983 was approved for 
loans in the form of a Standby Arrangement that covered Ghana’s outstanding interest 
payments to private banks in developed countries.90 As a condition for providing this 
credit, the PNDC was forced to adopt the economic reforms that inaugurated Ghana’s 
Economic Recovery Programs. 
 
2.4. The Economic Recovery Programs (ERP) 
Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical underpinnings that form the foundation of 
structural adjustment programs. It is against that concept that Ghana’s Economic 
                                                 
87 Hutchful (1994 and 1997); Panford (1997) 
88 Panford (1997) 
89 Panford (1997); Konadu-Agyemang (1998); Hutchful (1997). As part of the NLC’s agreement with the 
IMF and World Bank, payments on Ghana’s debt and other interest were deferred to 1974 –1981 (Boafo-
Arthur, 1999).  
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Recovery Programs were launched. These programs emphasized the “elimination of price 
controls, privatization of state industries, removal of subsidies,” the adoption of free 
trade, “and other orthodox liberal economic measures” (Jeong 1995, 82). Ghana’s ERP 
can be divided into four phases: 1983-1986, 1987-1989, 1990-1993 and 1994-2000.91  
Konadu-Agyemang (1998) identified the following key aspects of the different 
phases of Ghana’s ERP. The first phase of Ghana’s ERP tried to reduce government 
expenditure from the “1982 level of 10.2 percent to 8.6 percent of GDP” (Konadu-
Agyemang 1998, 132). Also, the exchange rate was adjusted through devaluation of the 
cedi, price controls were abolished, the tax base was broadened and the tax 
administration was strengthened in an effort to increase government revenue. The second 
phase initiated structural changes to address the causes of demand and supply 
imbalances. It focused on rebuilding the productive base; liberalizing the exchange rate 
and trade system; privatizing state enterprises; reforming and reducing the size of public 
service; attempting reforms of the tax system and its administration; instituting reforms in 
the domestic banking system; and trying to rehabilitate the economic infrastructure 
(export industries and the public sector). The third phase tried to “build upon the previous 
phases by implementing structural and institutional reforms” (Konadu-Agyemang 1998, 
132). Steps were taken to complete exchange rate reforms, develop the private sector, 
reform the civil service, control public expenditure, and alleviate poverty. Also, changes 
were made on tax and cocoa sector policies “with the aim of achieving an average annual 
real GDP growth of at least 5%; reducing the average rate of inflation from 37% in 1990 
to 5% in 1993; and generating an overall balance of payments surplus of at least $90 
                                                                                                                                                 
90 Hack (2001); IMF Country Report (1996) 
91 Panford (1997) identified two phases of the SAPs prescribed for Ghana: the ERP (1983 to 1985) and 
SAP (1986-date). I agree with Anyinam (1994) and Konadu-Agyemang (1998) that Ghana’s ERPs have 
gone through four phases that have addressed different aspects of economic growth. 
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million a year” (Konadu-Agyemang 1998, 132).92 From 1994 to 2000, under IMF 
direction, the Rawlings government tried to further reduce inflation, maintain a realistic 
exchange rate, complete the privatization of state enterprises, and efficiently allocate 
resources for growth.93
For the period 1983 to 1994, the IMF and World Bank acknowledged Ghana as 
the country that implemented structural adjustment economic policies more consistently 
than any other African country.94 Ironically, it was the military dictatorship of Rawlings 
and his PNDC government that showed commitment to liberal economic reform. During 
the Rawlings’ years, Ghana “earned a reputation as one of the most successful IMF and 
World Bank cases in Africa and the rest of the developing world” (Panford 1997, 82).  
Several causes have been advanced for the seeming success of adjustment in 
Ghana during Rawlings’ military and civilian governments.95 Firstly, Boafo-Arthur 
(1999), Hutchful (1997), and Panford (1997) argue that the pivotal factor for the 
consistency and success of adjustment in Ghana was Rawlings’ personal commitment to 
reform and the authoritarian political climate under which the SAPs were sustained. 
Furthermore, unlike his predecessors, Rawlings rejected monetary expansion like salary 
increases and extensive government subsidies for social services as the cure for inflation. 
Also, Rawlings focused on the internal factors (domestic shortcomings including 
corruption and profiteering) that were responsible for Ghana’s economic crisis. Finally, 
Rawlings’ PNDC explored all avenues of reform, regardless of the consequences and 
through coercion, and was able to silence all social opposition.96
 
                                                 
92 See also World Bank (1995); Anyinam (1994) 
93 Louis (2005); Oduro (2004); Konadu-Agyemang (1998) 
94 Jeong (1995); Panford (1997); Konadu-Agyemang (1998); Hutchful (1997) 
95 Konadu-Agyemang (1998); Panford (1997); Hutchful (1997); Jeong (1995)  
96 Hutchful (1997); Jeong (1995) 
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Figure 2.2: Ghana’s Annual Growth Rates (1965-2003) 
 
 
 
 Secondly, macro-economic indices show that Ghana is successful at adjustment. 
In comparison to other African countries that have implemented SAPs, Ghana has “fared 
better from a standpoint of aggregate economic indicators” (Panford 1997, 83). Figure 
2.2 tracks Ghana’s annual growth rates in gross domestic productions from 1965 to 2003. 
The graph shows marked improvement in the country’s GDP from 1983 to 1987 and an 
average annual growth rate of 5% since then. 
However, success in Ghana’s economic growth can be traced to the extensive 
foreign loans Ghana received from international financiers for sticking with the SAPs. 
Figure 2.3 shows us the steady increase in aid that Ghana received from international 
donors in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, from 1983 to 1992 the overall gross 
domestic investment increased from 11% to 16%.97 During this period, Ghana’s GDP 
grew consistently: from 1984 to 1986 the country’s average GDP growth was 6.3 percent 
                                                 
97 Aryeetey and Fosu (2002) 
39 
  
annually, and 5 percent since then.98 The average annual growth in GDP of other sub- 
Saharan African countries is 2.1 percent.99
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show that as more foreign loans were given to Ghana, there 
was a corresponding increase in the country’s annual growth rates. To a great extent 
Ghana’s economic growth was sustained by increases in foreign debt rather than the 
development of its economy for sustainable development. For example between 1983 and 
1987 foreign aid to Ghana rose from approximately 20% per capita to over 30% per 
capita. During that same period, Ghana recorded an increase in annual growth rates from 
– 4% in 1983 to over 6% in 1987.    
Similar to Ghana’s GDP growth, were substantial improvements in its balance of 
payments between 1983 and 1994. The credit facilities and markets provided by the 
World Bank and other international financiers for companies in the cocoa, mining and 
timber industries enabled those industries to triple the supply of their goods and improve 
on Ghana’s foreign exchange earnings.100 For example, between 1986 and 1996, 
industries that were operating at 25% of installed capacity before 1984 were performing 
at 35-40%.101 Export growth increased from 9% before adjustment to 11% from 1985 to 
1992.102 Earnings in cocoa exports rose from $409.2 million in 1983 to $722.1 million in 
1990. This accounted for approximately 42% of Ghana’s export earnings between 1986 
and 1996.103 Also, the foreign exchange earnings from the trade of timber, minerals and 
non-traditional products increased during this same period. Export earnings from the 
mineral sector reached its peak in 1994 at 48% but declined to 41% in 1996. 
                                                 
98 Aryeetey and Fosu (2002); Konadu-Agyemang (1998); Panford (1997) 
99 Konadu-Agyemang (1998) 
100 Konadu-Agyemang (1998) states that gold is now Ghana’s leading export. See also, Aryeetey and Fosu 
(2002). 
101 Konadu-Agyemang (1998) 
102 Aryeetey and Fosu (2002) 
103 Aryeetey and Fosu (2002); Parfitt (1995 as cited by Panford, 1997, 83) 
40 
  
Figure 2.3: Foreign Aid to Ghana (1960-2000)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: University of California (Atlas of Global Inequality, 2006). 
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Finally, improvements in Ghana’s balance of payments curtailed inflation. For 
example, inflation which was at 123% in 1984 dropped to 34% in 1991, decreased further 
to 32% in 1994 and then 14.1% in 2004.104 Also, there has been growth in real incomes 
per head from 0.4% annually between 1970 and 1980 to 2% since the introduction of 
SAPs in 1983. Most significantly Ghana has devoted 30 to 60 percent of its foreign 
earnings to paying debts.105 The above data shows the huge turn-round that Ghana’s 
economy experienced since the late 1970s. 
 
Kufuor and the New Patriotic Party 
Ghana’s Fourth Republic was established in January 1993. Under pressure from 
the international community and Ghanaians, the PNDC in 1992 appointed a Consultative 
                                                 
104 World Bank (2006); CIA World Factbook (2006); Aryeetey and Fosu (2002) 
105 Ghana’s external debt stands at $6 billion (Bank of Ghana, 2006). 
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Assembly that drew up the constitution that established the country’s Fourth Republic.106 
As stated earlier, Rawlings transformed his government to a civilian party under the 
NDC, won the elections held in November 1992 and December 1996, and ruled Ghana as 
a civilian president from 1993 to 2000. 
By the mid 1990s Rawlings’ regime had been mired in accusations of 
mismanaging the funds provided for various projects under Ghana’s poverty related 
plans.107 Economic growth had not improved the living conditions of Ghanaians and 
Ghana’s external debt continued to rise. The various projects implemented to reduce 
poverty in the country had not met the desired results instead; international donors 
accused the Rawlings’ regime of lack of transparency in handling foreign loans.108 As 
Ayittey (2001) observes, Rawlings who diligently pursued the policies prescribed by the 
IMF and World Bank, ended up blaming external factors (low prices of exports, tardy 
disbursement of foreign aid pledges) for the country’s worsening economic crisis. It is 
under these sour conditions that in December 2000, Ghana experienced the first 
“democratic” presidential change of power in its entire history. John Kufuor (NPP) 
defeated the NDC’s John Mills by winning 56.73% of the vote.109 Kufuor’s NPP also 
won 103 of the 200 seats in Parliament, with the NDC winning 89 and other independent 
small parties winning eight.110  
                                                 
106 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (2006) 
107 Ayittey (2001); Ghana’s poverty related plans were initiated as early as the late 1980s to mitigate the 
effects of SAPs on the vulnerable: PAMSCAD (1989), Human Development Strategy for Ghana (1991), 
National Development Framework (1994), Vision 2020 (1995), First Medium Term Development Plan 
(1996-2000), Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (2000), and Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (2003-
2005). 
108 Ayittey (2001); Ampaw (2006) 
109 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (2006) 
110 Ghana’s Fourth Republic was established in 1992. Ghana is a constitutional democracy: the President is 
the head of the Executive Branch and is elected for a four-year term (can be re-elected once); Legislative 
Branch calls for a unicameral Parliament comprising 230 members that are directly elected for four-year 
terms; and Ghana’s Supreme Court is the Judicial Branch (CIA World Factbook, 2006). Also, U.S. 
Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (2006) 
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This transition was significant in terms of Ghana’s political development. 
However, Oduro (2004) and Louis (2005) argue that even though there was a change of 
government in 2000, President Kufuor and his NPP government have not advocated any 
change in terms of economic policy and development agenda. Instead, the IMF and 
World Bank continue to determine Ghana’s economic policies. In March 2001 Ghana 
applied for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) program and in 
2004 received $3.5 billion total relief from its creditors over a twenty-year period.111 It is 
hoped that under the enhanced HIPC initiative, Ghana would be able to increase its 
expenditure on education and health programs.  
This research focuses on the ERPs that were implemented during the Rawlings’ 
years and for a brief period by the Kufuor government (before opting for debt relief). 
Does Ghana’s impressive showing in its macroeconomic indices translate into sustainable 
economic and political development? There is the expectation that the ERPs would 
improve living and working conditions. Have twenty years of adjustment accomplished 
this? Have there been improvements in the country’s socioeconomic infrastructure? Have 
the institutions that promote strong democracies been built?  
Konadu-Agyemang (1998) argues that “adjustment has taken some casualties, and 
will continue to take some more” (Konadu-Agyemang 1998, 133). The reduction in 
spending in education, health care, income disparity, and sanitation during the ERPs has 
impeded Ghana’s prospects of building a consolidated democracy that could survive 
economic crises, natural disasters, and guarantee the civil liberties of citizens. The next 
section will assess how ERPs have affected Ghana’s socioeconomic development. 
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2.5. Impact of the ERP on Economic Development and Socioeconomic 
Infrastructure 
According to the Bank of Ghana report (2006) the economic reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s have only recorded modest development in Ghana’s economy. Despite the 
consistency with which Ghana has implemented SAPs, Ghana (like many other 
economically poor sub-Saharan African countries) has continued to experience 
“worsening economic conditions leading to unacceptable levels of poverty and higher 
levels of external debt” (Bank of Ghana, 2006, 3).  
In 2001, with all the celebration of the growth rates the country had achieved 
during the implementation of SAPs, the Ghanaian government was forced to declare 
bankruptcy and apply for the enhanced debt relief under the HIPC Initiative because the 
country still is so heavily indebted and is unable to repay its public debts.112 Ghana’s 
foreign debt had risen from $1 billion in 1981 to over  $6 billion in 2000 and over 30% of 
the country’s annual revenues were allocated for debt servicing. Figure 2.4 shows 
Ghana’s debt over time (1983 – 2000). In addition, unemployment rates remained high 
(20% in 2000), income disparity was growing between the rich and poor, a 
comprehensive health policy had not been implemented to address the needs of majority 
of Ghanaians, and the country was unable to use its limited resources to pay its foreign 
debts and at the same time improve on the conditions of living of the citizens. The 
Kufuor government saw debt relief as the way of relieving the country of its debt burden 
and providing much-needed funds for socioeconomic development. 
 
                                                 
 
112 Bank of Ghana (2006); Aryeetey and Fosu (2002); Apusigah (2002) 
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2.5.1.  Economic Growth and Income Inequality 
Ghana’s economic growth has been, to a great degree, at the expense of 
development. That is, whereas the country has experienced economic growth  - as 
measured by an increase in real GDP terms - there has been a decline in its level of 
income distribution, education, healthcare and social services. The conditionalities 
imposed by SAPs have caused three major social problems in Ghana’s income 
distribution: increase in poverty and income inequality, rise in unemployment, and 
devaluation has led to a fall in real income wages. 
 
Figure 2.4: Ghana’s External Debt (1983 – 2000)  
 
 
Source: World Bank Group (WDI, 2007)          
 
Firstly, at the macro-economic level, the policies prescribed by the World Bank 
and the IMF caused a major shift of resources from the urban to the rural areas.113 The 
policies implemented by the PNDC during the first two phases of the ERPs (1983-1989) 
focused on retrenchment in state sectors, while credit facilities were provided for export 
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materials like cocoa, timber, and mining that are in the rural areas. As such, whereas help 
was provided for export crop farmers, SAPs hurt urban wage earners. As Jeong (1995) 
observes, in as much as key urban groups have taken much of the cost of the reform 
programs, in the rural areas economic liberalization has only favored large landowners, 
commercial farmers, and multi-national corporations.114
As a result, there has not only been an increase in income disparity, but 
additionally, there has been a rise in poverty levels in both the rural and urban areas. In 
the urban areas, the number of people living below the poverty line increased from 35% 
in 1970 to 50% in the mid-1980s to early 1990s. As of 2002, 78.5% of Ghanaians live 
below the poverty line ($2 a day) and in the area of income inequality, the richest 30% of 
the country control 80% of the national income.115 According to the most recent IMF and 
World Bank estimates (cited by Louis, 2005), with the current growth rates it will take 
the average poor in Ghana at least 30 years to cross the poverty line. 
Secondly, there is a marked increase in unemployment (1983-2000).116 
Privatization of state enterprises and massive retrenchment in both the public and private 
sectors after adjustment has resulted in the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs. 
Measures advocated by the World Bank and the IMF provided increased flexibility to 
employers in the hiring, firing, use and compensation of labor.117 By 1992 150,000 jobs 
had been lost in the public sector, up to 45,000 civil servants were retrenched, and an 
                                                                                                                                                 
113 Jeong (1995); Lipset (1981) identifies wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education as strong 
indices of economic development. I argue that shifting resources towards rural areas weakens urbanization 
and runs counter to attaining economic development. 
114 Jeong (1995) argues that economic liberalization favored large landowners, commercial farmers, and 
multi-national corporations involved in the mining industries since these were the sectors believed to 
generate the foreign exchange earnings needed to balance Ghana’s budget.   
115 The poverty line used in this study is the one defined by Sonia Rocha (1997) of the Applied Economic 
Research Institute (IPEA), which establishes the poverty line at approximately $2 to 3 per day/capita. 
According to the Human Development Index (HDI, 2005), Ghana ranks 138 of the 144 countries included 
in the report. Apusigah (2002) states that 52% of Ghanaians live below the poverty line. 
116 CIA World Factbook (2006); Konadu-Agyemang (1998) 
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additional 35,000 jobs were cut in other state enterprises.118 According to Chhibber et al. 
only about 15% of the 250,000 Ghanaians leaving the school system annually would find 
formal sector jobs. According to the CIA World Factbook (2006), as of 1997 Ghana has a 
20% unemployment rate (the most recent available data on Ghana’s unemployment 
rate).119  
Finally, Ghana’s currency has gone through excessive devaluation. As of 2005, as 
many as C9, 072.5 (cedis) exchanged for $1 (CIA World Factbook, 2006; WDI, 2006). 
The extreme devaluation of Ghana’s currency (over 64,000% from 1983-2005) has had a 
devastating effect on the country’s imports of fuel, machinery, hospital supplies, school 
supplies, etc.120 And, the fact that incomes were not increased to parallel the increased 
cost of living (as a result of devaluating the cedi) the real wages of Ghanaians has 
dropped considerably. 
The adjustment programs that were implemented between 1983 and 1989 had 
such a negative impact on the livelihood of Ghanaians that by the late 1980s Ghana was 
in turmoil. Massive demonstrations by the general citizenry forced the PNDC 
government to – after further negotiations with and approval by the World Bank and IMF 
in 1988 – implement the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment 
(PAMSCAD).121  
PAMSCAD was initiated in 1989 to provide a “safety net for population groups 
vulnerable to the effects of the economic reform” (Leite et al. 2000 cited by Apusigah, 
                                                                                                                                                 
117 The majority of the companies that have been privatized in Ghana belong to MNCs that violate and limit 
labor standards in most third world countries (Panford, 1997). 
118 Konadu-Agyemang (1998); Weissmann (1990); Panford (1994) 
119 CIA World Factbook (2006); Chhibber et al. cited by Konadu-Agyemang (1998) 
120 Konadu-Agyemang (1998) 
121 Apusigah (2002) argues that the growing impatience of Ghanaians with the effects of SAPs on their 
livelihood was evident in the massive demonstrations that were embarked on between the late 1980s and 
the mid-1990s. During this time, the ruling government’s use of force to suppress dissent often resulted in 
fatalities. Aryeetey and Fosu (2002) in their study of Ghana’s economic growth from 1960-2000 
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2002, 9). This program was initially funded by a $85 million loan that was aimed at 
creating 40,000 jobs over a two-year period and in the process improve on basic needs 
through labor intensive self-help projects. By 1993, the program received additional loans 
that focused on general health conditions, social and economic infrastructure, and 
education.122 However, as Panford (1997) observes the $100.70 million allocated for 
community development under PAMSCAD was too late to turn around the decline in 
education, employment, income disparity, and healthcare services.123  
Furthermore, the program was badly mismanaged and did not create the 
employment it was supposed to.124 According to Ayittey (2002) officials of the PNDC 
and NDC governments squandered at least 40% of World Bank loans and Western aid to 
support PAMSCAD. For example, over $280,000 allocated to the Tema Municipal 
Assembly for the implementation of its Poverty Alleviation Program (in the late 1990s) 
by the World Bank remains unaccounted for; and $20,000 assigned for the small 
community farmers of the Afram Plains was embezzled by NDC officials. As a result of 
the misappropriation of program funds, Ghana’s various poverty reduction plans from 
1989 to 2000 were unable to create jobs and alleviate poverty as was intended.  
Aryeetey and Fosu (2002) and Kanbur (2001) ask why Ghanaians still show a 
lack of appreciation for adjustment even though the economy has been growing at a rate 
of 4%-5.5% for two decades. Apparently, as ordinary Ghanaians would attest, growth 
rates mean very little when you can’t find a job. The question then is what modifications 
                                                                                                                                                 
determined that SAPs did not deliver the economic development Ghanaians expected. Konadu-Agyemang 
(1998) and Panford (1997) argue that PAMSCAD failed to alleviate the negative social costs of adjustment.  
122 Apusigah (2002); Konadu-Agyemang (1998); Panford (1997) 
123 Panford (1997) observes that PAMSCAD has failed to mitigate the impact of SAPs in Ghana. 
124 Ayittey (2002) discusses the rampant corruption that accounts for the failure of many government 
programs. Panford (1997) argues that several factors including government corruption, unreliable revenues 
for supporting the program, ineffective state parastatals, etc account for the failure of PAMSCAD to 
provide employment opportunities for the unemployed. 
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need to be enacted for structural adjustment programs to be more beneficial to citizens of 
borrowing countries?  
 
2.5.2.  Education 
The educational sector has taken a big hit as a result of the implementation of 
SAPs. After independence, Ghana offered its citizens free and compulsory universal 
education because this was denied under colonialism. This policy was later extended to 
the secondary and university levels.125 Under this policy the cost of books and other 
educational materials were provided free to students. By 1983, the central government 
was investing 25.7% of its total expenditure on education. During this period, 
government expenditure as a percentage of GDP allocated to education was 6.4%.126 As a 
result of these investments in the educational sector, Ghana (between mid-1960s and 
early 1980s) produced the best-trained and educated work force in the sub-Saharan 
region.127  
The national education reform program that was adopted in 1987 as part of 
Ghana’s structural adjustment programs shifted the cost of education to students, 
especially at the university level. Subsidies for educational materials, boarding, and food 
allowances at the university level were removed; government expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP dropped to 1.0%; and the implementation of the Junior Secondary School (JSS) 
system created problems for parents and guardians of secondary school age children. The 
                                                 
125 Asare and Wong (2004) discuss the economic development policies of Ghana and Malaysia. They argue 
that Malaysia has attained more economic and political development than Ghana because of political 
stability, human development (education and health), a diversified economy, and the development of 
domestic entrepreneurial groups. 
126 According to Asare and Wong (2004) the amount of funds provided for education in the first two 
decades after Ghana’s independence was above most sub-Saharan countries. However, by 1999 
government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP had dropped to 4% (WDI, 2006). 
127 Asare and Wong (2004); Konadu-Agyemang (1998); Panford (1997) 
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JSS system was a community-sponsored program that required parents and guardians to 
contribute towards establishing the new school system.128  
According to the Asare and Wong (2004) the cost of school expenses like school 
uniforms, textbooks, transport fares to school, etc are beyond the financial means of 
parents in the rural areas. For example, in the late 1980s when a school of predominantly 
poor children in Ashiaman demanded C20, 000 each from the parents of its 198 pupils to 
cover the costs of a government-provided six-classroom pavilion, only three parents were 
able to pay in full. The C168, 000 that was raised for this project was barely enough to 
complete one classroom.129  
The reforms in education have affected Ghana’s development in the following 
ways. Firstly, the uncoordinated approach of the different agencies like USAID, Action 
Aid, UNICEF, EU, etc under PAMSCAD has resulted in minimal gains in improving the 
quality of education in Ghana.130 In addition to the minimal gains recorded, the World 
Development Report (2006) states that Ghana’s educational sector lacks financial 
sustainability because of its over-dependence on external donors and NGOs for funding. 
According to World Development Indicators (WDI, 2006), 4% of Ghana’s expenditure 
goes towards education. However, foreign donors provide most of the funds that the 
government allocates for educational expenses (3%).131 In other words, the Ghanaian 
government only allocates 1% from its national coffers for education. In the late 1960s, 
6% of Ghana’s expenditure went towards the educational sector.  
Secondly, during the ERPs Ghana was unable to develop the policies that would 
have improved on the country’s educational sector as many other developing countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. This has resulted in an increase in the number of adult Ghanaians 
                                                 
128 Jeong (1995); Asare and Wong (2004) 
129 Graham and Hormeku (1996) 
130 World Development Report (2006); Mettle-Nunoo and Hilditch (2000); Graham and Hormeku (1996) 
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that are functionally illiterate. According to World Bank (WDR, 2000/2001 as cited by 
Asare and Wong, 2004, 6), 40% of adult females and 22% of adult males were 
functionally illiterate as recently as 1998. The average adult literacy rate in sub-Saharan 
Africa as of 2003 is 61.3%; the adult literacy rate in Ghana (2003) is 54.1%.132 This data 
suggests that Ghana has lagged behind many African countries in growing its human 
capital and lost ground under SAPs.  
Thirdly, educational reforms have created inequalities among citizens enrolled in 
secondary and tertiary education. There has been a decline in the enrollment of students 
in rural areas, especially in the northern parts of the country.133 The WDR (2006) 
indicates that access to tertiary education is declining in the both the rural and urban 
areas. Only about 10% of basic schools produce over 70% of students admitted to 
Ghana’s tertiary institutions. 
Finally, the limited employment opportunities for the educated including 
university graduates, is creating additional social problems. The Ghanaian government 
has not been able to replace over half of the jobs that were retrenched during the early 
period of SAPs. Further, the new companies that have taken over Ghana’s industries 
under privatization have not been able to increase employment as was expected. As 
Panford (1997) puts it, “the symptoms of this social and economic malaise are the youths 
who roam the streets in urban areas plotting their escape from the country in search of 
greener pastures in other countries” (Panford, 1997, 86). 
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132 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2005) 
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2.5.3.  Healthcare and Sanitation 
The physical health of the workforce and general population is an important 
aspect of human capital that sustains a country’s economic development.134 Scholars 
(Panford, 1994; 1997; Konadu-Agyemang 1998; Kraus, 1991) argue that the health of 
Ghana’s workforce and general population has been jeopardized by the imposition of 
hospital and other health care fees after the implementation of the ERPs. As a means of 
reducing government expenditure, full cost recovery and cost saving measures in health 
care delivery were introduced after 1983.135 That is, all categories of patients were 
expected to pay for health care services. In addition, new charges were introduced to 
cover the costs of basic hospital supplies and prescriptions. Under this new policy, 
hospital pharmacies had to use the cash collected from patients to purchase medicines. 
Ghanaians dubbed this new policy “cash or die” (Panford, 1997, 93).  
The impact of these measures to health care services in Ghana can only be fully 
understood within the context of a comparison between similar services before and after 
the introduction of SAPs. At independence, Ghanaians received free health care services 
through public health facilities and over 90% of Ghanaians did not have health insurance 
policies.136 After reforms were implemented that required that all patients pay for their 
health care services, only 2% of the population that needed health care at any given time 
– about 18% of the population – had access to it.137 According to Laari (2006), during the 
period when the “Cash and Carry” policy was in place (1985 to 2004) attendance at 
health facilities dropped and people who could not afford the health care costs died of 
diseases that are readily prevented in developed countries. Currently, there are nine 
physicians per 100,000 people; 2.3% of Ghanaians are infected with HIV/AIDS; only 
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58% of the population has access to improved sanitation; and 206 per 100,000 people 
have tuberculosis.138  
ERPs removed health care services that were readily available to the poor who 
could not afford the services provided by hospitals. And similar to other professions, the 
deteriorating socioeconomic conditions under SAPs have undermined primary healthcare 
in Ghana and spurred the exodus of up to 50% of health care professionals from public 
health to other countries including the United Kingdom, United States of America, and 
Canada.139
As earlier stated, PAMSCAD was introduced to mitigate the impact of SAPs on 
education, employment, income inequalities, and health. According to Britwum et al. 
(2001) the health component of PAMSCAD involved the provision of essential drugs 
through the public health community (PHC). Implementation of the Exemption Policy 
(1988) that was introduced to cover certain categories of people including the poor, 
children under 5 years old, disabled people, and pregnant women, among others had 
many problems. For example, officials could not determine who was poor enough to be 
exempted. Also, many Ghanaians did not know about this policy in order for them to take 
advantage of the benefits. Above all, the programs under the PHC were largely 
ineffective “due to insufficient funding, shortage of manpower and equipment, and lack 
of logistical support” (Britwum et al. 2001, 64). 
Despite the shortcomings of PAMSCAD in improving the health sector, Ghana 
has recorded minor improvements in life expectancy and infant mortality. However, 
Rosenberg (2006) observes that improvements made in public health, nutrition, and 
medicine in the twentieth century have increased life expectancy and lowered infant 
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mortality across the world.140 The improvements in life expectancy and infant mortality 
rates in Ghana is unimpressive when compared to improvements that have been made in 
countries like Malaysia and Mauritius with similar infrastructures as Ghana’s at 
independence.  
The promise that austerity measures and neo-liberal policies would lead to 
economic growth (in terms of growth in per capita) has been achieved in Ghana. 
Unfortunately, the above assessment demonstrates that Ghana’s economic growth has not 
translated into improvements in the conditions of living of its citizens, or human 
development. The modest gains achieved by SAPs have been at the expense of Ghanaians 
who continue to live under stringent austerity measures. This is why scholars question 
whether the ERPs have been as successful as its proponents tend to suggest. World Bank 
(2006) and IMF (2005) reports cite Ghana’s current 5.1% annual GDP growth rate as an 
indicator of successful adjustment. Panford (1997), Konadu-Agyemang (1998, 2000), 
Britwum et al. (2001), and ILO/UNDP Report (2003) call attention to the fact that the 
conditionalities imposed by SAPs have taken away much-needed funds from the social 
sectors. This has contributed to the less than average development in Ghana’s education, 
healthcare, unemployment, income disparity, and sanitation in comparison to other third 
world countries with similar resources. And the Rawlings’ authoritarian regime that 
promoted and sustained SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s stifled the political rights of 
citizens in order to maintain its policies. The next section reviews the impact of the ERPs 
on democratization in Ghana. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
139 The Commission on Population and Development (2006) 
140 Matt Rosenberg (2006) observes that improvements made in public health, nutrition and medicine have 
contributed to improved life expectancy in the world. According to Carnell (2000), during this period 
(1980-2000) life expectancy increased to an average of 75 years in developed regions and 63 years in less 
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2.6. ERP and Democratization 
In Chapter 1, I argued that a country with a strong democracy is one in which the 
democratic process has moved from simply electing governments to an institutionalized 
system of choosing leaders, policies and guaranteeing civil and political liberties.141 
Furthermore, I agree with scholars like Asare and Wong (2004), Przeworski et al. 
(20005), Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), and Lipset (1981) whose studies have 
determined a correlation between economic development and democratization.142 
Further, a common thread that runs through these studies is the importance of education, 
income distribution and wealth, political incorporation, and the availability of social 
services to economic or political development. As Asare and Wong (2004) summarized, a 
crucial contributor to the economic and political development of a country is human 
capital. Education, health and the distribution of wealth are important variables in the 
development of human capital.143  
To what extent have Ghana’s ERPs promoted these variables that scholars see as 
vital to the attainment of strong democracies? Freedom House (2006) portrays Ghana as a 
“free” country because political rights and civil liberties are guaranteed.144 On a scale of 
                                                                                                                                                 
developed regions. Ghana’s life expectancy of 58 years (UNDP, 2005) is still below the average in 
developing countries.  
141 O’Donnell (1992) extensively discusses the typology of democracies. He argues that installing an 
elected government does not make that society a representative democracy. According to him, attaining 
consolidated democracy is a long process that culminates in the institutionalization of democratic 
institutions. Note Sen’s (1999) discourse of the intrinsic value, instrumental value, and constructive 
importance of democracy.  
142 Asare and Wong (2004) see a correlation between education, health, income disparity, and the 
development of domestic entrepreneurs and the strength of a country’s democracy. Przeworski et al’s study 
(2005) shows a relation between income/wealth and democratization. Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) 
stress the importance of income disparity in creating transitions to democracy or in consolidating a 
country’s democracy. Lipset (1981) sees a direct relation between economic development and 
democratization.  
143 Lipset (1981) argues that the higher the level of education of a nation, the better the chances for 
democracy. Asare and Wong (2004) also see the importance of education and health to a country’s 
industrial growth. Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) suggest that intermediate levels of inequality promote 
transitions to democracy or strengthen the institutionalization of democracy. 
144 It is worth noting that Freedom House does not rate governments per se or evaluate the political 
conditions in a country. A country’s rating (free, partly free, or not free) is determined by two general 
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1 to 7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free, Ghana scores a 2 on both 
political rights and civil liberties because of the successful hand-over of power from one 
democratically elected government to another in 2000.145 But, has Ghana developed the 
infrastructures that are most important to democratization? Can Ghana sustain its 
economic growth without sound infrastructures? Is the rule of law guaranteed?   
Boafo-Arthur (1999) contends that the “incompatibility thesis” of the pursuit of 
adjustment and democratization “pari passu” has been challenged by the current 
economic and political dynamics in Ghana. He argues that Ghana has been able to pursue 
adjustment and democratization because of the “receptivity to adjustment by critical 
societal groups, the strength of associational groups, the absence of viable alternatives, 
and the continued support by the international donor community” (Boafo-Arthur, 1999, 
41). Do these make Ghana’s democracy strong?  
Meaningful civic participation is an important aspect of the democratic process 
and even more critical in consolidation. A democratic society ensures that policy 
decisions are made with the input of the citizens. During the years when the ERPs were 
actively implemented (1983-1992), a military dictatorship that had banned political 
participation and was treating dissidents with impunity ruled the country.146 The 
prevailing political climate under which the ERPs were implemented made it difficult if 
not impossible for various groups that were opposed to the program to rise up against 
their imposition.  
                                                                                                                                                 
characteristics: political rights (the right to vote and be voted for) and civil liberties (the freedom to develop 
views and institutions). I argue that consolidated democracies provide much more than regular elections: in 
such societies the state has the capacity of implementing independent internal and external policies; there is 
high civic participation in the decision making process; the rule of law is guaranteed; possess strong 
socioeconomic infrastructures; and has the capacity to absorb internal and external economic shocks caused 
by natural disasters and globalization.  
145 Freedom House (2006) has the following ratings of Ghana’s political system: Not Free – 1970 to 1992, 
Partly Free – 1993 to 2000, and Free – 2001 to date. This data portrays Ghana’s democracy in a positive 
light for the years when elections were held. As stated, the strength of a country’s democracy is determined 
by the institutionalization of democratic processes, state capacity, and legitimacy. 
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Harvey and Robinson (1995 cited by Boafo-Arthur, 1999) argue that the 
international financial institutions that prescribed the ERPs did not advocate for a 
democratic environment because such and environment makes economic reform more 
difficult or even impossible. The emphasis on “good governance” only became one of the 
IFIs conditionalities in the mid-1990s. According to Jeong (1995), the PNDC was able to 
maintain neo-liberal economic policies despite popular opposition through the regime’s 
willingness and capability to “insulate itself from powerful social groups and deal with 
social opposition with coercion, a weak institutional structure in society, and heavy 
financial assistance from international donors” (Jeong, 1995, 82). From 1983 to 1997, the 
period during which the ERPs were consistently implemented, Ghana was either under 
military rule or under the rule of a military leader turned civilian president. This was a 
period when the ruthlessness of the military regime successfully weakened political 
participation and citizen input in formulating critical policies for Ghana’s future.   
In democratic societies, the civil society or civil movements serve as forums for 
the creation of new ideas and as a check on the government. The ERP moved resources 
away from the sectors of society that build a strong civil society and other associational 
groups including the civil service, health care professionals, educators, labor unions and 
domestic entrepreneurs. Retrenchment, reduced expenditure for social services, and 
adverse conditions of living of the workforce and general population resulted in a 
politically weak civil society. These groups (which were originally active) have not been 
able to make any meaningful impact on Ghana’s economic and political growth.147 
Further, the actions of Ghanaian military governments that dealt harshly with political 
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opposition – especially during the Rawlings years – have resulted in the lack of 
participation of vital groups in the political process. 
Instead of dealing with these harsh realities, millions of professionals have 
immigrated to neighboring countries or across the globe in search of greener pastures. 
Studies conducted by Ghana’s Commission on Population and Development (2006) 
confirm that brain drain from poor countries leads to a permanent loss in growth and 
income levels.148 In Ghana, the health and education sectors are areas where immigration 
has had tremendously negative impacts. It is believed that there are more Ghanaian 
doctors working outside the country than there are in Ghana. As stated earlier, between 
1990 and 2000 it is estimated that 50% of Ghana’s health care professionals immigrated 
to other countries.149 In the educational sector, “the shortage of academic, professional 
and research staff have left some of the universities with inexperienced and insufficient 
staff with low morale” (Owusu-Ankomah, Ghana’s Minister of Interior, 2006). The net 
effect of this decline is that Ghana has been left with a weak civil society, the 
concentration of power in the hands of the executive branch, a weak legislature, and a 
media that is over-shadowed by government interference.150
Furthermore, the ERPs created a new class of elites who repressed the masses. 
The beneficiaries of SAPs include top executives in public services, local agents of 
foreign business partners and consultants, top executives in private business dealing with 
foreign capital, beneficiaries of divestiture measures in state owned enterprises and large 
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150 Osei-Dadzie (2004) argues that even under the Kufuor regime public officials are still engaged in 
corrupt practices and lack transparency even after the president vowed to clamp down on corruption. 
Further, tribalism, nepotism, and cronyism are still an integral part of Ghanaian politics, coupled with the 
fact that too much power has been given to the executive branch over the legislature and the judiciary. 
Jeong (1995, 83) discusses the power’s given to Ghana’s executive branch of government.  
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landowners and big-time commercial farmers.151 This new class of elites controls over 
70% of Ghana’s wealth and supports adjustment because of the capital gains it affords to 
them. It is not surprising that the income disparity between the richest 10% and poorest 
10% of Ghanaians continues to increase. The gains made in the 1950s and 1960s through 
expanded access to social services – education, health, housing, urban transportation – 
through subsidies provided to the poor is virtually extinct.152 As such, Ghana has been 
riven by constant political unrest in the 1980s, 1990s, and as early as 2001/2002 and 
2006.153 According to Panford (1997), the mounting social discontent could explode and 
threaten the political stability now exists in Ghana.   
Another area where ERPs have weakened Ghana’s democratization is in the 
government’s inability to formulate and implement policies that are independent of the 
dictates of external donor governments. This incapacity is a result of Ghana’s heavy 
reliance on external financial support.154 From 1983 to 1999, external donors had 
contributed a total of $8 billion into Ghana’s economy. This dependence on external aid 
“has consequently escalated the debt burden with high debt service ratio” (Boafo-Arthur, 
1999, 52). By the time the ERP was introduced in 1983, Ghana’s total external debt was 
$1.177 billion. Currently, Ghana’s external debt is over $6.4 billion.155 Ghana has not 
been able to diversify its economy and promote industrialization because donor 
governments dictate its economic policies. Ghana’s economy continues to heavily rely on 
cocoa production and gold mining because that’s what IFIs prescribe and what they are 
willing to invest in.  
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The lack of diversification in the nation’s economy makes its economic growth 
not as bright as the picture portrayed by IFIs. Above all, Ghana’s over-dependence on 
foreign aid erodes the state’s capacity to determine its internal and external policies. 
Democracy is weak in any society that answers to the dictates of foreign donors rather 
than to the needs of its population. This was demonstrated in Busia’s overthrow wherein 
the military’s reason for staging the coup was that the civilian administration had turned 
over the reigns of government to international financiers. 
In conclusion, the steps that have been taken by both the Rawlings and Kufuor 
governments to mitigate the socioeconomic impacts of the ERPs on economic growth and 
political development have not brought Ghana out of the dark. Opting for debt relief in 
2000 shows that Ghana has still not developed the structures necessary for sustainable 
growth. For example, in the agricultural sector (on which the country depends for foreign 
exchange earnings) measures have not been taken to allow for the “modernization of 
agricultural production…agricultural credit and price support programs” (Baffoe, 2005, 
2). It is only in recent years (2000-2005) that programs are being developed that 
primarily focus on the social sectors (education and health). PAMSCAD and other 
poverty related strategies have failed to reverse the effects of the ERPs on the conditions 
of living of Ghanaians. The country is still heavily indebted to foreign governments, who, 
through IFIs continue to vet, revise, and approve Ghana’s domestic budget. 
While the IMF and the World Bank have been brandishing Ghana as a “poster 
child” for successful adjustment in third world countries, the impact of SAPs on Ghana’s 
socioeconomic infrastructures – which are necessary prerequisites for building strong 
democracies – have often been ignored.156 Ghana’s economy has been growing at 5.2% 
per annum, but development has still not been accomplished. Instead, the current state of 
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education, health, income distribution, unemployment rates, etc. show that Ghana has 
actually lost ground under SAPs. Four consecutive elections have been held in Ghana 
(1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004), but citizen input and participation in policy formulation is 
still limited and power continues to be heavily concentrated on only one branch of 
government – the executive branch. The institutionalization of democratic ideals like the 
rule of law, transparency in all areas of government, an independent judiciary, a 
participant civic population, etc. is years away. Economic growth alone is necessary, but 
not sufficient for improving on sectors in society that educate the citizens, guarantee their 
well-being, and have them involved in all affairs of their lives. In other words, SAPs took 
away much-needed funds from the social sectors that build the foundations for the 
development of such ideals. As a result, Ghana’s democracy is weak, fragile, and overly 
dependent on the good-will of donor governments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
156 Louis (2005) 
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3. MAURITIUS 
 
On March 12, 1968 Mauritius attained independence from British colonial rule 
and in 1992 it became a republic within the British Commonwealth of nations. Since 
independence Mauritius has been a stable democracy with regular free elections, a strong 
civil society, positive human rights record, has been able to attract considerable foreign 
direct investment, and currently has one of Africa’s highest per capita incomes. How did 
a country that was expected to fail (because of scarce natural resources) develop from a 
low-income, agriculturally based economy to a middle-income diversified economy? 
This chapter reviews Mauritius’ economic growth and development from 1980 to 2000, a 
period during which the country adopted IMF and World Bank conditionalities (1979 – 
1987), reformed its economic policies, and institutionalized democratic principles. 
The first part of this chapter will give a historical background of Mauritius (post-
independence) and its prospects for economic and political development. The following 
sections review the economic and political conditions in Mauritius prior to the 
implementation of SAPs, the debt crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, and the Export 
Processing Zone (EPZ), which (during adjustments) was very instrumental in 
transforming the country’s economy. Following that, I analyze the impact of the EPZ on 
economic growth and socioeconomic infrastructures in Mauritius. The final section 
reviews the impact of the EPZ on Mauritius’ democratization.  
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3.1. Historical Background 
 
Subramanian (2001) observed that few African countries have achieved high 
standards of living and consolidated democracy since their independence, but one notable 
exception has been Mauritius. James Meade, in the early 1960s, stated that the prospects 
for Mauritius’ development were bleak; it was a small island state with a “very diverse” 
population, not endowed with any natural resources, low in managerial and technical 
resource skills, and having only a monocrop economy to face the daunting challenges of 
growth and development.157 However, Mauritius’ history portrays a country that bucked 
the trend of stagnation and poverty and succeeded in building a vibrant economy that 
proves “Meade’s dire prognostication famously wrong” (Subramanian, 2001, 22). Was 
growth and development achieved because Mauritius made overcoming the negatives that 
stacked against the island a priority? 
At independence (1968) Mauritius was faced with difficult structural problems; 
the island’s occupation by the different colonizers from 1638 to 1968 contributed “to 
form a structural syndrome of underdevelopment” (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2006, 2).158 
Firstly, like most of the other British colonies, Mauritius produced only what the colonial 
government imposed on it.159 In this case, the country’s integration into the colonial 
economy left it with a sugarcane monocrop plantation economy that was vulnerable to 
both weather conditions and to fluctuations in demand and price.160 In fact, by the time 
Mauritius gained independence in 1968, the country did not only depend on sugar for 
                                                 
157 James Meade was head of the Royal Commission that was appointed in 1959 by the Governor of the 
colony to survey the development prospects of Mauritius (Meade Report, 1961 cited by YeungLamko, 
1998). See also Subramanian (2001). 
158 Mauritius was discovered by the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century; in 1638 the Dutch created the 
first settlement and the French stayed in control – from 1721 to 1810 – until it was conquered by the 
British. The British authority ruled Mauritius for 158 years (1810-1968) before it gained independence in 
1968 (Bowman, 1991). Also, Sobhee (2006); Walle (2004) 
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95% of its total export earnings, but the sugar sector had already reached its physical 
limits of development.161 That is, all the available land for the cultivation of sugar was 
already in use by Mauritian farmers. As such, prospects for sustainable growth and 
development of the economic sector which only relied on sugar production and exports 
were bleak, especially when compared to countries like Ghana, Nigeria, and Botswana (at 
independence) that had a wealth of natural resources, advanced tertiary institutions, and 
an educated work force that bolstered their human resources. Mauritius on the other hand 
joined the league of newly independent countries with no natural assets and did not have 
any advanced tertiary institutions to foster growth and development.162  
Secondly, colonial rule left the country with a high degree of ethnic and 
sociocultural heterogeneity.163 Mauritius is the only African country where 90% of the 
population comprises immigrants from other regions. Two-thirds of the country’s 
population are descendants of contract workers recruited from British India, 3% are of 
British and French origin, 3% are of Chinese origin, and remaining one-quarter are 
Creoles of African descent.164 This composition of a diverse group of immigrants left the 
country with different languages, religions, and cultures and was initially seen as a 
potential avenue for political and economic rivalry and conflicts in the development 
process.165 For example, English is the medium of instruction in the island’s schools, 
French is the language used by the media, politics is mostly conducted in Kreol, and few 
Franco-Mauritian plantation owners controlled the country’s economy.166 However, 
hindsight shows that cultural and ethnic diversity has surprisingly worked well for 
                                                                                                                                                 
159 YeungLamko (1998); Bertelsmann Foundation (2006) 
160 YeungLamko (1998); Bertelsmann Foundation (2006) 
161 YeungLamko (1998) 
162 The only tertiary institution Mauritius had at independence was the Mauritius College of Agriculture 
(Bowman, 1991). 
163 Bertelsmann Foundation (2006); Bowman (1991) 
164 Bertelsmann Foundation (2006); Walle (2004) 
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Mauritius’ political growth and development.167 What then accounts for the “Mauritian 
miracle” that has caught the attention of international scholars?168  
Scholars (Sobhee, 2006; English, 1998; YeungLamko, 1998; Weissman, 1996) 
have primarily focused on Mauritius’ market-oriented economic policies as the important 
factors that account for the “Mauritian miracle.” But according to Miles (1999), 
economic reforms only offer a partial explanation for the democratic consolidation that 
has taken place in Mauritius. In addition to successful economic reforms, the country’s 
peculiar colonial history, its political geography and present demography, and its robust 
civil society offer valuable explanations about Mauritius’ economic growth and political 
development. 
Mauritian society is a creation of diaspora communities that have gone through 
cultural and linguistic transformations to produce a political culture that accommodates 
the views of citizens and adheres to the dictates of the constitution.169 Subramanian and 
Roy (2001) see the country’s plural population of 1.2 million as the social capital that has 
greatly helped in attracting investors and strengthening commercial ties between 
Mauritius and the different continents whose offspring inhabit the island. 
Further, the country’s historical experience of “sequential colonialism” and the 
complex dualistic institutional structure that was inherited by post independence 
governments have been important to the country’s economic and political 
                                                                                                                                                 
165 Bertelsmann Foundation (2006); Darga (1998); Bowman (1991) 
166 Miles (1999) 
167 Even though diversity has worked well for consociational arrangements in the political process, it still 
has a negative impact on wealth distribution as discussed later. Mauritius’ sociocultural heterogeneity has 
produced a class of plantation and sugar factory owners who even today constitute “an ownership 
oligarchy” Bertelsmann Foundation (2006, 2). 
168 Scholars including Sobhee (2006), Walle (2004), Miles (1999), and YeungLamko (1998) see Mauritius’ 
development from a low-income to a middle-income diversified economy as a “miracle” because of the 
way in which the country has effectively utilized its limited natural resources to foster socioeconomic 
growth and development.  
169 Miles (1999) 
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development.170 In other words, dealing with two sets of colonial influences has helped 
the leaders in developing sophisticated political skills that thrive on the accommodation 
of all views in the political process. This tolerance has been the supplementary force that 
has strengthened the social capital that has worked well in favor of Mauritians.171
Also, Mauritius has made great progress in its economic growth and political 
development because of the country’s political leadership, a strong civil society, and 
tremendous assistance from the international community.172 Table 3.1 illustrates that the 
Mauritian political system has historically been forged by alliances that cut across ethnic, 
religious, and political cleavages.173 As Walle (2004) observed, no single leader can be 
credited for putting Mauritius on the right path to development. Instead, the political 
compromise that was crafted by the leading politicians “across the ethnic divide right 
around independence” paved the way for political stability and long term economic 
growth (Walle, 2004, 3). In other words, from independence the political elite realized 
that it was only through consensus building and forming alliances that social and political 
stability was guaranteed. 
                                                 
170 Mauritius’ political and judicial systems are a combination of the British and French models. The 
political structure is patterned on the British parliamentary system where the party that wins the majority of 
seats chooses the prime minister. Until March 1992 when Mauritius became a republic, a titular governor 
general in the name of the British monarch presided over parliament. Since then, a president, appointed by 
the prime minister and ratified by parliament has assumed the role of the governor general. The constitution 
is a composite of British constitution and the French Napoleonic code. The chief justice is appointed by the 
prime minister and he/she helps in selecting five other judges. The Supreme Court interprets the 
constitution and serves as the Court of Criminal and Civil Appeals. The British Privy Council continues to 
serve as the country’s highest court of appeal (U.S. Library of Congress, 2006; Miles, 1999). 
171 Sobhee (2006) 
172 Miles (1999); Treebhoohun (1999); Carroll and Carroll (1999) 
173 Miles (1999) 
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Table 3.1: Mauritius’ governments since independence 
 
Government Leader Dates of Tenure 
 
Mauritian Labor Party (MLP) in 
coalition with other parties 
 
Mauritian Militant Movement 
(MMM) & Mauritian Socialist 
Party (MSP) 
 
Mauritian Socialist Movement 
(MSM) in coalition with other 
parties 
 
Mauritian Socialist Movement 
(MSM) in coalition with other 
parties 
 
Mauritian Socialist Movement 
(MSM) in coalition with other 
parties 
 
Mauritian Labor Party (MLP) &  
Mauritian Militant Movement 
(MMM) 
 
Mauritian Socialist Movement 
(MSM) & Mauritian Militant 
Movement (MMM) 
 
Mauritian Militant Movement 
(MMM) & Mauritian Socialist 
Movement (MSM) 
 
Mauritian Labor Party (MLP) 
 
 
Sir Seewoosagur 
Ramgoolam 
 
Sir Anerood Jugnauth 
 
 
 
Sir Anerood Jugnauth 
 
 
 
Sir Anerood Jugnauth 
 
 
 
Sir Anerood Jugnauth 
 
 
 
Dr. Navin C. Ramgoolam 
 
 
 
Sir Anerood Jugnauth 
 
 
 
Paul R. Bérenger 
 
 
 
Dr. Navin C. Ramgoolam 
 
3/1968 – 6/1982  
 
 
6/1982 – 8/1983  
 
 
 
8/1983 – 8/1987 
 
 
 
8/1987 – 3/1992  
 
 
 
3/1992 – 12/1995  
 
 
 
12/1995 – 9/2000  
 
 
 
9/2000 – 9/2003  
 
 
 
9/2003 – 7/2005  
 
 
 
7/2005 – Present  
 
Source: European Community Country Overview (2006); U.S. Department of State (2006); Darga (1998); 
Bowman (1991) 
 
The above point is vividly demonstrated in light of the fact that over 90% of 
Mauritian governments have ruled through coalition building with other parties. No 
single leader, political party, or ethnic group has been able to dominate the political 
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scene.174 As a result, the leaders have been directly or indirectly forced to accommodate 
the views of the opposition, its diverse communities, and ethnic groups. Successive 
governments have, with varying degrees of success, tried to work out a modus vivendi 
that takes the concerns of the island’s myriad communities into consideration in the 
formulation of policy. The diverse interests of the different communities have contributed 
to a political culture that is “sometimes volatile and highly fluid,” and characterized by 
shifting alliances.175 As Miles (1999) puts it, politics in Mauritius “makes for familiar 
bedfellows in small bedrooms” (Miles, 1999, 96).  
In addition to the political leadership, Mauritius’ vibrant civil society has greatly 
influenced economic growth and political development. Civil society plays a central role 
in the formulation and implementation of policies.176 It has promoted the growth and 
development of the country’s socioeconomic infrastructures by engaging in a range of 
activities and functions that include women’s groups, charity, the handicapped, senior 
citizens, religion, education, youth and culture, and sports. The freedoms that Mauritians 
enjoy within civil society have helped them in channeling their intercultural differences 
in positive directions.177 Miles (1999) observed that civil society has promoted a 
Mauritian nationalism that does not come at the expense of ethnicity, but which embraces 
all subcultures without expecting them to shed their own particular familial and private 
                                                 
174 The political parties that emerged after Mauritius gained independence were primarily formed along 
ethnic, cultural, and economic lines causing class-based struggles and ethnic competition and violence. The 
realization – in the 1960s and 1970s – that individual parties rarely had the ability to control the 
government produced norms of conduct whereby coalitions joined together different parties that 
represented different ethnic, cultural, and religious interests (Lange, 2007). On the other hand, individual 
susceptibilities to cultural mixing through intermarriage and linguistic and cultural assimilation have made 
ethnic and communal boundaries remarkable fluid. As a result, the majority of parties now cut across 
ethnic, religious, and cultural lines (Christopher, 1992). 
175 U.S. Library of Congress (2006) 
176 Miles (1999); Darga (1998) 
177 Carroll and Carroll (1999); Miles (1999) 
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customs. In Mauritius as in other democratic societies, civil society has been one of the 
main pillars in the sustenance and progress of governance.178    
At the economic level, Mauritians inherited an economy – at independence – that 
was heavily dependent on sugar export earnings and for a third of the total employment 
in the country.179 An attempt to diversify the country’s economy through an import-
substitution (ISI) strategy in the early 1960s failed to deliver growth in the country’s 
employment sector and was unable to attract foreign investment in the economy.180 To 
address these underdevelopment issues, the government that took over from the British 
colonizers changed Mauritius’ economy strategy from import-substitution 
industrialization to export-oriented industrialization (EOI).181 Although different 
economic reforms have been implemented by the various coalition governments post-
independence, all such reforms have consistently followed the EOI strategy that was 
adopted by the Mauritian Labor Party government under the Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ) Act of 1970.182 It can be argued that, domestically, a stable political and social 
environment, consistency in the development strategy, and the development of 
socioeconomic infrastructures should be given credit for the “Mauritian miracle.”  
                                                 
178 Darga (1998) 
179 YeungLamko (1998) 
180 Import substitution industrialization (ISI) and export-oriented industrialization (EOI) were two central 
strategies in the debate over development economics in the 1950s and 1960s (YeungLamko, 1998). Many 
of the newly independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa adopted the ISI strategy believing that less 
reliance on imports from the developed countries or their former colonial masters would eventually make 
them truly independent. According to YeungLamko (1998), Mauritius adopted the ISI strategy in the early 
1960s based on the recommendations of the Meade Report (1961). Legislation was passed in 1964 that 
protected companies that were setting up ISI industries from external competition through tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade. This strategy was unable to cope with the unemployment situation and did not attract 
the foreign investment that was expected. See also Sobhee (2006). 
181 Unlike African countries that were attracted to the ISI strategy, in the Asian region many of the LDCs 
saw the importance and benefits that international markets would bring to their economies. As such, 
countries like Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea – as early as the late 1950s – tailored their 
development goals along the lines of export industrialization. That is, developing industries that produced 
primarily for international consumption. Mauritius (after 1970) followed the example of Asian economies 
(Sobhee, 2006; YeungLamko, 1998). 
182 Sobhee (2006); Subramanian (2001); YeungLamko (1998) 
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In spite of the above positive aspects of growth and development, Mauritius “is no 
political paradise” (Miles, 1999, 98). Miles (1999) and Bowman (1991) argued that as the 
economy has mushroomed, so has the level of corruption. Darga (1998) observed that 
government parastatals have been intensely subjected to the practice of political 
patronage and clientelism in the recruitment and promotion of employees. Further, 
Mauritius has witnessed high levels illicit drug trading, political violence, and curtailing 
of political freedoms. For example, many Mauritian diplomats have been caught 
smuggling drugs into countries like Holland and the United States. Numerous 
assassination attempts have targeted political leaders like Bérenger in 1971 and Jugnauth 
between 1983 and 1995. Police brutality has sometimes sparked racial tensions, as in the 
February 1999 beating of a popular Creole seggae musician (Kaya) and from 1972 to 
1976 the MLP in response to national strikes banned all political activities under a state 
of emergency. Still, there is agreement that even though malpractice is not absent in 
Mauritian politics, corruption “has not become predatory on the economic growth and the 
overall development of the country” (Darga, 1998, 10).183 For Walle (2004), corruption 
appears to be relatively unimportant and abuse of power is minimum. 
Mauritius has emerged as one of the few African success stories. However, 
Mauritius’ development from a low-income to a middle-income level country has not 
come without hassles. The first decade of the post-independence period saw a wave of 
growth (1970-1976) and then a drastic deterioration of the country’s fiscal and external 
balances, and in its employment and inflation rates (1979-1981).184 This situation was 
worsened by external factors including world recession and the oil crisis of the 1970s, 
                                                 
183 See also Walle (2004); Miles (1999). 
184 Scholars (Sobhee, 2006; Dabee and Greenaway, 2001; Treebhoohun, 1999; Darga, 1998; YeungLamko, 
1998) argue that the trade preferences enjoyed by Mauritius – in the early 1970s – with Europe, Asia, and 
the United States quickly improved the country’s revenues, but during that period excessive wage increases 
for public employees and expansionist policies created balance of payment problems to the economy. 
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deterioration in the terms of trade for the country’s major export (sugar), import 
restrictions on EPZ exports (1976-1979), and decline in foreign investment during that 
period.185 The declining economic situation led to a growing deficit in 1976 –1977; this 
forced Mauritius to approach the IMF in 1978 for a Standby Agreement.186 From 1981 to 
1987, the government had no alternative than to adopt the IMF and World Bank 
prescribed structural adjustment program (SAP). This program primarily targeted 
development of export-oriented industrialization; favorable conditions at home and 
abroad helped the EPZ flourish and Mauritius was able to pay off its debts to the IMF and 
the World Bank between 1987 and 1992. Did the country’s preexisting socioeconomic 
infrastructures foster the success of the SAP? How was Mauritius’ SAP different from 
that of Ghana? 
 
3.2. Post Colonialism: Economic Growth and Political Development 
Four distinct eras can be identified in Mauritius’ economic growth and political 
development from 1968 to 2005: the Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam era (1968-1982), the 
Sir Anerood Jugnauth era (1982-1995), the Navin Ramgoolam era (1995-2000), and the 
Sir Anerood Jugnauth and Paul Bérenger era (2000-2005). This section reviews how 
these different eras impacted Mauritius’ growth and development. 
 
The Seewoosagur Ramgoolam Era (1968-1982)  
The majority of political parties that were formed as the British colonial 
government allowed more political participation by Mauritians in the political process of 
their country were organized along ethnic, cultural, and economic lines.187 The political 
                                                 
185 YeungLamko (1998) 
186 From 1978 to 1986 Mauritius negotiated five Standby Agreements with the IMF (English, 2002). 
187 Meisenhelder (1997); Bowman (1991) 
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leaders who emerged during this process were under many pressures to address the 
multiple concerns of a society that had so many differences in terms of class, religion, 
color, caste, and language.188 These differences became manifest in the drive for 
independence when some communities and interests advocated for an association with 
the colonial regime, while others wanted an independent Mauritius.189 The Mauritian 
Labor Party, led by Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, was able to generate a strong 
movement for suffrage and independence with the support of the Indo-Mauritian farmers 
and professionals, and Indian and Creole laborers.190 The August 1967 elections were 
very important to Mauritius’ status in international relations; the MLP-led alliance for 
independence won these elections and Mauritius was granted independence on March 12, 
1968. 
The government that was formed at independence had two main challenges: 
laying the foundation for stable political development and developing an economic 
strategy that would jumpstart economic growth and development. From the political 
perspective, the Seewoosagur government had to find a way of working with other 
political parties to address the needs of Mauritius’ diverse communities. As stated above, 
political parties were formed along ethnic, cultural, and economic lines with none of 
these groups having a clear majority to control parliament. As such, crafting a way of 
forming alliances and keeping them together became crucial to the country’s political 
stability. Sir Ramgoolam realized this need and reached out to all factions of the 
Mauritian society in 1969 and formed a broad-based national unity government which 
                                                 
188 Bowman (1991) 
189 According to Bowman (1991) the PMSD, led by Gaëtan Duval fought against independence and in 
favor of an association. Duval rallied the support of minorities including the Franco-Mauritians, Chinese, 
Muslims, and Tamils against the MLP which was dominated by Hindus. This group, especially the Franco-
Mauritians advocated for an association with the colonial regime because their economic interests were 
greatly protected under colonial rule. In contrast the poor farmers and Creole minority wanted to sever ties 
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included members of the main opposition party – the PMSD.191 As Bowman (1991) 
observed, the coalition government that was formed in 1969 was a typical “Mauritian 
hybrid” that blended Hindu and other communal activists, socialists from within the 
MLP, and “the wealthy white landowners, Chinese, and the poor Creole workers” from 
the PMSD (Bowman, 1991, 70). It was at these initial stages that the Mauritian leadership 
accepted the fact that it is only through forging partnerships with rivals that stability and 
national unity would be maintained. 
 In addition to the challenges of forming alliances, the new government had to 
address the high level of income inequality between the 3% Franco-Mauritians and over 
80% of other ethnic groups that were extremely poor. This challenge became even more 
urgent with the rise of the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) – in 1969 – that 
challenged the then accepted notion that Mauritian society was one divided just among 
communities. The MMM interpreted the Mauritian society in terms of class; they focused 
on issues relating to unemployment, poor wages, and the redistribution of land.192 Since 
these were concerns at the heart of the majority of Mauritians, the MMM was able to 
draw a lot of support from the very communities that formed the MLP coalition’s 
political base. 
From 1970 to 1971 the MLP led government faced series of strikes that disrupted 
the Mauritian economy.193 Unable or unwilling to address the issues that were raised by 
                                                                                                                                                 
with colonialism because they saw much hope for improvements in their conditions of living in an 
independent Mauritius. 
190 Meisenhelder (1997) 
191 In 1969 Sir Seewoosagur’s MLP formed a coalition government with the main opposition party, PMSD, 
and CAM. The cabinet was expanded from ten to twenty-one members; Gaëtan Duval (leader of PMSD) 
was made the foreign minister and his party was given seven seats in the cabinet. Also, CAM had two 
cabinet seats and the remaining twelve seats were given to MLP members (Bowman, 1991). 
192 Bowman (1991) 
193 The MMM capitalized on the growing discontent of the majority of Mauritians (about their poor 
conditions of living) by organizing strikes that sought economic reforms for the poorly paid workers and 
advocated other political reforms. Sectors like transportation, agriculture, docks, public service, and 
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the various sectors that engaged in these civil disobedience, the MLP led government 
resorted to oppressive practices. A state of emergency was declared at the end of 1971, 
twelve trade unions were suspended, numerous trade union and MMM leaders were 
arrested and imprisoned with no charges brought against them, political meetings were 
banned, and the MMM newspaper, Le Militant was shut down.194 These violations of 
civil and political liberties and the shifting alliances between the various political parties 
– especially between 1971 and 1976 – threatened Mauritius’ young democracy. 
From political challenges that faced Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam and his 
government, Mauritius had inherited an economy that was poised to fail. Unlike other 
African countries, Mauritius had no mineral or oil deposits, the country was very distant 
from sources of raw materials abroad, there was shortage of management and technical 
skills, and there was little capital for investment purposes.195 As English (2002) puts it, 
Mauritius was a poor country with an annual per capita income of only $350, a rapidly 
growing population that threatened to overwhelm a stagnant sugar economy, and an 
unemployment rate that was estimated at 16%.196 Also, the country’s sugar economy was 
primarily in the hands of a few Franco-Mauritians. According to Meisenhelder (1997), of 
the 19 large estates (sugar) that accounted for 93% of the country’s exports fifteen were 
owned by local Franco-Mauritians, three by foreign capital (Lonrho), and one was owned 
by the state. Addressing the countries social and economic inequalities between the upper 
and the lower class was necessary, especially with series of strikes that demanded land 
redistribution and better salaries for the poor farmers.  
                                                                                                                                                 
electricity were disrupted causing shortages of essential food imports and reduced sugar exports (Bowman, 
1991). 
194 Bowman (1991) 
195 World Bank (1978 cited by YeungLamko, 1998). 
196 See also Subramanian (2001); YeungLamko (1998); Bräutigam (1997); Bowman (1991). 
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To address the above problems, Sir Ramgoolam’s regime adopted a Fabian or 
social democratic ideology by advocating for a partnership between the public and 
private sectors.197 Mauritius had a very strong indigenous capitalist class that was 
dominated by Franco-Mauritian plantation and sugar factory owners.198 Prior to 
independence, this small group of Mauritians had accumulated much wealth from the 
sugar plantations and was in control of the country’s economy. At the other end of the 
spectrum, were the Indo-Mauritians (the majority) and other minorities that accounted for 
over 80% of the country’s population. This group was relatively poor but formed much of 
the middle class; by independence they were in political control of the government, some 
of them had started owning land, and were having growing access to public education.199  
Post independence, the sugar economy remained in the hands of the Franco-
Mauritians, while the state and the public sectors were dominated by the Indo-Mauritian 
middle class. For the country’s economic growth, the independence government realized 
that cross-ethnic/class alliances had to be formed around coalitions of workers, the 
middle class, and the upper class. The traditional capitalist class was allowed to prosper 
while the state became more involved in the economy; the government held down wages 
and rewarded workers through public services and benefits, and implemented policies 
that favored local capital accumulation.200 The leaders hoped that such a partnership 
would achieve both capitalist economic growth and a modern welfare state.201
                                                 
197 Meisenhelder (1997) 
198 Bertelsmann Foundation (2006); Meisenhelder (1997) 
199 Meisenhelder (1997) 
200 According to Bräutigam (1997), the MLP coalition government was under so much pressures from the 
demands of all sectors of society – spearheaded by the MMM – that it provided subsidized rice and wheat 
flour for the rural and urban poor (beginning in 1973), gave fertilizers to small scale sugar producers, 
implemented a policy of free primary and secondary education for school age children, lowered the voting 
age to eighteen years, and provided free healthcare for all. Also, the government passed laws that heavily 
protected local businesses from external competition. See also Meisenhelder (1997). 
201 Dabee and Greenaway (2001); Treebhoohun (1999); Meisenhelder (1997) 
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Also, the new government moved away from the import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI) strategy that was adopted in the early 1960s.202 The ISI strategy 
was beset by two main factors: it was unable to encourage much needed investment in the 
Mauritian economy and could not create the jobs that would have reduced the 
unemployment rate. By 1970 the country had an unemployment rate of 20% and only a 
few ISI companies had been set up.203 Studies of Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Singapore showed that Export Processing Zones (EPZ) produced rapid economic growth 
and created employment for the domestic population. Since economic growth and 
employment creation were problems that Mauritians had to address, the Seewoosagur 
government decided to emulate the Asian countries by developing its own strategy.204 
This was embodied in the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) Act No.51 of 1970.205
As discussed in the next section, Mauritius experienced an economic boom 
between 1970 and 1975. However, this proved to be short-lived as both endogenous and 
exogenous factors dampened the country’s economic prosperity; by 1976 Mauritius was 
facing a debt crisis. 
 
3.3. Debt Crisis: 1970s and 1980s 
Mauritius, like much of the world faced some form of political and economic 
crises in the 1970s and 1980s. For Mauritius, the first half of the 1970s was marked by 
rapid economic growth and development of the country’s infrastructures. However, 
during the second half of the 1970s the economy stagnated, budget deficits expanded, and 
                                                 
202 The Meade Report (1961) recommended that Mauritius should diversify from its over-dependence on 
sugar, and to industrialize in order for it to cope with the rapidly growing population and unemployment 
problems (Meade Report, 1961 cited by YeungLamko, 1998). As such, the Mauritian government adopted 
the import-substituting industrialization (ISI) strategy suggested by the Meade Report. Legislation was 
passed in 1964 that provided incentives for setting up ISI industries. However, between 1964 and 1968 the 
labor force continued to grow rapidly and the ISI industries did not create as many jobs as was expected. 
203 YeungLamko (1998), Meisenhelder (1997). 
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the country had to turn to the IMF and World Bank for assistance. Scholars (English, 
2002; YeungLamko, 1998; Meisenhelder, 1997; Treebhoohun, 1997; Bräutigam, 1997) 
have produced extensive literatures that identify the endogenous and exogenous factors 
that contributed to both the economic growth that Mauritius experienced in the early 
1970s and the stagnation it faced during the latter half of that period. Among these factors 
were the favorable prices for sugar in the international market in the 1970s, attractive 
trade agreements with EC countries, and the timely implementation of the export-oriented 
industrialization strategy. On the hand, causes for the stagnation and crisis that Mauritius’ 
economy faced in the late 1970s were attributed to the expansionist and wage policies the 
government adopted in the early to mid-1970s, coupled with other circumstances beyond 
the government’s control including cyclones that hit the island in the late 1970s and the 
oil crises and world recession from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s.   
Firstly, the economic growth that Mauritius experienced immediately following 
independence was spurred by favorable sugar prices in the international market. The 
increased demand for sugar and its by-products forced an increase in sugar prices around 
the world. In 1972 the price of sugar increased from £40 to £330 (pounds sterling) per 
ton.206 Fortunately, during this period (1972-1974) Mauritius successfully renegotiated 
the quota for its sugar exports under the EEC Sugar protocol; the country’s sugar exports 
increased from 380,000 tons to 505,000 tons at a guaranteed price of £260 per ton.207 
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207 The European Community (EC) was originally founded on March 25, 1957 by the signing of the Treaty 
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Convention provided special, privileged trade and aid links between former French and Belgian African 
colonies and the European Community (YeungLamko, 1998). See also Meisenhelder, 1997. 
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This favorable trading agreement and the quadrupling of the price for sugar in the 
international market, increased the value of sugar exports from Rs. 321.6 million 
(Rupees) in 1971 to Rs. 1584.2 million in 1974.208 The increased revenue that was 
received from sugar exports had an immediate positive impact on the country’s economy 
growth. 
Secondly, the special trading privileges under the Yaoundé Convention provided 
Mauritius and other African countries access to markets of EC members. In other words, 
for Mauritius and similar countries, all restrictions (quotas or tariffs) were removed from 
the exports of their products to EC markets. As Sobhee (2006) and Meisenhelder (1997) 
noted, the economic growth that Mauritius experienced at the early part of independence 
was primarily due to the preferential trade arrangements negotiated under the Lomé 
Convention and the Multi-Fibre Agreement that allowed its textile products to be 
exported around the world.  
Finally, the implementation of the EOI strategy was very timely in that it 
coincided with a favorable trading climate in the international arena. Under the EOI 
strategy, the entire island was converted into an export processing zone (EPZ) where 
apparel, watches, and jewellery were produced for international markets.209 Investment, 
employment, and export expanded considerably after the implementation of the EPZ. 
From 1970 to 1977 up to 86 export industries were created employing 17,474 workers.210 
Investment in the export sector did not only come from foreign entrepreneurs, but also 
from the local business community that was making high profits from the sugar boom 
during this period.211 Also, investment in the export sector led to an increase in EPZ 
export earnings from Rs. 3.9 million in 1971 to Rs. 196.4 in 1975, and then to Rs. 433.4 
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million in 1977.212As a result of the increases in investment and export earnings, 
Mauritius was able to considerably improve on its balance of payments; from a surplus of 
Rs. 94 million in 1970 to Rs. 365 million in 1974. Between 1971 and 1975 EPZ exports 
grew at 31% per annum and EPZ employment expanded by 38%.213 Also, the fact that 
Mauritian products could access prominent Europeans markets under special trading 
privileges brought in much needed investment capital from countries like Hong Kong and 
Taiwan that did not have such access. From 1972 to 1977 Mauritius’ gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew at an average of 9% per annum.214     
The MLP government used the surplus revenue it was receiving during this period 
to develop the institutional framework for industrialization and development.215 The 
agricultural sector was furnished with modern equipment to increase productivity. Jobs 
were created in government service, manufacturing, and tourism. Further, the government 
increased wages, built tertiary educational institutions, kept taxes low, and provided 
subsidies for small farmers.216 The government also developed its economic 
infrastructure during this period; it constructed modern roads, developed its electricity 
and water supplies, offered training to the labor force, and improved on its internal and 
external communications and transportation systems including telephone networks, telex, 
air services, and sea port facilities.217
It was during this period that Mauritius was making progress in economic growth, 
that the government adopted policies that would later lead to crises.218 For example, in 
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response to the strikes and riots in the early 1970s – for better wages – the government 
substantially increased wages, awarded unnecessary end-of-year bonuses, and increased 
the subsidies on food and social welfare services with no long-term financing plan.219 
The wage and expansionist policies adopted by the government created imbalances in the 
economy. From 1975 to 1976 government budgetary expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
increased from 22% to 29%; it further increased to 32% in 1978 and this resulted in the 
rapid increase of the budget deficit.220 As YeungLamko (1998) and Bräutigam (1997) 
argued, the government’s ill-advised wage policy and the increased spending on social 
services created rapid price inflation and a drop in the rate of growth of the economy. For 
Treebhoohun (1999), the government’s ambitious investment program in infrastructure – 
estimated at Rs. 7 billion for the plan period 1975-1980 – disregarded macroeconomic 
management and had dire consequences on the economy. The Mauritian leaders had to 
borrow heavily from European governments to sponsor their expansionist policy. Figure 
3.1 shows a sharp increase in Mauritius’ external debt service in the mid-1970s.  
Internationally, the 1973 and 1979 oil crises led to world recessions. Furthermore, 
between 1976 and 1979 the price of sugar tumbled; France imposed import restrictions 
on EPZ exports in 1976 and the United Kingdom acted similarly in 1979. As the price of 
oil doubled during the second oil crisis in 1979, the price for imported goods soared; this 
caused a relative decline in foreign investment.221 In addition, other natural 
circumstances beyond the control of the government had negative impacts on the 
economy.  
According to Bräutigam (1997), the sharp rise in the cost of oil imports from 
1973-1974 together with the poor harvests of sugar in the mid-1970s depressed earnings 
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in the sugar sector and resulted in a sharp deterioration in the country’s balance of 
payment. Four cyclones hit the island between 1976 and 1980, destroying crops and 
reducing sugar production. By the end of the 1970s, as a result of all of the above 
internal, external, and natural circumstances, Mauritius’ “balance of trade deficit 
widened; the government’s budget deficit expanded; workers were laid off (567 in 1976, 
3581 in 1978, 4234 in 1980); the unemployment rate soared” (Treebhoohun, 1999, 6). 
 
Figure 3.1: Mauritius’ debt service as a percentage of GDP (1970-1981) 
 
Source: World Bank Group (WDI, 2007) 
   
The worsening economic situation forced the Mauritian government to negotiate 
its first Stand-by Agreement with the IMF in 1978.222 Natural disasters – a couple of 
cyclones between December 1979 and March 1980 – and a fall in sugar production 
prevented the Mauritian government from meeting the requirements of the first Standby 
Agreement with the IMF. As such, another agreement was negotiated with the IMF and 
the World Bank in 1980. The loans that were granted under this new Agreement were 
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conditioned on the implementation of a structural adjustment program that started in 
1981.223 Mauritius’ SAP is discussed in Section 3.4. 
Mauritius had seen its own share of successes and failures in the first decade of 
independence. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam managed to maintain a coalition from 1968 
to 1982 when his government was democratically removed from office. He has been 
given credit for laying the economic and political foundation upon which the Mauritian 
society has developed into a successful middle-income country. From 1968 to 1982 the 
infrastructures for a strong welfare state were built, the country started diversifying the 
economy, and the leaders started abiding by the results of the democratic process. This 
legacy has been followed by successive Mauritian governments. 
 
Sir Anerood Jugnauth Era (1982-1995) 
Events leading up to the 1982 elections made it virtually impossible for the MLP 
to stay in power. The MLP was in constant turmoil after the 1976 election and corruption 
among government officials was becoming rampant.224 Also, the Mauritian economy was 
in crisis and the majority of citizens were feeling the pinch.225 The austerity measures 
that were adopted with the implementation of SAP created economic, political, and social 
discontent among Mauritians. As such, it was not surprising that the 1982 election was an 
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overwhelming victory for Sir Anerood Jugnauth and his MMM/PSM coalition: they won 
62% of the vote and all sixty elected seats in parliament (forty-two by the MMM and 
eighteen by the PSM).226
The Sir Anerood Jugnauth era went through four distinct phases: 1982-1983, 
1983-1987, 1987-1991, and 1991-1995. These phases were marked by various coalition 
governments ruling Mauritius, corruption scandals at all levels of government, but above 
all, significant improvements in the country’s economy. In the area of politics, Jugnauth 
came to power at a time when it had become obvious that only forming alliances with 
other groups would give leaders the necessary majority to govern. From 1982 to 1983 
Jugnauth ruled in coalition with the PSM; this phase ended over conflicts relating to 
policy issues. By then, to the surprise of many Mauritians, Bérenger (the new Minister of 
Finance) advocated for a continuation of the SAP that had been adopted by the MLP 
government in 1981; to him the program’s focus on developing export-oriented industries 
was economically sensible for Mauritius’ growth and development.227 Boodhoo’s PSM 
party was opposed to the continuation of SAP because the IMF and World Bank austerity 
plan was having adverse effects on poorer Hindus who had been the primary 
beneficiaries of government subsidies. 
Sir Jugnauth was unable to resolve this conflict and save the coalition. On the one 
hand, he agreed with Bérenger that repudiating the agreement his predecessor had with 
the IMF and World Bank would shake the international community’s confidence in the 
Mauritian economy which heavily depended on international markets and international 
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financiers. On the other hand, Jugnauth knew that his predecessor was kicked from power 
primarily because of the austerity measures that were implemented as a condition of 
SAP.228 The incapacity of Sir Anerood Jugnauth to solve this problem and the rift 
between the core MMM and PSM supporters led to the collapse of the MMM/PSM 
coalition government in March 1983 and new elections were set for August 1983.229
The brief rule of the MMM under Jugnauth should be remembered for two 
important aspects of Mauritius’ economic and political development. Firstly, Mauritian 
leaders were able to work through a tumultuous stage of their political development 
without violating the provisions of the constitution and violence. Secondly, the economic 
policies of Bérenger cemented acceptance of the SAP that had been adopted prior to the 
MMM/PSM regime. 
From 1983 to 1987 Mauritian society was engulfed in excessive corruption 
scandals. According to Bowman (1991), charges of government corruption, fraud, and 
drug trafficking were a constant feature of Mauritian political life post 1983. Numerous 
members of the Alliance government and senior police officers were exposed of being 
involved in drug trafficking and the government was either unwilling or unable to clamp 
down on this problem.230 Due to these scandals, ranking cabinet members and 
parliamentarians defected from the Alliance.231 By November 1986 it was obvious that 
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the Alliance had crumbled and Sir Jugnauth did not have enough of a majority to stay in 
power. As such, an election was set for August 1987 which Jugnauth’s MSM contested 
with the same Alliance as in 1983 with the exception of the PSM.232
Two major factors worked in their favor for Jugnauth in the 1987 election; firstly, 
members of the Alliance were able to work through their differences and remained united 
for the election and secondly, the Mauritian economy was gradually recovering.233 
Bowman (1991) argued that, the result of the election confirmed that Mauritians were 
more interested in economic prosperity and the communal electoral traditions that had 
been developed over the years, than punishing the entire government for corruption 
charges against some of its members.  
Political life in Mauritius from 1987 to 1995 was pretty much the same: a shaky 
alliance that saw the resignation or defection of some of the members and corruption 
scandals.234 However, one important policy decision that was introduced by the MSM 
and MMM leadership for the September 1991 election was the introduction of legislation 
to make Mauritius a republic.235 This legislation was passed on March 12, 1992 and 
Mauritius became the twenty-ninth republic under the British Commonwealth.236 This 
was significant because it was only after the passage of the 1992 legislation that the 
British monarch ceased being the country’s ceremonial head of state. Under the new 
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republic, Sir Veerasamy Ringadoo, a Hindu, was appointed as the first president of 
Mauritius.237 Jugnauth’s government was finally defeated in the 1995 election by the 
MLP/MMM coalition. 
At the economic level, Jugnauth inherited an economy that was in crisis, but his 
era (1982-1995) witnessed significant improvements in the country’s economy. By 1982 
Mauritius was relying on loans – conditioned on the implementation of the SAP – from 
the IMF and World Bank to keep its economy afloat.238 Sir Anerood Jugnauth’s various 
coalition governments – from 1982 to 1995 – have been given credit for turning the 
Mauritian economy around from the crisis mode it had reached in the early 1980s.239 The 
most important decision that was made by Bérenger during the MMM/PSM alliance 
(1982-1983) was to continue with the IMF/World Bank program that the Sir 
Seewoosagur government had adopted in 1981.240 This decision was important for two 
main aspects; firstly, according to English (2002) and Treebhoohun (1999) it was 
important that Mauritius put “its macroeconomic house in order before it could expand 
welfare programs” (English, 2002, 8). Secondly, Mauritius continued to receive foreign 
aid from international financiers and the SAP that was approved for Mauritius by the IFIs 
promised to lay the foundations for “renewed growth by promoting export-oriented 
industries” (Treebhoohun, 1999, 6).241
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The adoption of strict monetary and fiscal policies during structural reforms and a 
favorable international economic environment for the country’s EOI strategy worked well 
for the country’s economy in the late 1980s. The rapid growth that occurred in the EPZ 
sector helped Mauritius to successfully conclude its structural adjustment program in the 
1980s; the second adjustment loan it received from the World Bank in 1983 was the last 
of that type, its last macro policy agreement with the IMF was in 1985, and by 1987 
Mauritius was achieving a surplus on its external current account and was able to pay off 
its loans to the IMF and World Bank in 1992.242 The next section discusses Mauritius’ 
SAP. 
 
3.4. The Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and the Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ) 
As discussed in Section 3.3., the Mauritian economy experienced increased levels 
of growth in the early 1970s, but was in crisis by the end of that decade.243 In February 
1978, the Mauritian government negotiated its first Standby Agreement with the IMF.244 
From 1978 to 1986 Mauritius negotiated five Standby Agreements with the IMF and two 
structural adjustment loans (SALs) with the World Bank valued at $55 million. English 
(2002), Greenaway and Gooroochurn (2001), and YeungLamko (1998) provide a detailed 
discussion of the different agreements Mauritius had with the IMF between 1978 and 
1986. This section specifically deals with Mauritius’ structural adjustment loans (1981-
1985) from the IMF and World Bank that were conditioned on the implementation of the 
SAP.  
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By 1981 when Mauritius started its SAP, the Standby Agreements with the IMF 
had forced the devaluation of the rupee by 47%, taxes and fees had been raised, real 
wages and food subsidies reduced, and the unemployment rate had reached 15%. Also, 
the government’s balance of payment and fiscal deficit was 15% and 10% of GDP 
respectively, and interest payments on the loans the government had received in the 
1970s had equaled 22% of export earnings.245 It was in the course of these stabilization 
programs that Mauritius negotiated two loans with the World Bank that were conditioned 
on the implementation of a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP).  
The first SAL was disbursed during the period June 1981 to June 1982 and the 
second SAL was from March 1984 to June 1985.246 Greenaway and Gooroochurn (2001), 
Treebhoohun (1998), YeungLamko (1998), and Meisenhelder (1997) state that the main 
aim of Mauritius’ SAP was to lay the foundation for renewed growth by promoting 
export-oriented industrialization, by developing tourism, and by diversifying the 
agricultural sector. The above scholars and others including Sobhee (2006), English 
(2002), Durbarry (2001), Bräutigam (1997), and Weissman (1996) agree that it was 
during SAP that Mauritius’ EPZ became the “engine” of growth that transformed the 
nation’s economy for sustainable development. How did SAP impact Mauritius’ EPZ 
strategy? 
The concept of an export processing zone (EPZ) started in Ireland in 1959 when 
the Shannon Export Free Zone was created in a bid to replace the jobs that were lost 
during the decline of Shannon airport.247 Mauritian leaders observed that the Asian 
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countries that had implemented the EOI strategy were reversing their unemployment 
problems and securing the investment capital that ISI strategy could not generate. As a 
country that had been diagnosed as a prime candidate for failure – because of its lack of 
natural resources, unemployment problems, and its geographical proximity to other 
regions – Mauritius took its cue from Asian economies (who by the late 1960s were 
reaping the benefits of the emerging global economy) and ventured into production for 
international consumption.248   
Durbarry (2001) and YeungLamko (1998) define an EPZ as an administratively, 
and sometimes geographically, designated area where industries that are manufacturing 
goods earmarked for export are given special status. Their status allows them free import 
of equipment and other materials for their industries, favorable legal provisions and 
regulations pertaining to taxation, control over employment rules and regulations, and 
flexibility in the repatriation of profits to other regions. UNCTAD (1983) identified five 
main objectives of EPZs: generating foreign exchange earnings, creating employment, 
attracting foreign capital and advanced technology, acquiring and upgrading labor and 
management skills, and creating linkages between EPZ industries and the domestic 
economy. 
The EPZ Act of 1970 had incorporated the above objectives in the legal 
framework within which export-oriented industries were expected to operate. This Act 
provided fiscal and financial incentives for firms producing for export markets.249 Some 
of these incentives included complete exemption from payment of import and excise 
duties on raw materials, productive machinery, and equipment; exemption from payment 
of income tax on dividends and profits for the first ten years; availability of factory 
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buildings and fully serviced land at subsidized rates; subsidized electricity or water rates; 
free repatriation of capital, profits, and dividends; and favorable labor laws.250 Since its 
inception, industries in Mauritius’ EPZ focused on the production and exportation of light 
bulbs, hand-made model ships, watches, jewellery, and textiles. Since the late 1990s, the 
EPZ industries have further diversified into financial services and information and 
communications technology (ICT).251
Mauritius’ SAP primarily focused on export-oriented manufacturing based on the 
contention that improvements in this sector of the economy would create the conditions 
necessary for export-led growth and mitigate the persistent unemployment problem the 
country faced.252 At the time that the SAP was implemented unemployment in Mauritius 
was at its peak (around 22%), the government deficit was over 13% of GDP, and foreign 
debt had risen (to $226 million from $33 million in 1972).253 To reverse this situation, 
policies implemented under Mauritius’ SAP (1981-1986) focused on trade and exchange 
rate liberalization, restriction of credit expansion, providing incentives for competition 
and high productivity within the economy, and reforming the economic institutions as a 
foundation for development.254  
Although the SAP was initiated under the Sir Ramgoolam’s government (1968-
1982), Sir Anerood Jugnauth (1982-1995) continued on this path of adjustment until the 
program was concluded in the late 1980s. The Jugnauth regime did not only continue the 
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export-oriented strategy of his predecessor but put in place new institutions and 
incentives to “maintain the viability and inherent attractiveness of the EPZ” (Durbarry, 
2001, 112).255 In the area of monetary and fiscal policies the Seewoosagur and Jugnauth 
governments reformed the tax structure, restricted wage increases, reduced food subsidies 
(although they were not eliminated), lifted price controls, and controlled the manner in 
which increases were made to the education and welfare sectors.256 For example, despite 
the continued rise in inflation wage hikes were held to approximately 60% of the rise in 
the consumer price index and a “regressive value added sales tax of 5% was 
implemented” (Bräutigam, 1997, 50). Also, to encourage local companies to export, a 
graduated tax structure was established whereby a 2% rebate was given to local 
enterprises for every 10% of output exported.257
In addition to the monetary and fiscal policies adopted, institutional reforms 
played a significant role in the economic recovery and ultimate development of the 
country. During SAP a successful international campaign was launched by the 
government to attract investors from Europe and Southeast Asia.258 For example, in 1984 
a parastatal organization, the Mauritius Export Development and Investment Authority 
(MEDIA), comprising members of the private sector, was set up to search for new 
markets and attract new investors.259 The main objectives of MEDIA were to promote the 
export of Mauritian goods and services; engage in investment promotion activities, such 
as, promoting Mauritius as an attractive manufacturing base for export purposes; develop 
                                                 
255 Additional incentives included automatic 100% income tax relief for the first ten years for EPZ 
industries, 50% exemption after the eleventh year, and 25% exemption from the sixteenth to the twentieth 
year. Further, profits reinvested in new manufacturing enterprises received other exemptions, foreign 
technicians were granted global exemption on a proportion of their salaries, and there was a guarantee 
against nationalization of foreign enterprises. See Durbarry (2001) for other incentives provided for EPZ 
firms after 1982.   
256 Greenaway and Gooroochurn (2001); Treebhoohun (1999); Bräutigam (1997) 
257 Treebhoohun (1999) 
258 Durbarry (2001) 
259 Durbarry (2001); Treebhoohun (1999) 
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and operate industrial sites and estates; and to “plan, implement, and review programmes 
to develop export and investment in export oriented manufacturing” (Durbarry, 2001, 
112). 
According to Durbarry (2001) the fiscal and financial incentives provided by the 
governments, the provision of first-rate infrastructural facilities, and cheap, literate and 
skilled labor led to a massive flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the economy. 
FDI increased substantially between 1983 and 1989; from Rs. 19 million in 1983 to Rs. 
68 million in 1984; this upward trend of FDI was maintained until 1990 when doubts by 
international investors about the future of the island caused a decline in investment.260
Following the initial rise in investment in the EPZ between 1981 and 1989, the 
growth of firms was constrained from 1989 to 1991. In 1989, 107 operating firms were 
closed primarily due to swelling costs in productivity; the government’s wage 
compensations in 1988 in both the public and private sectors forced the closure of a lot of 
EPZ industries; and employment fell from 89,080 in 1988 to 88,650 in 1989.261 Though 
much could not be done about the wage increases that were enacted in 1988, the 
government took other measures to sustain and consolidate the growth that the EPZ had 
witnessed during SAP. Between 1989 and 1991 the authorities developed programs that 
diversified the EPZ into areas other than textile production. Initially, textile industries 
accounted for 90% of EPZ employment; in the early 1990s the government encouraged 
investment in other products like leather goods, footwear, jewellery, flowers, and 
                                                 
260 Plans by the Jugnauth coalition in the late 1980s to make Mauritius a Republic created doubts about 
political stability in the country. Also, the wage increases that were adopted in 1988 resulted in high cost of 
productivity. These factors forced many firms to close and prevented new investors from coming to the 
country (Durbarry, 2001).  
261 In 1988 pressures from workers unions and other agencies forced the Jugnauth government to increase 
wages in the public and private sectors. These pressures were felt by EPZ industries whose workers also 
advocated for increased wages; this led to swelling costs and reduction in competitiveness. The net effect 
was the closure of a substantial number of EPZ firms (Durbarry, 2001). 
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watches.262 This move improved on employment and was beneficial to both the textile 
and non-textile industries. For example, there was an increase in employment in textile 
from 20,421 in 1982 to 80,118 in 1999. Simultaneously, employment in non-textile firms 
rose from 3,055 to 10,334 in 1999.263
After 1991, the various governments have adjusted policies to meet the challenges 
of globalization. Not surprising, the EPZ during and after SAP has positively impacted 
Mauritius’ economic growth in the following ways. Firstly, the rapid growth that the 
Mauritian economy witnessed in the 1980s can be traced to several economic, political 
and social factors. Mauritius implemented its EOI strategy at a time when many sub-
Saharan African countries had not realized the benefits of globalization to their 
economies. Mauritius took advantage of favorable trade agreements and the growth of the 
international economy in the 1980s to diversify its economy and improve on its export 
earnings.264  
Also, Mauritian leaders played an important role in the different phases of 
industrialization: initiator, promoter, protector, and arbiter.265 The leaders showed great 
commitment to the development of the country and not to sectarian interests. They 
determined the economic policy direction of the country but trusted the private sector 
with development and implementation of the development strategies. Furthermore, the 
civil service was very instrumental in implementing the various economic and social 
programs. Finally, the close collaboration between the public and private sectors was 
marked by the willingness and commitment to constructively participate in policy 
making. For example, twice every year the Prime Minister chaired a joint meeting 
                                                 
262 Durbarry (2001) 
263 Durbarry (2001) 
264 Treebhoohun (1999); Weissman (1996) 
265 Treebhoohun (1999) 
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between his economic ministers and all members of the Joint Economic Community 
(JEC) to determine policy directions.266
Secondly, microeconomic indicators show that the EPZ contributed enormously 
to the rapid growth of the Mauritian economy.267 Prior to the rapid growth of the 
manufactured export in the 1980s, sugar was the main source of income and export 
earnings and it contributed significantly to the GDP. For example, in 1976 sugar 
accounted for 23% of total GDP and 73% of export earnings. By then, the EPZ only 
accounted for 2.6% of GDP. From the mid-1980s, the EPZ contributed up to 13% of 
GDP and the Mauritian economy grew at an average of 4% over the period.268 Figure 3.2 
shows steady improvement in the economy from 1981 to 2000, even though growth rates 
were less than spectacular in some years. In addition to the EPZ growth, Mauritius 
received extensive foreign aid from international financiers during adjustment as seen in 
Figure 3.3. 
The EPZ accounted for a good proportion of the growth that the economy 
witnessed during the period shown. That sector increased the trading account of the 
economy and since the late 1990s, surpassed sugar in foreign exchange earnings. The 
exports of textile, wearing apparel, jewellery, and lately financial services and ICT show 
the relative importance of the EPZ in the Mauritian economy.  
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268 Sobhee (2006); Durbarry (2001) 
94 
  
Figure 3.2: Mauritian Economy - Growth Rates as Percentage of GDP (1981-2003) 
 
 
Source: World Bank Group (WDI, 2006). 
 
Finally, because of the impressive growth record of Mauritius in the 1980s, it 
became the only African country to successfully conclude its SAP during that period. The 
second SAL that the government negotiated with the World Bank in 1984 was the last of 
that type, as was its fifth macro policy agreement with the IMF in 1985.269 By 1987 
Mauritius had not only paid off its last structural adjustment loan to the World Bank but 
had achieved a surplus on its external current account. Also, the rate of inflation which 
was 42% in 1980, due to the devaluation of the rupee, was below 5% in the late 1980s.270 
Furthermore, the progress made at the macroeconomic level trickled down to the 
socioeconomic development of the country. The EPZ’s impact on economic development 
and socioeconomic infrastructure is analyzed in the next section. 
 
                                                 
269 English (2002) 
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Figure 3.3: Foreign Aid to Mauritius (1968-2000) 
 
Source: World Bank Group (WDI, 2007). 
 
As demonstrated above, giving credit to IFIs for Mauritius’ economic success 
would be misleading. Instead, a farsighted leadership that showed commitment to 
constructive development, a stable political environment, favorable conditions and 
preferential trading arrangements in international markets, an aggressive socioeconomic 
infrastructural development, and the EPZ account for the “Mauritian miracle.” The 
question now is can the Mauritian miracle be sustained without preferential trade 
agreements? 
 
Navin Ramgoolam Era (1995-2000) and Jugnauth/Bérenger Era (2000-2005)  
Two eras can be identified after Mauritius successfully concluded its SAP: the 
Navin Ramgoolam era (1995-2000) and the Jugnauth/Bérenger era (2000-2005). During 
both eras, the country’s political institutions continued to thrive and the political climate 
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remained the same as in the first two decades after independence.271 Coalition 
governments continue to rule Mauritius and the leaders abide by the decisions of the 
electorate; this has succeeded in consolidating Mauritius democracy.272 One important 
political development that is worth noting though was the implementation of the pre-
election arrangement between the MMM and the MSM that made Paul Bérenger (in 
2003) the first non-Hindu to assume the position of Prime Minister. Bérenger hails from 
the Franco-Mauritian upper class that is not favored by the majority of Mauritians 
because of the level of social and economic disparity between the small upper class and 
the majority that form the lower class. The distrust of the upper class by the majority has 
consistently prevented the election of Franco-Mauritians to higher positions of authority 
in Mauritian politics.273 As such, the election of a Franco-Mauritian Catholic to the 
highest position in the country was an important first step in Mauritius’ political 
development.  
Politically, Mauritian society continues to face challenges that could deride the 
economic gains that have been made so far. The leaders continue to grant wage increases 
at times when the economy is stagnating. Meisenhelder (1997) observed that, by 1995 
local wages continued to rise while firms that were opened during the EPZ boom were 
closing at a fast rate. The complex system of pay-offs whereby political leaders 
compensate their supporters through unwarranted wage increases and bonuses erode the 
economic gains that the country makes; this was partially responsible for the debt crisis in 
                                                 
271 Mauritian political parties continue to form alliances for strategic reasons – mostly to win elections – but 
easily pull out or are dismissed from government when the various interests collide (Cherian, 2000; 
Bowman, 1991) 
272 Huntington (1991) defined a consolidated democracy as one in which there has been two electoral 
turnovers of power according to the popular will; in Mauritius this occurred in 1982, 1995, 2000, and 2005. 
In addition, Mauritius development meets Dahl’s (1971) criteria for a strong democracy; there is 
meaningful competition, a high level of political participation, and civil and political liberties are 
guaranteed. 
273 According to Cherian (2000), many Mauritians believed that Bérenger’s race and religion had been 
preventing him from becoming prime minister. See also, U.S. Department of State (2006); and Ford (2003). 
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the 1970s and 1980s. Again, between 1995 and 2000 undue wage increases caused 
distortions in the budget; the economy experienced declining rates of savings, balance of 
payment deficits, and increased public debt.274 Also, corruption continues to dampen 
Mauritius’ success story. For example, in 2002 Robert Lesage, head of the Mauritius 
Commercial Bank (MCB), the country’s biggest financial institution was charged with 
misappropriating up to $30 million worth of shares.275 Although Walle (2004) argued 
that there is minimum corruption in Mauritius, there is strong possibility for it to become 
an epidemic in society. 
It is the Mauritian economy that has faced the most challenges after the SAP. The 
main pillar of the economy – export-oriented manufacturing – heavily relies on favorable 
conditions in international markets and special trading privileges for its sustainability, but 
those conditions and privileges are phasing out.276 During the Jugnauth/Bérenger era, the 
guaranteed price of Mauritian sugar – which was above the world market price – at the 
European Union (EU) market was legally challenged at the WTO, the preferential 
treatment which Mauritius had under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement ended in 2004, sugar 
and textile exports dropped, the EU drastically cut the price it paid for sugar under the 
quota system, and both foreign and domestic investors started withdrawing their 
investments to seek cheaper pool of labor in the region.277 Also, Mauritius invested a lot 
in developing a strong social welfare system that provides services including 
compensations to the poor, a social security and pension program for the elderly, and 
healthcare services to the public. As important and innovative these programs are – for an 
                                                 
274 See Figure 3.1. Also, Sobhee (2006); Meisenhelder (1997) 
275 Ford (2003) 
276 Mauritius’ EPZ was developed at a time when there was less competition in that sector. Preferential 
treatment from countries like Hong Kong, Singapore, South Africa, and Sri Lanka (all of whom were 
looking for new international investment opportunities) is declining as these countries can now invest in 
other countries where the cost of production is cheaper; for example, China, India, and Madagascar. Also, 
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African country – providing revenues to sustain them can be a burden on the economy if 
extra taxes are not imposed to pay for them. As the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(2006) stated, the social services programs are gradually reaching the limits of their 
sustainability. The elimination of such programs will be a major cause for social and 
political instability within Mauritius’ diverse communities.  
In response to these vulnerabilities of the economy, the different governments 
(after the adjustment period) have attempted reforms that have managed to sustain the 
economy’s growth and development. For example, between 1995 and 2000, the Navin 
Ramgoolam government invested in computer and software production, diversified the 
agricultural sector further into fruits, vegetables, and flowers; continued promotion of the 
tourist industry; and the development of an export-oriented service sector – primarily 
financial services.278 These new measures succeeded in sustaining the country’s growth 
rates; the annual GDP growth rate increased from 5.6% in 1995 to 8.9% in 2000 and 
foreign trade recorded an average growth rate of 9.5% from 1995-2000. But during this 
same period, trade deficit increased by Rs. 3 million – mainly due to the imports of 
machinery and transport equipment – and unemployment rate increased from 5.1% in 
1995 to 8% in 2000.279
Jugnauth and Bérenger diversified the economy further into offshore banking and 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Between 2000 and 2005, the 
government rapidly invested in these new sectors to dampen the effects of reduced sugar 
and textile exports.280 Although the economic growth rates dropped during this period in 
comparison to the 1995-2000 period (from an average of 6% per annum from 1995-2000 
                                                                                                                                                 
preferential trading arrangements with the EC and U.S. are phasing out and this would create bottlenecks 
for Mauritian exports (W.T.O., 2001; Meisenhelder, 1997). 
277 IRIN (2006); Sobhee (2006); IMF and World Bank (2003); Ford (2003) 
278 Sobhee (2006); Treebhoohun (1999); Meisenhelder (1997) 
279 Neil (2003); W.T.O. (2001) 
99 
  
to an average of 3.5% from 2000 to 2004), diversification into these new sectors helped 
in sustaining Mauritius’ economic growth. According to Sobhee (2006), the economy 
grew around 4% from 2002 to 2005, growth in the Financial Services sector offset the 
declining performance of the sugar and textile industries, and inflation rates fell from 6% 
in 2000 to 4.8% in 2004. Also, employment in the services sector – tourism, finance, 
transport and communication – reversed the high unemployment rates the country was 
facing in early 2000. Where as the sugar and EPZ sectors lost approximately 19,000 jobs 
between 2000 and 2003, the services sectors created over 25,000 new jobs during that 
same period.281 Venturing into projects that are relatively less dependent on preferential 
trading agreements is important for the sustained growth of the economic sector. 
Mauritius has failed to fit regional patterns. That is, while most sub-Saharan 
economies crumbled soon after independence and their political systems declined into 
chaos, Mauritius’ economy is relatively strong and the political and social environment is 
stable. Internally, the leaders have managed to maintain a stable political and social 
environment that endears the island to international investors. Exogenously, the 
international community has rendered tremendous support to Mauritius as discussed in 
previous sections. The simultaneous growth of the economy and continued adherence to 
the rules of the political system has created domestic constituencies that have a stake in 
the continuation of the same patterns.282 As Sacerdoti and El-Masry (2005) put it, 
Mauritius has succeeded in establishing strong institutions that have improved on the 
conditions of living of Mauritians and the leaders continue to reform their EOI strategy to 
meet the demands of the changing international environment. In the process, the country 
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has witnessed improvements in economic growth and income distribution, education, and 
healthcare and sanitation. 
 
3.5. Impact of the EPZ on Economic Development and Socioeconomic 
Infrastructure 
For the last three decades, Mauritius has successfully transformed its fortunes 
from that of a low-income monocrop economy with a per capita income below $400 (in 
1970) to that of a middle-income diversified economy with per capita incomes of $4,900 
in 2004.283 While real per capita incomes stagnated in over 90% of sub-Saharan Africa, it 
tripled in Mauritius. From 1970 to 2000 real GDP grew at an average of 5.9% per annum, 
the income of the average Mauritian tripled, life expectancy and literacy rates increased, 
the income gap between the richest and poorest Mauritians narrowed considerably, and 
unemployment rates declined.284 According to Sacerdoti and El-Masry (2005), Mauritius 
was able to achieve this success by diversifying its economy from a heavy reliance on a 
single export commodity (sugar) to other sectors including export processing, tourism, 
financial services, and more recently ICT. Scholars (Sobhee, 2006; English, 2002; 
Durbarry, 2001; Subramanian, 2001; Treebhoohun, 1999) agree that export processing 
(EPZ) has been the “engine” of Mauritius’ economic success and the revenues it brought 
to the economy has trickled down to all aspects of the country’s socioeconomic 
development. How has the EPZ impacted Mauritius’ economic development and 
socioeconomic infrastructure – which this thesis argues are important variables in 
democratization? 
 
                                                 
283 U.S. Department of State (2006); English (2002); Weissman (1996) 
284 IMF Survey (2005); Subramanian (2001); Weissman (1996) 
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3.5.1. Economic Growth and Income Inequality 
Unlike regions where after the implementation of SAP economic growth came at 
the expense of development, in Mauritius reforming the EOI strategy was instrumental in 
improving income distribution, education, healthcare, employment, and social 
services.285 That is, the reforms that took place during SAP (in the 1980s) reduced 
poverty and unemployment, bridged the gap between the rich and the poor, and 
considerable improved on the real wages of all Mauritians. 
At the macroeconomic level, the EPZ directly impacted employment, real GDP 
growth, exports, and foreign exchange earnings.286 When the EPZ was established in 
1970, the sugar industry was the dominant employer and the country had a 20% 
unemployment rate. Since then employment in the sugar industry has fallen behind EPZ 
industries and the unemployment rate currently stands at 9.5%; EPZ enterprises employ 
more workers than the sugar industry and the government combined.287 The EPZ sector 
has not only created employment opportunities, but has been attracting labor from the 
agricultural sector. Also, Durbarry (2001) argued that the EPZ has made an enormous 
contribution to GDP growth. Prior to the EPZ, sugar was the main source of income and 
accounted for 23% of total GDP and 73% of export earnings. As of 2005, the EPZ 
contributes up to 13% of total GDP while the sugar sector’s contribution has been 
reduced to 6% of total GDP.288  
For Sobhee (2006), the increased investment and expansion of EPZ exports led to 
higher growth rates. The country successfully substituted foreign debt by local debt; the 
                                                 
285 Subramanian (2001) 
286 Sobhee (2006); Subramanian (2001) 
287 The current unemployment rate in Mauritius is very high when compared to the mid-1990s when it was 
below 4%. According to Sobhee (2006) the EPZ accounts for fluctuations in employment rates; closures of 
EPZ enterprises between 2000 and 2003 are responsible for the current state of employment in Mauritius. 
However, the current growth in the services sector is reversing that trend (World Factbook, 2006; U.S. 
Library of Congress, 2006; Subramanian, 2001). 
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country’s external debt declined from 24% of GDP in 1981 to 12.9% in 2004 and 
inflation was reduced to 5% in 2005.289 However, similar to countries that adopt 
conditional loans from IFIs, Mauritius public debt greatly increased, prior to, during, and 
after structural adjustment as portrayed in Figure 3.4.290
One important factor that accounts for the positive impact of the EPZ on the 
Mauritian economy was the additional foreign exchange earnings brought in as a result of 
increased exports in goods and services other than sugar. With the help of favorable 
trading agreements, the EPZ sector now dominates exports – bringing in net foreign 
exchange earnings of Rs. 9,152 million in 1997, above the Rs. 7,294 million brought in 
by the sugar sector.291
Secondly, Mauritius was able to reduce poverty – post independence – through a 
couple of measures adopted by successive governments. EPZ revenues to government 
budgets were vital to achieving the objectives of those measures and in some cases EPZ 
enterprises directly impacted poverty. The fact that the Mauritian governments did not 
restrict EPZ enterprises to specific areas in the country allowed employment 
opportunities to be created across the country. As such, employment with EPZ industries 
brought direct revenue to Mauritians in both the rural and urban areas. This was 
particularly beneficial to females whose numbers accounted for 80% of the EPZ 
workforce in the initial stages of the EOI strategy. Weissman (1996) cautioned though, 
that the chief attraction to EPZ investors “is a cheap, brutalized, and controlled 
workforce” (Weissman, 1996, 2). In most countries where EPZs are established, 
                                                                                                                                                 
288 World Factbook (2006); Durbarry (2001) 
289 World Factbook (2006); Sobhee (2006) 
290 Countries that adopt SAPs borrow heavily from the IMF and World Bank to maintain, among other 
financial obligations, scheduled interest payments on their external debts, provide revenue to bring their 
deficits down, and finance programs that have to be reformed. As a result, these countries end up accruing 
additional debts during adjustment; this problem is worse for countries like Ghana who pursued adjustment 
for a very long time.  
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including Mauritius, labor laws are repressive when compared to the approved 
international standards. 
 
Figure 3.4: Mauritius’ External Debt (1981-2000) 
 
Source: World Bank Group (WDI, 2007). 
 
Also, revenues from both the sugar and EPZ sectors allowed governments at 
different stages of the country’s growth to increase wages in the public sector and provide 
social services to poor Mauritians. Increased wages in the public sector forced similar and 
sometimes better wage increases in the private sector. For example, in the EPZ sector, the 
average daily earnings tripled from Rs. 52 in 1989 to Rs. 151 in 1999 surpassing average 
earnings in other sectors during the same period – which was Rs. 119 in 1999.292 This is 
important because in countries like Haiti, Guatemala, and El Salvador the wages of 
workers in EPZ industries are not only poor but workers who have tried to organize and 
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demand improved conditions have met with brutal repression.293 This has not being the 
case in Mauritius. 
Furthermore, the state has been able to build a strong middle-class through long-
term strategies like the provision of free compulsory education, the implementation of 
micro-credit schemes that deal with poor households and women who require finance to 
start up their own businesses, and providing export tax exemptions for small-scale 
planters.294 For example, in the 1980s the Mauritian Development Bank was directed by 
the government to offer $18 million in unsecured small business loans to unemployed 
Mauritians (especially graduates) who wanted to establish EPZ firms. According to 
Bräutigam (1997), this program accounts for the fact that over 50% of current EPZ firms 
are owned by Mauritians. In countries like Kenya, Cameroon, and Senegal all EPZ firms 
are owned by international corporations that repatriate profits to other regions.295 With 
over 50% of Mauritius’ EPZ firms owned by local investors, profits are kept and 
reinvested in the economy.  
Above all, the governments have continued to respond to the needs of the poor by 
providing subsidies for food (mainly rice and flour), increased free education to include 
secondary and university education, provide benefits for the elderly through the old age 
social security (OASS) program, and guarantees a minimum income to all citizens.296 
Mauritius is one of the few African countries that have established a minimum wage level 
for its citizens. Currently, only 10% of Mauritians are below the poverty line and the 
nature and depth of poverty in Mauritius is “distinctly less severe than the poverty levels 
                                                 
293 According to Multinational Monitor (1992, 1994, 1995, and 1996 as cited by Weissman, 1996), EPZ 
workers in Sri Lanka, El Salvador, and the Philippines have been raped, terminated, jailed, assassinated by 
death squads, and beaten for reasons like attempting to unionize. 
294 Sobhee (2006); Bräutigam (1997) 
295 Weissman (1996) 
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in neighboring African countries” (World Bank Country Brief, 2004 as cited by the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2006, 10).297 But within the country, the economic 
miracle has not benefited minority groups like the Creole who form 28% of the 
population. The poverty and social imbalances that exist in Mauritius are a threat to 
social stability and potential area of future conflicts.298 The Hindu majority who control 
the political scene remain reliant on the willingness of the Franco-Mauritian upper class –
who dominates the economic sector – to cooperate in an equitable spread of the country’s 
economic benefits.299 This willingness has not yet been demonstrated by the upper class. 
Thirdly, with inflation below 5% in 2006 when compared to approximately 40% 
in the early 1980s, the country has seen considerable improvement in the real wages of all 
Mauritians. The government has successfully consolidated the national budget and 
stabilized prices and, with per capita incomes of $4,900 Mauritius has done exceptionally 
well in growth rates, employment, and income distribution. The country’s HDI in 2006 
ranked 63rd – with a score of 0.800 – out of 177 countries with data.300 Also, the value for 
Mauritius’ Human Poverty Index is 11.3 and the country ranks 24th among 102 
developing countries for which the index has been calculated. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
296 It is worth noting that even at the height of the country’s economic crisis, the governments reduced but 
continued subsidies for food, education, and provided social welfare benefits to citizens (Sobhee, 2006; 
Bräutigam, 1997).  
297 Although only 5% of Mauritius’ population is classified as undernourished, there is still some relative 
poverty as well as “provocative levels of social inequality” especially between the Franco-Mauritian upper 
class and the majority of the population – above all the Creole minority (BTI, 2006, 10).  
298 Conflicts between the Franco-Mauritian plantation owners (2% of the population) and poor farmers 
(approximately 30% of the population) have been a part Mauritius’ history. The poor wages and inadequate 
social services provided to unskilled workers have been reasons for continuous civil disobedience (BTI, 
2006; UNDP, 2002; Bowman, 1991). 
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3.5.2.   Education 
Similar to economic growth and income distribution, the educational sector 
prospered in the last couple of decades because of the additional revenues generated by 
the EPZ and other sectors of the economy. Since independence Mauritians were in 
agreement that the provision of good quality primary, secondary, and tertiary education is 
the foundation for all forms of national development.301 And, as in other sectors of 
Mauritius’ socioeconomic growth and development, the different governments that have 
implemented policies – although shaky at times – that fostered progress. 
In 1956, the colonial regime passed the Education Act that provided free 
education at the primary school level.302 Sir Ramgoolam extended the provision of free 
education to the secondary level in 1976 and under Sir Jugnauth, postsecondary 
education became free to Mauritians in 1988.303 According to UNDP (2006), the data 
from 1990 to 2000 revealed that Mauritius has made significant progress in the field of 
access to Education; primary education is compulsory and free and both boys and girls 
have the chance to attend primary schools. By 1994 the enrollment rate in primary 
education had reached 95% and the pupil teacher ratio was 20.304
One of the conditions of the SAP prescribed by the IMF and World Bank for 
Mauritius was the reduction of expenditures on education; which from 1968 to 1980 was 
approximately 13.5% of total government expenditures.305 The education expenditure 
reduction plan advocated by the IMF and World Bank included reducing expenditure on 
education to 4% of GDP; charge some school expenses like books, sports, and feeding 
                                                 
301 U.S. Library of Congress (2006); Parsuramen (2001); Bowman (1991) 
302 Parsuramen (2001) 
303 It is important to note that all of Mauritius’ tertiary schools – the University of Mauritius, the Mauritius 
Institute of Education, the Mahatma Gandhi Institute, and the Mauritius College of the Air – were opened 
after the country attained independence (between 1968 and 1981). The only tertiary institution in the island 
prior to independence was the College of Agriculture that was established in 1965 and later incorporated 
into the University of Mauritius (Bowman, 1991; U.S. Library of Congress, 2006). 
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programs to parents, no recruitment of new teachers from 1985 to 1988, and the phasing 
out of sub-standard secondary schools from 1983.306 Although the Mauritian government 
implemented most of the IMF and World Bank conditionalities that restricted wage and 
social welfare increases, it refused cutting back the expenditures that developed the 
education and healthcare sectors.307 Instead, the government maintained its education and 
healthcare expenditures by increasing taxes on sugar exports to provide the revenue for 
its policies in these areas.308
The Mauritian leaders were resolved that human resource development was 
fundamental to sustainable development. In fact the governments – post SAP – increased 
their investment in education by offering total free education and even tailored the 
curriculum in some of the tertiary institutions to fit the country’s development goals.309 
Even after 1991, the governments have made the effort – sometimes strenuously – to 
provide adequate funding for education; between 1991 and 1995 average expenditure on 
education was 15.3% of total government expenditures and has been around 16% 
since.310 The evidence that follows demonstrates that the governments’ investment in 
education has paid off. 
Firstly, Parsuramen (2001) argued that the policies implemented under the 
guidelines of the 1984 White Paper and the 1991 Master Plan for the educational sector 
have accomplished a lot for Mauritius’ socioeconomic development since 1984. For 
example, between 1984 and 1991 free education was extended to the tertiary level 
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School Certificate Examinations conducted in collaboration with the University of Cambridge in the U.K. 
(Parsuramen, 2001). 
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308 Nath (2001)  
309 After 1981 the government reformed the education system to fit the changing needs of the economy, 
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(1988), 14 new primary schools were built, 37 extended, and more than 50 refurbished, 
teacher training was intensified, school libraries were strengthened and schools were 
provided with audio-visual facilities, enrollment reached 97%, and over 700 teachers 
were recruited.311 Literacy in the 1990s for the population over fifteen years of age was 
80%; 85% for males and 75% for females. This number increased to 85.6% in 2003 
(88.6% for males and 82.7% for females) and Mauritius ranked better than all other 
African countries in the Education Index (2006).312  
Secondly, the development of a strong educational sector has produced a large, 
diverse, and economically viable middle-class. At independence, majority of the middle-
class were Indo-Mauritians who were primarily employed in the public sector.313 
Developments that have taken place in the educational sector have given rise to a large 
and upper income level middle class that invests in the country’s economy. Education has 
helped in wealth redistribution and in bridging the gap between the previously small 
upper class and the poor.314 In other words, the country’s educational policies accounts 
for the visible improvements in wages and living conditions of Mauritians; the state 
schools offer a “route to social mobility for the children of middle and working class 
families” (Meisenhelder, 1997, 285). This is evident in the private sector, where as 
Bräutigam (1997) observed, the loan facilities provided by government to unemployed 
graduates in the 1980s accounts for the over 50% of EPZ enterprises that are owned and 
operated by middle-class Mauritians. 
Thirdly, Mauritius’ human capital development has been crucial to sustainable 
growth and development. The granting of free secondary schooling in 1976 provided the 
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semiliterate labor force that was needed at the initial phase of industrialization.315 
Extending this provision to the tertiary level in the late 1980s provided the technical, 
managerial, and expertise needed to further diversify the economy into financial services 
(off-shore banking), tourism, and ICT. As Sobhee (2006) noted, these sectors have 
readily replaced the jobs lost in the export manufacturing sectors in the mid-2000s; the 
services sector increased employment levels from 238,800 to 264,900 over the period 
2000 to 2003.  
Finally, the country’s high level of education has been instrumental in building a 
strong civil society. At independence, Mauritius already had nongovernmental groups 
that were dedicated to promoting the religious, ethnic, social, and economic goals of the 
country’s diverse communities.316 Through the years, this group has evolved as a broad-
based civic network that is very much involved in the policy making process in all 
important policy sectors. Carroll and Carroll (1999, 23) gives credit to the government 
for deliberately involving professionals on policy related issues and to a “moderately 
well-educated populace” who can effectively participate in such a process. 
The leaders of Mauritius showed commitment to the general well-being of their 
country; the plans they implemented that emphasized export led growth, social and 
political stability, and infrastructural development, especially in the area of education has 
been crucial to the sustained development the country is enjoying. This process has not 
only built the legitimacy of the state, but continues to improve on the policy capacity of 
the different governments. 
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3.5.3.   Healthcare and Sanitation 
Healthcare and sanitation is another area where the government has demonstrated 
a strong commitment to human resource development. Some of the major challenges that 
Mauritius faced at independence were a rapid growing population, unemployment, 
inadequate health care facilities and healthcare education, and shortage of healthcare 
professionals.317 At the time Mauritius gained independence, the population was growing 
at 3% per annum and suffering from diseases common in underdeveloped countries 
including malaria, tuberculosis, smallpox, and cholera.318 In addition, Mauritius did not 
have good or adequate healthcare facilities or healthcare professionals, health or welfare 
programs were insufficient, and poverty prevented the majority of the citizens from 
having access to healthcare. A combination of the above factors resulted in high infant 
mortality rates (80 per 1000 in 1970) and a life expectancy that was below 60 years.319 
The above circumstances were a huge setback for the quality of life of Mauritians. 
In response to these problems, Mauritian leaders, as early as the 1970s started 
rapidly expanding public-financed health and other social services.320 By then, the 
government implemented policies that provided free health care to all Mauritians and 
developed programs that dispersed health services and facilities across the country to give 
everyone reasonable access to treatment. It also started welfare programs that guaranteed 
fixed wages to poor Mauritians, social welfare benefits to the elderly, and trained 
professionals to meet the healthcare needs of the population.321 Investments in this sector 
have improved on the quality of life of all Mauritians in the following ways.  
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According to Mistry (1999), social indicators and the standards of living of 
Mauritians improved because of the governments’ insistence on keeping the budgetary 
allocations for free education, health care, and other social services intact in spite of 
pressures from the IMF and World Bank to cut back on expenditures in these sectors 
during the period of adjustment. This has resulted in Mauritians enjoying the standards of 
nutrition, health, and education of countries with much higher per capita incomes. 
Mauritius has been able to control its population growth at levels seen only in developed 
countries. This was accomplished through national family planning programs that 
employed a variety of techniques including free contraceptives and supplies, training of 
aids to work closely with family groups, training potential parents on family planning 
methods, and educating the public through billboards and the media.322 As a result, the 
rate of population growth has declined; between 1980 and 2000 the annual average 
population growth was 0.9% total; with growth rates of 1% in rural areas and 0.8% in 
urban areas.323
Secondly, the governments have continued to allocate substantial amounts of 
funds to healthcare, social security and welfare, and other social services. For example, 
average health care expenditure as a percentage of general government expenditure was 
about 5% in the 1970s; this increased to 8.4% between 1987 and 1995, and has been in 
the 8.8% range since then.324 Currently, the patient/doctor ratio has been significantly 
reduced (one doctor for every 1,089 inhabitants), with trained personnel attending all 
births.325 Infant mortality has declined to 13.5 per 1000 births, life expectancy increased 
to 72 years in 2005, and according to BTI (2006), there are adequate health care centers 
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or public hospitals across the country, and 99% of the population has access to safe 
drinking water.326
Thirdly, Mauritius now boasts of having one of the best social welfare programs 
in Africa. In additional to the OASS benefits for the elderly, the country offers health 
insurance to poor Mauritians, child development and family welfare programs, and other 
special welfare programs that have been used to lower the country’s Human Poverty 
Index to 11.3%; below that of even the U.S. with a corresponding figure of 15.8%.327 
Finally, the general health of Mauritius is good and has improved over the last three 
decades, but there is still more work to be done.328 For example, as of 2007 Mauritius 
leads the world in the rate of diabetes (over 20% of Mauritians above 30 years have type 
2 diabetes), the level of tuberculosis cases remain the same as in 1980 (approximately 
150 per year), 0.1% of adults 15 years and over are infected with HIV/AIDS, and non-
communicable diseases like hypertension, cancer, and heart disease are a growing 
problem.329
Mauritius is in a strong position in terms of economic growth and socioeconomic 
development. Macroeconomic indicators shows fluctuating growth rates for the last 
couple of decades, but a diversified economy that continues to sustain growth and 
development. Mauritius has also greatly invested in human development; in 2006, 
Mauritius ranked 63rd on the Human Development Index (HDI) – close to Bosnia (62nd) 
and Malaysia (61st) – and way ahead of all other African countries, including South 
Africa which is ranked in 119th place.330 Mauritius does not only have a better ranking 
                                                 
326 In developing countries, life expectancy is 64 years and infant mortality is 61 per 1000 births (Mauritius 
Ministry of Health, 2002). See also, WRI (2006); Sobhee (2006) 
327 BTI (2006); Sobhee (2006); Bräutigam (1997) 
328 In the WHO (2002) report, Mauritius ranked 84th out of 191 countries in overall achievement of the 
health system. 
329 Mauritius Ministry of Health (2007), BTI (2006); WRI (2006); Mauritius Ministry of Health (2002) 
330 UNDP (HDR, 2006); BTI (2006) 
113 
  
than all African countries on HDI, it is the same for Life Expectancy Index, the 
Education Index, and the Human Poverty Index. Even though improvements need to be 
made, the income gap between the richest and poorest Mauritians has narrowed; the GINI 
coefficient declined from 0.5 in 1962 to 0.37 in 1997.331 Not surprisingly, in 2002 
Mauritius ranked 16 of 155 developing and newly industrialized countries.332 All of the 
above have been made possible by a leadership that has shown a commitment to 
improving on the lives of Mauritians, standing up to the IMF and World Bank regarding 
its education and social welfare policies, winning preferential trade agreements, and 
adopting a development strategy (EPZ) that was implemented under favorable 
international conditions. 
 
3.6. The EPZ and Democratization  
In previous chapters, I argued that there is a strong correlation between economic 
development and democratization.333 Further, I agreed with scholars whose studies have 
determined that education, income distribution and wealth, political incorporation, and 
the availability of social services are important variables to economic and political 
development.334 How has the EPZ contributed to the above variables that promote strong 
democracies? 
 It is obvious that Mauritius has done extremely well in terms of economic and 
political development, given the circumstances under which it emerged from 
independence. The past three decades have served to “consolidate the Mauritian model of 
                                                 
331 The GINI index for Mauritius is 37 (according to 1987 estimates) and the country ranks 62 out of 175 
countries, ahead of all African countries including Libya – 63rd and South Africa – 111th (CIA, 2006; HDR, 
2003).  
332 BTI (2006) 
333 See studies by Przeworski et al. (2005); Asare and Wong (2004); Acemoglu and Robinson (2002); and 
Lipset (1981). 
334 Asare and Wong (2004); Acemoglu and Robinson (2002); Lipset (1981) 
114 
  
stable, democratic, export-led growth” (Bräutigam, 1997, 52). Mauritius shifted from an 
economic regime that was highly protected and which heavily depended on sugar for 
both employment and revenues to one that is an increasingly liberalized export 
powerhouse. In the course of this economic transformation, the country has experienced 
nine democratic elections and five peaceful changes of leadership. Mauritius’ democracy 
is firmly consolidated and Freedom House (2006) gives it perfect scores in political rights 
and civil liberties; the country scored 1 in both areas. How was Mauritius able to 
consolidate its democracy? 
Firstly, Mauritius has successfully developed the right political institutions that 
form the foundation for consolidated democracies. The Westminster model of 
government – adopted from the British colonizers – was deliberately structured by 
Mauritians in a “modified consociational fashion” to represent all ethnic concerns 
(Bräutigam, 1997, 53).335 Mauritius parliamentary system was designed so that no single 
party can gain a majority of seats through votes alone since 10% of seats are reserved for 
the “best losers.”336 This provision by the constitution has forced political parties to run 
in coalitions and forge consensus with the different ethnic groups. Bräutigam (1997) sees 
the need for consensus as an important modus operandi that has steered the leaders away 
from extreme positions on economic policy and has helped to consolidate the democratic 
system. Consensus building is important to Mauritian politics given the diverse ethnic 
groups that inhabit the island. 
Also, Mauritian leaders have respected the rule of law and separation of powers 
provisions that are anchored in the constitution.337 Mauritius has a good track record of 
having legitimately established governments. This legitimacy is realized by holding 
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regular competitive multi-party elections, guaranteeing citizens their basic freedoms, 
adherence to the rule of law, and an independent media.338 Elections have been 
conducted in a transparent manner and its results have been accepted as free and fair by 
both winners and losers. Unlike many African countries were their constitutions were 
changed to give both legislative and executive powers to the ruling party, Mauritius has 
maintained a constitution where the separation of powers between the legislature, the 
executive, and the judiciary are entrenched.339  
Secondly, in addition to a political leadership that has institutionalized democratic 
principles in the election process, rule of law, and separation of powers, the country has 
also developed a vibrant civil society that is very involved in policy formulation and 
implementation. As Bräutigam (1997) observed, democratic consolidation requires 
institutionalized channels for “voice” by the labor and business communities and 
professional organizations. In Mauritius this voice has been provided by a strong civil 
society that represents the interests of the many labor and business unions. Mauritius has 
developed institutions that provide formal opportunities for dialogue between the private 
and public sectors over matters of concern and have an input in shaping some aspects of 
policy.340 For example, the government in the 1990s invited the Mauritius Export 
Processing Zone Association (MEPZA) to become a collaborator with government in 
policy making. Mauritius has a lot of committees, unions, and organizations that 
negotiate and establish recommendations relating to wages, protection of workers, and 
various policies of interest.341 As Carroll and Carroll (1999) concluded, it is the 
consultation between government and Mauritius’ broad civil society that has built 
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legitimacy and improved on the policy capacity of the government. In the majority of 
African countries civil societies, where present, are usually not actively involved in 
policy formulation as in Mauritius.  
Thirdly, the success of Mauritius can be traced to the EOI strategy that it adopted 
soon after independence.342 The EPZ Act of 1970 was an outward looking strategy that 
provided generous incentives to attract foreign direct investment. FDI was not only 
actively encouraged and sought, but there was a consensus among Mauritians that the 
EOI strategy was the route to development.343 Mauritius’ EPZ greatly benefited from 
preferential trading agreements with the EC and the U.S; the growth that was taking place 
in these markets in the 1980s accrued a lot of foreign exchange earnings for Mauritian 
goods. Also, Mauritius received a lot of investment from Asian countries, especially from 
Hong Kong entrepreneurs where prospects of transferring the territory back to China in 
1997 made investors nervous.344 Mauritius was uniquely well positioned to attract these 
investors.  As the EPZ took roots in the country’s economy, macroeconomic indicators 
improved; from 1980 to 2005 the economy diversified into tourism, financial services, 
and ICT, average annual GDP growth rate was 4%, inflation declined to 3.8% in 2004, 
and per capita incomes reached $4,900.345 As Przeworski et al. (2000) determined in their 
study, countries that have per capita incomes of over $6,000 either make transitions to 
democracy or consolidate their democracies. Mauritius has succeeded in achieving that 
level of economic growth and its democracy is strong.    
Fourthly, developments that the EPZ spurred in the country’s physical and social 
infrastructures have directly and indirectly contributed to consolidating democracy. In the 
1970s the government paid foreign consultants to train Mauritians to staff new areas 
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including bureaus of project evaluation, export marketing, investment promotion, and 
monitoring.346 Even when the EPZ was being reformed in the 1980s expatriates were 
hired to train the labor force and substantial amounts were invested in education, health 
care, and other social welfare programs; human resource development is fundamental to 
growth and development.347 Furthermore, the government invested billions of rupees in 
building roads, harbor, electricity, telecommunications, water supply etc. Even though 
mistakes were made in the 1970s with regards fiscal management, these investments 
helped provide the physical and socioeconomic infrastructures that were necessary for the 
take-off of export-oriented manufacturing in the 1980s.348 That is why the World Bank 
(1992) attributed the success of Mauritius’ export-led growth reforms, in part, to stronger 
institutional capacity and infrastructural development. 
Finally, as Walle (2004) argued, the positive synergy between political and 
economic success has consolidated Mauritius’ democracy. Factors including the 
establishment of institutions that adhered to democratic principles, separation of powers 
between the three branches of government, and the empowerment of technocrats to make 
and implement effective development policies resulted in economic success.  Economic 
success reinforced the political choices, consolidated democratic governance, and 
“created domestic constituencies that had a stake in the continuation of the same 
patterns” (Walle, 2004, 1). 
The strong showing of Mauritius in the above areas does not negate the fact that it 
still has some challenges to face. Mauritius needs to maintain a competitive edge in 
export manufacturing especially with the phasing out of preferential agreements with the 
EC and the U.S. and the development of relatively cheap costs of production in countries 
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like China, India, and Bangladesh. With an economy that depends on the international 
economy, producing reasonable and high quality goods will likely sustain its viability. 
Also, employment in Mauritius depends on the country maintaining its current industries 
and at the same time continues to attract FDI. Fluctuations in the employment rates have 
primarily been caused by the lack of FDIs and closures of export-oriented industries. It is 
possible that Mauritius’ excessive dependence on favorable conditions in international 
markets could be catastrophic in times of world economic crises and recessions. 
Furthermore, as reported in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2006), 
Mauritius still has some relative poverty and provocative levels of social inequality 
between the Franco-Mauritian upper class and the majority of the population, especially 
the Creole minority. Failure to address this issue could lead to social instability. Also, the 
country’s welfare regime is gradually reaching the limits of its ability to deliver.349 
Attempts to reform the pension system has met with bitter opposition by the citizens and 
the government has failed to address this issue because of the political repercussions such 
reforms would cause. For a country that is now a middle-income country the role of 
women in both the private and public sectors is still limited. Although they constitute 
approximately 20% of the labor force, they generally occupy a subordinate role in society 
and only 5% occupy senior positions in the 100 top companies.350 Finally, corruption 
continues to taint the progress the country is making in many other areas. For example, 
domestic banking market scandals in recent years have impeded efforts to market 
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Mauritius as an international financial center.351 Therefore, Mauritius’ political and 
economic miracle could sink at anytime, depending on circumstances outside its control. 
At the moment, however, Mauritius has proven to have the capability to manage 
its affairs and initiate its own development strategy. The EPZ strategy was not imposed 
from without by IFIs but was studied, developed, and institutionalized from within. In the 
process, the country was able to improve on microeconomic indicators, socioeconomic 
infrastructures, and consolidate democratic governance. The government is actively 
investing in the region to keep its economy strong; this farsighted endeavor by the 
leadership to reform the economy in accordance with international developments has 
been a major factor in the country’s development. Also, developing a strategy in the 
1970s that takes advantage of the benefits of globalization – when many African 
countries were inward looking – has put Mauritius way ahead of its counterparts. Above 
all, the continued guarantee of the political and civil liberties of its population, the 
maintenance of a stable political climate, the adherence to the rule of law, the consistency 
in the implementation of the economic strategy, and constant improvements of physical 
and social infrastructures have been crucial to the consolidation of Mauritius’ democracy 
and the sustained growth of the economy.  
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4. Analysis of Findings and Conclusion 
 
Determining the success or failure of foreign aid that is conditioned on the 
implementation of SAPs is crucial to the ongoing debate about the importance of IFIs in 
eradicating poverty and improving on the conditions of living of the billions of people 
still living in abject poverty, many of whom are in third world countries. Virtually all 
developing countries have implemented or are in the process of instituting SAPs.352 As 
discussed in Chapter 1, third world countries whose economies are particularly 
vulnerable to crises – usually caused by domestic and international factors – seek loans 
from IFIs that are conditioned on the implementation of programs that are intended to 
provide “shock therapy” for ailing economies.353  The proponents of SAPs say that they 
promote good governance, help reduce government deficits, maintain timely payment of 
external debts, and control inflation; however, in the process of restructuring the 
economies of borrowing countries, the socioeconomic infrastructures – which I argue are 
important variables in promoting stable democracies – are adversely affected. The 
question then is, without sound infrastructures already in place, are the neo-liberal 
policies advocated by IFIs likely to be associated with successful democratization? The 
study of Ghana and Mauritius provide some helpful insight for third world countries.  
Chapter 1 detailed the main assumptions underlying this study. It is hypothesized 
that democracy is the panacea for the social, economic, and political problems in third 
world countries.354 Also, conditions placed on structural adjustment loans directly impact 
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democratization in the borrowing country.355 Furthermore, I argue in line with scholars 
(Asare and Wong, 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002; Przeworski et al., 2000; Lipset, 
1981) whose studies determined that high level of socioeconomic development 
determines transitions to democracy or consolidation of democracy. In addition, it is 
assumed that the primary variables that comprise a country’s level of socioeconomic 
development or infrastructure include education, healthcare, sanitation, and income 
distribution. Finally, I argue that strong economic and social infrastructure is a necessary 
prerequisite in order for the neo-liberal policies advocated by IFIs to be correlated with 
strong democracies. It is against this background that I analyze the impact of SAPs on 
democratization in Ghana and Mauritius. 
The rest of this chapter is organized in the following order. The next section 
compares and contrasts the development strategies of Ghana and Mauritius prior to SAPs, 
the programs that were implemented during adjustment, and the sociopolitical climate 
under which SAPs were adopted. Following that I analyze how the respective SAPs 
implemented by Ghana and Mauritius impacted the variables that promote socioeconomic 
growth and development. The final sections review the strength of democracy in Ghana 
and Mauritius, draw some conclusions, and offer recommendations for further research. 
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4.1. The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) in Ghana and Mauritius 
The economic and political growth and development in Ghana and Mauritius 
from independence to the year 2000 were impacted by domestic and international factors 
that played a key role in determining the strength of democracy in both countries. Factors 
including the sociopolitical climate, the development strategies, and the economic 
policies of both countries determined why Ghana and Mauritius had to seek the 
assistance of the IMF and World Bank at some point in their growth and development. 
Also, these factors provide some insight about the nature of the SAPs that the IMF and 
World Bank prescribed for them and explain the respective support they received from 
developed countries – either through foreign direct investment (FDI) or favorable trading 
agreements – in the development process. 
Firstly, Ghana and Mauritius produced and maintained different sociopolitical 
environments that either attracted or repelled investments into their respective economies. 
Although Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from 
British rule and carried the hope of setting the pace for Africa’s economic development, a 
series of political miscalculations by Ghana’s leaders from the 1960s to the 1990s 
prevented FDI into the economy and set the country on the path of instability and 
underdevelopment. For example, just seven years after independence, Nkrumah (in 1964) 
abandoned political pluralism by declaring Ghana a one-party state, made himself a “life 
president” in 1965, and nurtured a political environment that stifled the rights, interests, 
and civil liberties of Ghanaians, made government officials unaccountable for fiscal 
mismanagement, and gave extreme powers to the executive branch of government. 
The Nkrumah government’s disregard for the rule of law set the precedent for 
consistent violations of the constitution by government officials, the military, the 
business community, and ordinary citizens. After the Nkrumah era, successive military 
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governments – with brief periods of democratically elected governments in 1969 and 
from 1969-1981 – whose leaders had little or no experience about the complex dynamics 
of growth and development became prime architects of the course of Ghana’s economic 
and political growth until 2000.356 Throughout the 1960s the country regressed into a 
dictatorial political climate. Disregard for the rule of law, as well as the 
institutionalization of nepotism, cronyism, and corruption in society weakened 
international confidence and stifled foreign direct investment into the economy. 
Contrary to the precedent set by Ghanaian leaders in the 1960s, Mauritian leaders 
realized soon after independence in 1968 that consensus building among the country’s 
myriad interests, communities, political parties, and ethnic groups was important for the 
country’s growth. The Mauritian economy was heavily dependent on a single commodity 
(sugar), did not have sufficient skilled managerial resources, had high levels of income 
inequality, and high rates of unemployment. Yet Mauritian leaders over the years gave 
priority to reversing the social, political, and economic negatives that stacked against 
them. But for a brief period (1971-1976) when political activities were largely proscribed, 
the different governments adhered to the rule of law, maintained a relatively stable 
sociopolitical environment, and developed a strong and vibrant civil society that serves as 
voice for the diverse communities. This stability attracted international investors and 
foreign capital and at the same time European, Asian, and Western countries awarded 
Mauritius’ good behavior with favorable and preferential trading arrangements that 
partially account for the Mauritian miracle. Unlike Ghana, where sociopolitical instability 
made the country less attractive to foreign investors, Mauritius’ good track record of 
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stability was endearing to foreign investment. As FDI increased, the country improved on 
its socioeconomic infrastructures and on the conditions of living of Mauritians.  
Secondly, the development history of Ghana and Mauritius demonstrate that 
sociopolitical stability and effective macroeconomic management are equally important 
to economic growth and development. That is, if a country develops a stable political and 
social environment, but fails to be fiscally disciplined a crisis scenario is ensured. So 
alike, the respective governments in Ghana and Mauritius – following independence – 
mismanaged their economies thereby causing huge budgetary deficits and accumulated 
lots of debts by heavily borrowing from developed countries to sponsor their domestic 
policies. In other words, the economic policies implemented and the level of corruption 
in Ghana and Mauritius after the 1970s negatively impacted the growth and development 
of their economies. In Ghana – in addition to the unstable sociopolitical environment that 
military rule caused – government mismanagement, expansionist policies, and corporate 
corruption became bottlenecks to growth, led to the accumulation of debt, and the 
country’s ultimate reliance on the IMF and World Bank for reversing the decline of the 
economy.  
Similar to the situation in Ghana, in the 1970s macroeconomic mismanagement 
and expansionist and ill-advised wage policies in Mauritius created huge deficits that 
necessitated adoption of the IMF and World Bank’s prescribed structural adjustment 
program in the 1980s. Furthermore, both countries implemented policies that heavily 
protected domestic industries from outside competition and which in turn prevented their 
industries from expanding and supplementing the revenues of their economies. Ghana 
and Mauritius developed different sociopolitical institutions but their failure to adhere to 
strict fiscal discipline landed them in the same economic situation by the late 1970s. 
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In addition to these domestic factors, other circumstances outside the Ghanaian 
and Mauritian governments’ control – natural disasters and world recessions in the 1970s 
– created structural imbalances of their economies and resulted in debt crises. The 
Ghanaian society was unstable; for example, within a nine-year period (January 1972 to 
December 1981) four military regimes and one democratically elected government ruled 
the country and these governments failed to effectively manage the country’s economic 
policies. In the case of Mauritius, the independence government produced a stable 
sociopolitical environment, but macroeconomic mismanagement reversed the progress 
the country was making towards development. In sum, the economies of Ghana and 
Mauritius witnessed rapid socioeconomic growth immediately after their independence, 
but their economies were in crises in the late 1970s because of one or a combination of 
the above factors that consequently forced the adoption of the conditional measures 
attached to the financial assistance they received from the IMF and World Bank. 
Thirdly, Ghana and Mauritius’ growth and development were impacted in varying 
degrees by the different economic development strategies they implemented. The 
Nkrumah government, which took over from the colonial administration in Ghana in 
1957 adopted an import-substitution industrialization (ISI) economic strategy and 
implemented policies fashioned along socialist or nationalist agendas that “called for a 
strongman at the head of a one-party state, state-owned industries” and unrestrained 
accumulation of debt to sponsor expansionist policies (Koppisch, 2002, 117). The belief 
that such policies would make Ghana less reliant on developed countries, especially the 
former colonial authority, had a two-fold effect on the economy. Firstly, it prevented 
Ghana from taking advantage of the benefits of the then evolving global economy and 
secondly, it frightened Western entrepreneurs away from the country especially during 
General Acheampong’s military rule (1972-1978) when the shares of foreign businesses 
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in the mining, timber, banking, and insurance companies were illegally confiscated. 
These domestic blunders did not make the international community enthusiastic about 
redeeming the Ghanaian economy when it became bankrupt in the late 1970s.357 Instead, 
stringent doses of anti-socioeconomic development policies were prescribed by the IMF 
and World Bank that added to the degradation of the country’s socioeconomic 
infrastructures and caused a decline in the conditions of living of Ghanaians. In other 
words, the policies implemented by Ghana under its ERPs which removed subsidies from 
education, health, and social welfare programs and drastically reduced employment in the 
public sector, collapsed the structures that are essential to Ghana’ political and economic 
development. 
Contrary to the development strategy of Ghana, Mauritius pursued the outward 
looking export-oriented industrialization (EOI) strategy that provided attractive 
incentives for foreign investors. Attempts at developing the country’s economy through 
the ISI strategy (prior to independence) had failed to attract foreign investments and 
increase employment opportunities for Mauritians. Implementation of Mauritius’ EOI 
strategy in the 1970s was very timely, in that it coincided with a favorable trading 
international climate that provided preferential opportunities for the country’s exports at 
prices that were above the international market.358 As a result of the vicious circle of 
special trading privileges granted to Mauritius from the 1970s to the 1990s, the economy 
opened to foreign direct investment and primarily accounts for the swift development of 
the country’s economic institutions. Unlike Ghana, which did not enjoy similar privileges 
and where sociopolitical instability made the country less attractive to foreign investors, 
Mauritius’ good track record of stability and the support it received from developed 
                                                 
357 In addition to government mismanagement, corruption, and exorbitant expansionist policies, the 
Ghanaian economy took a hard hit during the oil crises and world recession in the 1970s and 1980s. 
358 See Chapter 3. 
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countries was endearing to foreign investment. As FDI increased, the country improved 
on its socioeconomic infrastructures and on the conditions of living of Mauritians. 
Finally, the respective policies forced upon Ghana and Mauritius vis-à-vis 
education, healthcare, and other social welfare services is correlated with the current 
conditions of living of Ghanaians and Mauritians and the strength of democracy in both 
countries. I contend that Mauritius’ ability to negotiate – or the fact that the IMF and 
World Bank allowed Mauritius to continue investing on its socioeconomic infrastructures 
– an Agreement with the IMF and World Bank that did not impede its socioeconomic 
growth primarily explains why Mauritius fared better than Ghana under adjustment. This 
assertion falls in line with Welch’s (2004) argument that it is the nature of the conditions 
placed on structural adjustment packages that determines the level of economic, social, 
political, and environmental problems that such programs create. The outcomes of 
adjustments in Ghana and Mauritius are related to the socioeconomic policies they had to 
adopt during their SAPs; whereas Ghanaians have witnessed declining conditions of 
living, Mauritians have seen improvements in their living standards. 
Some parallels run between the policies adopted by Ghana and Mauritius during 
their SAPs, including elimination of price controls, privatization of industries, 
reformation of the tax structure, adoption of free trade and other orthodox liberal 
economic measures, and adherence to strict microeconomic management. Specific to 
Ghana were removal of subsidies for education, healthcare and other social services 
programs, and reforms in the mining, timber, cocoa industries for increased 
productivity.359 For Mauritius, their SAP primarily focused on diversifying the economy 
by promoting export-oriented industrialization (EPZ), tourism, and diversification of the 
                                                 
359 See the chapter on Ghana for a detailed description of the different policies that were implemented 
during the different phases of the ERPs including devaluation of the cedi, privatization of state enterprises, 
removal of subsidies, and the abolishment of price controls.  
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agricultural sector. As stated in Chapter 3, the Mauritian governments reformed areas of 
the economy dealing with wages, expansionist policies, protection of local industries, and 
taxes but refused implementing specific policies that advocated the elimination of 
subsidies for education, healthcare, and social welfare services.360 Instead, the 
government raised spending in the development of the country’s human resources to meet 
the needs of the EOI strategy.361
Another noticeable distinction between the SAPs in Ghana and Mauritius relates 
to the length of time that adjustment policies were implemented. Bello and Cunningham 
(1994) argued that the longer countries spend implementing the IMF and World Bank 
prescribed policies that cut back on employment, devalue currencies, remove subsidies 
on education, healthcare, and social welfare services etc., the more indebted they become 
and the more poverty is intensified in their societies. Although proponents of the IMF and 
World Bank contend that the conditions placed on structural adjustment loans brings 
ailing economies into balance, spurs GDP growth, opens industries to competition, 
improves on productivity, and such growth would trickle down to other sectors of 
society, the study of Ghana and Mauritius show that such policies can only succeed with 
strong human resources. That is, sustained growth and development can only be attained 
in a society that has a well trained and educated work force and where the sociopolitical 
climate is conducive to both the domestic population and international investors. 
As demonstrated in the case of Ghana, a lengthy period of adjustment (from 1983 
to 2000) during which the country’s economy posted impressive growth rates did not 
translate into development. Instead, after two decades of consistently abiding by the IMF 
                                                 
360 Under Mauritius’ SAP the rupee was devalued and expansionist policies curtailed, but the governments 
continued heavy protection of domestic industries until the mid-1990s when the EPZ sector’s growth 
stagnated (Sobhee, 2006; Bräutigam, 1997). 
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and World Bank conditionalities the country (in 2001) applied for debt relief under the 
HIPC program. This is because Ghana did not have strong educational, welfare, and other 
professional institutions that would have made adjustment bearable or have positively 
impacted the future economic direction of the country. Mauritius, on the other hand, 
because of the support it received from international trading partners and the leverage it 
had over socioeconomic infrastructural development, implemented a SAP that lasted for a 
brief period – from 1981 to 1985 – and the country was able to pay off its loans to both 
the IMF and the World Bank by 1992. This is made possible, domestically, by 
developing the educational, social, and professional institutions that are crucial to growth 
and development and, internationally, by preferential trading agreements. 
Ghana’s case offers valuable insight about the failures of the IMF and World 
Bank in evaluating the effectiveness of their programs. By the mid-1980s these 
institutions failed to see that the austerity measures forced upon Ghana was contributing 
to the further decline of the country’s already weak socioeconomic infrastructures; 
PAMSCAD, which was implemented in the late 1980s to mitigate the socioeconomic 
impact of the ERP on the poor, failed because it was not timely executed and was badly 
mismanaged. 
This thesis stresses the importance of promoting education and healthcare, and 
reducing income disparity to building strong democracies. Ghana and Mauritius gave 
different levels of importance to the development of these sectors priority to adjustment 
and the policies they had to implement during their SAPs impacted education, healthcare, 
and wealth distribution in different ways. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 show the trends in 
                                                                                                                                                 
361 It was during Mauritius’ SAP that free education became available to all Mauritians from primary to the 
tertiary level. Also, the curricular in some of the institution were specifically reformed to train individuals 
for employment in all sectors of the export-oriented industries (Parsuramen, 2001). 
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human development indicators of Ghana, Mauritius, and other sub-Saharan African 
countries from 1975 to 2004.362  
 
Table 4.1: Ghana, Mauritius, and sub-Saharan Africa; Human Development Index 
(1975-2004) 
 GHANA MAURITIUS SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
1975 0.438 0.630 0.417 
1980 0.467 0.661 0.438 
1985 0.482 0.692 0.454 
1990 0.511 0.726 0.461 
1995 0.531 0.749 0.461 
2000 0.555 0.779 --- 
2004 0.532 0.800 0.470 
Source: UNDP (HDR:  2002, 2006) 
 
The data in Table 4.1 validates the hypothesis that strong socioeconomic 
infrastructures are necessary prerequisites for the policies advocated by IFIs to be 
correlated with strong democracies. In other words, Mauritius was successful at 
adjustment over Ghana and many other sub-Saharan African countries because it had 
developed a strong educational system, had created access to healthcare and other social 
welfare benefits for the majority of Mauritians, and had witnessed considerable reduction 
of poverty levels prior to its SAP. The strong human resource capital that Mauritius 
developed in the 1970s was beneficial to the countries growth and development during 
adjustment. 
 
                                                 
362 The HDI gives us a comprehensive picture of the standards of education, healthcare and sanitation, and 
the level of poverty in countries. The data in Table 4.1 show that Mauritius had higher standards in 
education, healthcare and sanitation, and reduced levels of poverty than Ghana prior to adjustment and this 
trend has continued.  
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Figure 4.1: Human Development Trends: Ghana, Mauritius, and sub-Saharan Africa 
(1975-2004) 
Human Development Index Trends: Ghana, 
Mauritius, and sub-Saharan Africa
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Source: UNDP (HDR:  2002, 2006) 
 
The next two sections give a comparative analysis of how these variables fared 
under adjustment and determine how adjustment policies impacted democratization in 
Ghana and Mauritius.  
 
4.1.1. Socioeconomic Growth and Development 
According to this study, the implementation of structural adjustment policies is 
strongly correlated to improvements in the macroeconomic indicators of Ghana and 
Mauritius. Figures 2.2 and 3.2 show considerable improvements in the annual GDP 
growth rates of Ghana and Mauritius’ economies between 1980 and 2000; Ghana’s GDP 
grew at an annual average of 5% and Mauritius’ economy witnessed GPD growth rates of 
approximately 4% per annum. Also, both countries saw substantial improvements in their 
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balance of payments. The credit facilities provided by the World Bank and other 
international financiers enabled Ghana’s cocoa, mining, and timber industries to triple the 
supply of their goods and improve on the country’s foreign exchange earnings. For 
example, earnings in the cocoa sector increased from $409.2 million in 1983 to 722.1 
million in 1990.363 In Mauritius, FDI in the EPZ sector increased the contribution of 
export enterprises to the total GDP; by the 1990s the EPZ was contributing up to 13% of 
total GDP and the country’s external debt declined from 24% of GDP in 1981 to 12.9% 
in 2004.364 In both countries, improvements in their balance of payments helped in 
curtailing inflation; Ghana’s inflation rate dropped from 123% in 1984 to 14.1% in 2004, 
while Mauritius’ declined from 42% in 1980 to 5% in 2005.365 As impressive as the 
macroeconomic indices are for Ghana and Mauritius between 1980 and 2000, 
development indicators like the GINI Index, Education Index, the Human Poverty Index, 
and Life Expectancy Index portray a different picture.366
In Ghana, the implementation of the ERP caused increased levels of poverty and 
income inequality, a rise in unemployment, and considerable drop in real income wages. 
As of 2006, 78.5% of Ghanaians lived on less than $2 a day, the country had a 20% 
unemployment rate, its GDP per capita income was $413, and the GINI index is 40.8.367 
PAMSCAD, which was initiated in 1989 as a safety net for poor Ghanaians, was badly 
                                                 
363 Aryeetey and Fosu (2002) 
364 Sobhee (2006) 
365 World Bank (2006); World Factbook (2006); Sobhee (2006); Aryeetey and Fosu (2002) 
366 The UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the average 
achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life (life expectancy), 
knowledge (adult literacy), and decent standard of living (human poverty). The life expectancy index 
calculates the number of years a newborn infant would live if the current patterns of age-specific mortality 
rates at the time of birth remain the same throughout the child’s life. The education index calculates the 
percentage of people ages 15 and above that can read and write a short simple statement about every day 
life. The human poverty Index measures deprivations in the three basic dimensions that are captured in the 
HDI. The GINI Index measures the income disparity between the rich and poor in a country; the index is 
measured from 0-100, whereby higher numbers indicate greater inequality (UNDP, 2007; Earth Trends, 
2006). 
367 Ghana’s GDP per capita income is below the average for sub-Saharan Africa which is $617 (World 
Factbook, 2007; Earth Trends, 2006). 
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mismanaged and was incapable of reversing the adverse effects of adjustment on the 
majority of the population. Mauritius, on the other hand, has experienced relative 
reductions in poverty and unemployment, improvements in income distribution, and an 
increase in the real wages of Mauritians. Currently, the government guarantees a 
minimum wage to all Mauritians; 10% of the population live below the poverty line, has 
an unemployment rate of 9.4%, GDP per capita income is over $4,900, and the GINI 
index is 37.368
When compared to Mauritius, Ghana’s rates of literacy, life expectancy, infant 
mortality, and access to improved sanitation and water are unacceptable especially for a 
country that started off (at independence) with better natural, capital, and human 
resources. Table 4.2 gives the raw data (2004 estimates) on some development indicators 
of Ghana, Mauritius, and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Whereas Mauritius is far ahead 
of sub-Saharan Africa on all human development indicators, Ghana is either below or 
barely above the averages posted by other countries in the continent. This becomes more 
significant in light of the fact that the averages posted by sub-Saharan African countries 
are the worse when compared to other regions around the world.369
In the Human Development Report (2006), Mauritius has better scores than 
Ghana and ranks ahead of all sub-Saharan Africa. On the Human Development Index, 
Mauritius ranks 63 (close to Bosnia and Herzegovina at 62 and Libya at 64), while Ghana 
ranks 136 (close to Bhutan at 135 and Bangladesh at 137) of the 177 countries for which 
the data was collected in 2006. The situation is the same for the Life Expectancy Index 
(Ghana – 0.53 years; Mauritius – 0.79 years), the Education Index (Ghana – 0.54; 
Mauritius – 0.81), and on the Human Poverty Index Mauritius ranks 24 (close to 
                                                 
368 World Factbook (2007); U.S. Department of State (2006); Earth Trends (2006) 
369 UNDP (Regional Statistics, 2007) 
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Suriname at 23 and Peru at 25) and Ghana ranks 58 (close to Namibia at 57 and Morocco 
at 59).370
 
Table 4.2: Development Indicators for Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana and Mauritius 
 Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Ghana Mauritius 
Adult Literacy rate (% 
ages 15 and older 
65 57.9 84.4 
Life Expectancy (years) 50 56.7 72.4 
Infant Mortality rate (per 
1,000 live births) 
103 68 14 
Access to improved 
sanitation (%) 
36 18 94 
Access to improved water 
source (%) 
58 75 100 
   Source: World Development Report (2006); WDI (2006); Heritage Foundation (2004) 
 
The above data further illustrates the misplaced perception that improvements in 
macroeconomic indices should precede development of a country’s socioeconomic 
infrastructures for sustained economic growth and development. The UNDP’s Human 
Development Reports place emphasis on the measures of three main dimensions of 
human development: life expectancy, literacy rates, and human poverty. A country’s 
performance in guaranteeing its citizens a long and healthy life, improving on their 
knowledge, and providing them decent standards of living tells how much choices 
citizens have in participating in the life of their communities and in leading lives that they 
value.371
This also underscores the critical role that human development plays in the 
promotion of economic and political development. As demonstrated in this case study, 
                                                 
370 UNDP (2007) 
371 UNDP (2007) 
135 
  
even though Ghana posted better average GDP growth rates than Mauritius from 1980-
2000, Mauritius which did better in terms of improvements on the three main dimensions 
of human development, has sustained a relatively stable and strong socioeconomic and 
political environment. Also, due to strong human resources Mauritius was able to meet 
the challenges of integrating a low-income monocrop economy into a dynamic, 
productive, and highly competitive global economy; a challenge that Ghana is still 
struggling with. Not surprising, according to UNDP (2007), Mauritius is one of the few 
sub-Saharan African countries that is meeting the targets of the millennium development 
goals (MDGs) in achieving universal primary education, empowering women, and 
reducing child mortality, while Ghana is lagging behind in the same areas. 
Both domestic and international factors helped Mauritius promote human 
resource development over the years: the commitment shown by the different 
governments to improving the lives of the citizens, support from developed countries 
through direct investment and favorable trading agreements, and the bargaining power it 
had in negotiating the terms of the SAP with the IMF and World Bank. Domestically, 
much to the credit of Mauritian leaders, even during the SAP, subsidies and revenues 
were allocated for the country’s education, healthcare, and social welfare programs. 
Internationally, Mauritius’ goods reached advanced international markets at favorable 
prices and diversification of the economic sector during adjustment was beneficial to the 
country’s economy. A combination of the above factors transformed the country from a 
low-income monocrop economy into a middle-income diversified economy. 
Ghana, on the other hand, showed less commitment to human resource 
development and above all, did not have much leverage in negotiating its adjustment 
policies with the IMF and World Bank. Instead, it was forced to accept conditions that 
took resources away from socioeconomic infrastructural development; the impact of 
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those decisions is reflected in the current state of the country’s level of education, 
healthcare, and general welfare which are lower than or about the same as African 
averages. Also, massive retrenchments in the public sector in the 1980s impoverished the 
majority of Ghanaians who heavily relied on public enterprises for employment and 
income. As a result, the country remains a highly indebted poor country that still heavily 
relies on foreign aid to keep its economy afloat and the prospect of reversing that trend is 
bleak.372
Growths in macroeconomic indices are good for every economy, but 
improvements in socioeconomic infrastructures are paramount to sustained growth and 
development. In fact, with the current trends in globalization that exposes small 
economies to stiff competitions from developed economies and other multinational 
corporations, developing countries need to develop strong domestic institutions to meet 
the challenges of integration into the world economy. This is evidenced in the case of 
Mauritius, whose relatively strong socioeconomic infrastructures prior to the 
implementation of the neoliberal policies advocated by the IMF and World Bank under 
its SAP, provided a strong foundation for its success at adjustment. Whereas Ghana, 
which did not possess similar infrastructures before it started its ERPs, had to opt out of 
adjustment after nineteen years of consistently implementing the IMF and World Bank 
policies. Approving Ghana for multilateral debt relief of $4.2 billion at the G8 summit in 
Gleneagles (2006) – a bulk of the country’s $6 billion debt – over a forty-year period 
buys the government some space to address the needs of the majority of Ghanaians who 
have limited opportunities and employment prospects.373 But Ghana can not rely on aid 
forever. As such, more than aid, Ghanaians should be interested in human resource 
                                                 
372 Ryan (2006) 
373 Ryan (2006) 
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development, be given the opportunity to negotiate better terms of trade, encourage more 
FDI, and ensure accountability in all sectors of society. Efficiently addressing these 
issues will be important to sustaining the progress it has made in improving growth rates. 
  
4.1.2. Democratization 
As argued in previous chapters, a consolidated democracy is found in a country 
that has moved the democratic process past simply electing governments to an 
institutionalized system of choosing leaders, policies, and guaranteeing civil and political 
liberties. Also, consolidated democracies are found in societies that have developed better 
infrastructures that sustain growth, thereby leading to political and economic 
development. It is a system that upholds the rule of law, with a government that is 
accountable to the people.374 It has been the contention of this study that in consolidated 
democracies, the level of education, income distribution, healthcare, and sanitation are 
important variables that produce, sustain, and determine the strength of democracy.375 
Freedom House (2006) rates both Ghana and Mauritius as free countries where political 
rights and civil liberties are guaranteed. But have democratic ideals and processes been 
institutionalized in Ghana and Mauritius? 
A critical aspect of democratic consolidation is an institutionalized channel for 
“voice” by citizens in policy development and implementation and as a check on 
government’s powers. Civil society, which serves as the voice of citizens in the 
democratic process in developed countries, was weak in Ghana’s growth and 
development, but strong in the case of Mauritius. Mauritius’ myriad ethnic groups and 
their diverse communal interests made consensus building an important feature of the 
                                                 
374 See Sen (1999); O’Donnell (1992); Dahl (1971) 
375 See Chapter 1. 
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country’s growth and development. The need by the different communities to have their 
interests met and the fact that Mauritian leaders could not control power without building 
alliances among the different cleavages in society resulted in the development of a very 
strong and vibrant civil society that represents the interests of workers, is involved in 
policy formulation and implementation, and serves as a resource for the provision of 
social services for the diverse communities. The broad civil society in Mauritius has 
helped in building the legitimacy and the policy capacity of the various governments. 
This opportunity was lost in Ghana where, soon after independence, the country 
witnessed series of cycles of dictatorial rule and the erosion of citizens’ input in policy 
formulation or implementation. After the 1960s, the various military regimes successfully 
weakened political participation by citizens and civil society was either non-existent or 
terribly weak. The absence of active citizens’ voice during the different stages of Ghana’s 
political development weakened government legitimacy and caused an exodus of 
professionals whose services are vital to the growth, development and sustenance of the 
country’s socioeconomic and political institutions. 
 The level of citizens’ involvement in the decision making process in Ghana and 
Mauritius is correlated to the different ways in which Ghanaian and Mauritian leaders 
have respectively adhered to the political process. In other words, because of the different 
degrees of priority that Mauritius and Ghana placed on citizen participation, adherence to 
the electoral process – as stipulated by their respective constitutions – is correlated with 
the strength of democracy in each country. Mauritius gained independence a decade after 
Ghana but has had more election cycles and democratic alternation in power than Ghana. 
From 1968 to 2000 eight general elections have been held in Mauritius, resulting in four 
139 
  
transfers of power from the incumbent government to the opposition.376 In Ghana, from 
1957 to 2000 twelve governments have ruled the country: six military regimes, two under 
a military leader turned civilian president, and four democratically elected governments 
and power has only been democratically transferred once from an incumbent leader to the 
opposition.377
It could be argued that in Ghana, the institutionalization of an acceptable electoral 
process and the attending legitimacy it accords to government is at its infancy even 
though the country attained independence before the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. In 
Mauritius, the leaders have successfully crafted a political culture that adheres to the 
electoral process and election results are generally accepted by winners and losers alike. 
Citizen participation and adherence to the electoral process have been positively or 
negatively correlated to democratization in Ghana and Mauritius because both countries 
gave different levels of importance to improvements of their socioeconomic 
infrastructures. 
Studies conducted by Przeworski et al. (2005), Asare and Wong (2004), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), and Lipset (1981) determined that there is a correlation 
between education, health, income disparity, and economic development in creating 
transitions to democracy or in consolidating a country’s democracy. These infrastructures 
are very critical to the development of a strong and vibrant civil society, which in turn is 
very important to democratic consolidation. This thesis stresses that socioeconomic 
development (not only economic growth) is a necessary prerequisite for democratic 
consolidation. As the above scholars determined, socioeconomic development produces: 
an educated society that tolerates diverse views and adheres to the rule of law, promotes 
                                                 
376 This exceeds Huntington’s (1991) prerequisite for a consolidated democracy. 
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an equitable distribution of wealth, and a healthy workforce is highly productive and is 
capable of sustaining growth and development. This accounts for the difference in 
democratization in Ghana and Mauritius. 
Ghana scores poorly on the HDI which measures improvements in the above 
variables. Ghana’s socioeconomic infrastructures received little or no attention during the 
different phases of the ERPs. As a result, Ghana’s literacy rate is below the average in 
Africa, there are inadequate healthcare facilities, programs, and personnel, and the 
majority of Ghanaians live below the poverty line. Ghana has not been able to develop a 
strong middle class that could promote democratic institutions; the new class of elites 
represses the masses and the mounting social discontent among the majority of 
Ghanaians could explode and threaten the political stability that now exists in the 
country.  
Mauritius successfully developed its physical and socioeconomic infrastructures; 
the country ranks better than all African countries on the HDI and is one of the few 
middle-income countries in the continent. Mauritius has developed a broad and strong 
middle class that has a stake in the continuation of the same patterns of the country’s 
growth and development. As such, they keep government in check through the activities 
of the civil society and during elections. The various alliances that have been formed 
throughout Mauritius’ political development have been forced to take the interests of the 
majority into consideration when policies are formulated. This has improved on the 
standards of education, healthcare and sanitation, and social services. However, one area 
that needs to be addressed is the extreme level of social and economic disparity between 
the 2% Franco-Mauritian upper class and the 10% of the population that are still below 
                                                                                                                                                 
377 The transfer of power from Rawlings to Kufuor in 2000 is the only occasion in Ghana’s political history 
when a party in power has lost elections. All other Ghanaian leaders (military or civilian) were removed 
from office by the military. 
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the poverty line. Conflicts between these groups could threaten the social stability the 
country has enjoyed over the years. 
Finally, a strong democratic government is expected to formulate and implement 
policies that are independent of the dictates of external donor governments. This is a 
challenge to Ghana, Mauritius, and all developing countries. The formulation and 
implementation of policies in Ghana has – since the 1980s – been at the utter mercy of 
international financiers. Ghana’s heavy dependence on external aid has not only 
increased its debt burden, but prevents the government from pursuing policies that are not 
approved by donor countries. In like manner, Mauritius’ reliance on favorable 
international conditions for the sustained growth of its export industries limits the ability 
of the country to develop policies outside the interests of its trading partners. With the 
growing important role that globalization plays in directing domestic economic and 
political policies, creating a balance between what is acceptable at home and abroad is a 
challenge to the independence of all countries especially developing countries. 
 
4.2. Conclusions and Further Research 
The experiences of Ghana and Mauritius offer some interesting insights for 
African countries and some third world countries that are under similar circumstances. 
Although this study does not draw parallels with all third world economies – because of 
potential differences in population size, development strategies, leadership, etc – that 
have adopted SAPs, it nonetheless captures the plight of countries that do not develop the 
sectors of society that sustain growth and development and who, during times of 
economic difficulties, are compelled to give over control of their socioeconomic policies 
to the dictates of the IMF and World Bank. In this study, we see that both Ghana and 
Mauritius went through a period under colonial rule and little or no experience with 
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democracy, have diverse ethnic populations, and had economies that were in debt crises 
in the 1970s and 1980s that forced the implementation of SAPs. By the 1990s, both 
countries were witnessing improved GDP growth rates but the standards of living of their 
citizens and the strength of their democracies were distinctly different; whereas Mauritius 
succeeded in improving economic, social and political conditions, Ghana is still a heavily 
indebted poor country and its democracy remains fragile. The level of development of the 
socioeconomic infrastructures in both countries prior to the implementation of their 
respective SAPs and the amount of support received from developed countries, in the 
form of preferential trading agreements, primarily determined the outcome of adjustment.   
 Also, the impact of adjustment on the socioeconomic variables determined how 
the economies and policies of both countries performed after reforms. The belief that 
macroeconomic growth would trickle down to other sectors of society is illusive. Instead, 
as seen in the case of Ghana, the country continued to witness declining levels of 
employment, education, and health and rising levels of poverty even though it was 
posting impressive GDP growth rates. In addition to poor leadership, fiscal 
mismanagement, and an unstable sociopolitical environment that fended off investment 
capital and international support, SAPs took vital resources away from the sectors that 
would have sustained growth and promoted development in both the economic and 
political spheres of society. In contrast, Mauritius performed better because of the 
positive synergy between domestic and international conditions during its adjustment 
years. Although the Mauritian government, similar to Ghana’s, was equality guilty of 
fiscal mismanagement and corruption that resulted in the implementation of a SAP, the 
Mauritian leaders however, did not only invest in their country’s socioeconomic 
infrastructures but promoted a sociopolitical climate that was attractive to foreign 
investors. 
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Furthermore, the Ghanaian society witnessed a series of despotic regimes that 
successfully eroded its socioeconomic infrastructures, drained the country of its 
professionals, and ran off investors. Consequently, the support that Mauritius received 
from the international community in terms of FDI was above that of Ghana; the aid 
Ghana received did not only have to be repaid, but by the mid-1990s – in order to receive 
further assistance from IFIs – the country had to allocate up to 60% of its export earnings 
for debt repayments as opposed to infrastructures. This is why the onus of political and 
socioeconomic success in the majority of African countries, whose economies are more 
than likely to face crises at some point during the development process, rests on the 
policies that are forced upon them by international financiers vis-à-vis the development 
of their socioeconomic infrastructures. 
As the debate continues on how IFIs could help developing countries meet the 
United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), further research on how aid 
programs can be effective in developing the socioeconomic infrastructures of borrowing 
countries would be useful. This is important in contemporary international relations 
because socioeconomic infrastructural development is the prime targets of the MDGs. 
Also, research on how IFIs could tailor their policy prescription to fit the individual needs 
of borrowing countries is important because the “one size fit all” approach accounts for 
numerous failures of SAPs. Empirical evidence shows that a great proportion of 
programs promoted by the IMF and World Bank in developing countries fail to achieve 
their intended goals because of the adverse effects of austerity measures on the standards 
of living of the citizens. Maybe this is because the IMF and World Bank do not take into 
serious consideration – at the time of negotiating aid packages – the impacts their policy 
prescriptions have on human resource development of the borrowing countries. As 
acknowledged by the World Bank in the 1990s, SAPs should not stifle governments’ 
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involvement in human resource development, improvements in infrastructure, and 
environmental action plans.378
One daunting question this research could not answer, because of restricted access 
to information pertaining to the IFIs’ negotiations with borrowing countries, is the 
respective level of input of Ghana and Mauritius in the Agreements they signed with the 
IMF and World Bank. Why was Mauritius able to refuse certain aspects of the policies 
advocated by the IMF and World Bank and Ghana could not? Does the ability of the 
leaders to negotiate determine what is approved for them or is there lack of consistency 
by IFIs in the criteria they follow in awarding aid packages? Research in these areas 
would shed further light on how IFIs could be of more relevance in the promotion of 
socioeconomic and political development. 
IFIs come to the aid of countries that are in desperate need of financial assistance, 
but reducing and sometimes eliminating subsidies for the sectors of society that will 
sustain growth and development (in order to balance the budgets of ailing economies and 
make timely scheduled debt repayments to international financiers) show less 
commitment on the part of the IFIs in eradicating poverty and fostering stable societies. 
Instead, while the majority of third world countries have plunged further into debt and 
poverty since the implementation of structural adjustment loans, the financial assets of 
the IMF and World Bank have increased. For example, Africa’s debt increased from $11 
billion in 1970 to over $295 billion in 2002 – of which $153 billion is owed to the IMF 
and World Bank. During this same period, third world countries have paid $550 billion in 
both principal and interest payments on $540 billion of loans, and yet there is still a $523 
billion debt burden.379
                                                 
378 Wright (1990) 
379 Shah (2005) 
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Third world countries should not lose sight of the fact that the IMF and World 
Bank are financial institutions that will continue to protect the financial assets of the 
countries that invest in them. However, they should be sensitive to the reality that taking 
resources away from the sectors of society that promote growth and development makes 
repayment of loans (in the long run) difficult and sometimes impossible. Inasmuch as 
making timely scheduled payments to lending countries is important, the welfare of the 
citizens of borrowing countries is equally crucial to stability, growth, and development. 
As demonstrated in the G8 summit at Gleneagles, most developed countries are 
increasingly recognizing this fact and taking steps to reduce the debt burden of the third 
world. On its part, third world countries should exercise fiscal discipline, hold public and 
private enterprises accountable, and invest in the sectors of society that foster growth and 
development. With strong human resource capacity, governments’ legitimacy and policy 
capacity will be advanced through the accepted democratic institutions. 
The IMF and World Bank will continue to perform important roles in the 
economic and political course of third world countries; they will continue to prescribe 
structural adjustment programs for ailing economies. This study shows that strong 
socioeconomic infrastructures prior to the implementation of SAPs are necessary 
prerequisites if the neoliberal policies advocated by IFIs should be correlated with strong 
democracies. At the moment, the IMF and World Bank continue to focus primarily on 
GDP growth rates, free trade, and debt repayment. Until these institutions acknowledge 
that the economies and industries of developing countries are not mature or strong 
enough to compete with those of their developed counterparts, SAPs will only continue to 
foster poverty and reduce the conditions of living of third world countries. The IMF and 
World Bank should allow African governments the latitude to seriously invest in the 
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socioeconomic sectors or the political and socioeconomic decline of the majority of 
Africa will remain on its present course. 
The economies of third world countries have to open up to outside competition 
and trade, but this should be at a pace that is realistic to the level of the individual 
country’s human, natural, and capital resources. This thesis does not argue against the 
adoption of neo-liberal policies by third world economies, rather, such policies must be 
part of an integrated strategy for encouraging socioeconomic development. SAPs must be 
tailored to each country’s particular situation and must allow borrowing countries the 
leverage to promote human resource development; which is very fundamental to 
sustained growth and development. Also, if third world countries should reduce their over 
dependence on foreign aid, the individual countries must demonstrate the willingness to 
promote civic participation in the economic and political process, observe the rule of law, 
with zero tolerance of corruption. Until these dynamics are taken into serious 
consideration when the conditionalities of structural adjustment loans are agreed upon, by 
the borrowing countries and lending institutions, the unspoken but generally perceived 
hope that foreign aid from IFIs would promote stable democracies in third world 
countries will continue to be false. 
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